#2fa
These are public posts tagged with #2fa. You can interact with them if you have an account anywhere in the fediverse.
There are different articles floating on the internet of people who've experienced the same as I have. For no reason, without any warning, you cannot uninstall authy anymore on your device.
If you do a few things will happen; one of them is that after installation it will not allow you to get an SMS from your mobile phone, or it will allow that, but you will not be able to add any new accounts.
In either case the program has become worthless and you will get no warning 
Have you started migrating your authy MFA 2FA accounts to open source MFA clients?
¡¿No?!
Please start asap. The company has quietly been changing things with this important program and since they do not allow you to export your accounts easily, you will be in a situation where you have to systematically migrate the most important account you have to open source clients
At a certain point authy will stop working even on your new Androids without explanation no **fucks given**
blog! “That's Not How A SIM Swap Attack Works”
There's a disturbing article in The Guardian about a person who was on the receiving end of a successful cybersecurity attack.
EE texted to say they had processed my sim activation request, and the new sim would be active in 24 hours. I was told to contact them if I hadn’t requested this. I hadn’t, so I did …
Read more: https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/04/thats-not-how-a-sim-swap-attack-works/
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#2fa #CyberSecurity #MFA #security #sim
There's a disturbing article in The Guardian about…
Terence Eden’s BlogThat's Not How A SIM Swap Attack Works
https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/04/thats-not-how-a-sim-swap-attack-works/
There's a disturbing article in The Guardian about a person who was on the receiving end of a successful cybersecurity attack.
EE texted to say they had processed my sim activation request, and the new sim would be active in 24 hours. I was told to contact them if I hadn’t requested this. I hadn’t, so I did so immediately. Twenty-four hours later, my mobile stopped working and money was withdrawn from my bank account.
With their alien sim, the fraudster infiltrated my handset and stole details for every account I had. Passwords and logins had been changed for my finance, retail and some social media accounts.
(Emphasis added.)
I realise it is in the consumer rights section of the newspaper, not the technology section, and I dare-say some editorialising has gone on, but that's nonsense.
Here's how a SIM swap works.
Attacker convinces your phone company to reassign your telephone number to a new SIM.
Attacker goes to a website where you have an account, and initiates a password reset.
Website sends a verification code to your phone number, which is now in the hands of the attacker.
Attacker supplies verification code and gets into your account.
Do you notice the missing step there?
At no point does the attacker "infiltrate" your handset. Your handset is still in your possession. The SIM is dead, but that doesn't give the attacker access to the phone itself. There is simply no way for someone to put a new SIM into their phone and automatically get access to your device.
Try it now. Take your SIM out of your phone and put it into a new one. Do all of your apps suddenly appear? Are your usernames and passwords visible to you? No.
There are ways to transfer your data from an iPhone or Android - but they require a lot more work than swapping a SIM.
So how did the attacker know which websites to target and what username to use?
What (Probably) Happened
Let's assume the person in the article didn't have malware on their device and hadn't handed over all their details to a cold caller.
The most obvious answer is that the attacker already knew the victim's email address. Maybe the victim gave out their phone number and email to some dodgy site, or they're listed on their contact page, or something like that.
The attacker now has two routes.
First is "hit and hope". They try the email address on hundreds of popular sites' password reset page until they get a match. That's time-consuming given the vast volume of websites.
Second is targetting your email. If the attacker can get into your email, they can see which sites you use, who your bank is, and where you shop. They can target those specific sites, perform a password reset, and get your details.
I strongly suspect it is the latter which has happened. The swapped SIM was used to reset the victim's email password. Once in the email, all the accounts were easily found. At no point was the handset broken into.
What can I do to protect myself?
It is important to realise that there's nothing you can do to prevent a SIM-swap attack! Your phone company is probably incompetent and their staff can easily be bribed. You do not control your phone number. If you get hit by a SIM swap, it almost certainly isn't your fault.
So here are some practical steps anyone can take to reduce the likelihood and effectiveness of this class of attack:
Remember that it's OK to lie to WiFi providers and other people who ask for your details. You don't need to give someone your email for a receipt. You don't need to hand over your real phone number on a survey. This is the most important thing you can do.
Try to hack yourself. How easy would it be for an attacker who had stolen your phone number to also steal your email address? Open up a private browser window and try to reset your email password. What do you notice? How could you secure yourself better?
Don't use SMS for two-factor authentication. If you are given a choice of 2FA methods, use a dedicated app. If the only option you're given is SMS - contact the company to complain, or leave for a different provider.
Don't rely on a setting a PIN for your SIM. The PIN only protects the physical SIM from being moved to a new device; it does nothing to stop your number being ported to a new SIM.
Finally, realise that professional criminals only need to be lucky once but you need to be lucky all the time.
Stay safe out there.
There's a disturbing article in The Guardian about…
Terence Eden’s BlogNew Gmail And Microsoft #2FA Security Warning
https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2025/04/15/as-gmail-and-microsoft-2fa-security-bypassed---do-this-one-thing-now/
2FA bypass attacks have evolved, and that’s bad news…
Forbes
@cybersmog@phpc.social@LimeSurvey The new #2FA with #YubiKey doesn't work well in combination with @1password and the auto submit feature. Why didn't you implement #WebAuthn?
OpenVPN (pfSense) + SSL/TLS + 2FA telegram (freeradius + postgres + telegram bot)
В данной статье будет показан процесс настройки OpenVPN сервера на базе pfSense (но подойдет и любой другой) с подключением пользователей с аутентификацией с использованием SSL/TLS и Telegram в качестве 2FA.
https://habr.com/ru/articles/900304/
#vpn #openvpn #pfsense #2fa #telegrambot #freeradius #telegram
В данной статье будет показан процесс настройки OpenVPN…
ХабрHey @Bugcrowd how come one had to reset password to add 2FA? "You must reset your password" emails usually imply a breach, but your support folks say it's just because you decided everyone needed to add #2FA. Which, I can respect, but why would that require a password reset?
800-53 suggests against password resets unless there is evidence of a breach.
On the topic of 2FA (2nd factor authentication), I really do need to find an alternative that:
1) Is cloud based sync service, but can also run locally
2) Does not require you to set up on your own server
3) Can be used on multiple devices
4) Is not limited to specific hardware.
5) Can export and import if needed.
6) Outside Us Jurisdiction
If I seem to be repeating my requirements, it is because there are so many unhelpful people, who believe they are being helpful, by ignoring all those requirements. - I said, what I said.
#2FA #2ndFactorAuthentication #Security #InfoSec #InformationSecurity
blog! “FobCam '25 - All my MFA tokens on one page”
Some ideas are timeless. Back in 2004, an anonymous genius set up "FobCam". Tired of having to carry around an RSA SecurID token everywhere, our hero simply left the fob at home with an early webcam pointing at it. And then left the page open for all to see.
Security expert Bruce…
Read more: https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/04/fobcam-25-all-my-mfa-tokens-on-one-page/
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#2fa #CyberSecurity #MFA #Satire(Probably) #security
Some ideas are timeless. Back in 2004, an anonymous…
Terence Eden’s BlogFobCam '25 - All my MFA tokens on one page
https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/04/fobcam-25-all-my-mfa-tokens-on-one-page/
Some ideas are timeless. Back in 2004, an anonymous genius set up "FobCam". Tired of having to carry around an RSA SecurID token everywhere, our hero simply left the fob at home with an early webcam pointing at it. And then left the page open for all to see.
Security expert Bruce Schneier approved0 of this trade-off between security and usability - saying what we're all thinking:
Here’s a guy who has a webcam pointing at his SecurID token, so he doesn’t have to remember to carry it around. Here’s the strange thing: unless you know who the webpage belongs to, it’s still good security. Crypto-Gram - August 15, 2004
Nowadays, we have to carry dozens of these tokens with us. Although, unlike the poor schmucks of 2004, we have an app for that. But I don't always have access to my phone. Sometimes I'm in a secure location where I can't access my electronics. Sometimes my phone gets stolen, and I need to log into Facebook to whinge about it. Sometimes I just can't be bothered to remember which fingerprint unlocks my phone1.
Using the Web Crypto API, it is easy to Generate TOTP Codes in JavaScript directly in the browser. So here are all my important MFA tokens. If I ever need to log in somewhere, I can just visit this page and grab the code I need2.
All My Important Codes
What The Actual Fuck?
A 2007 paper called Lessons learned from the deployment of a smartphone-based access-control system looked at whether fobs met the needs of their users:
However, we observed that end users tend to be most concerned about how convenient [fobs] are to use. There are many examples of end users of widely used access-control technologies readily sacrificing security for convenience. For example, it is well known that users often write their passwords on post-it notes and stick them to their computer monitors. Other users are more inventive: a good example is the user who pointed a webcam at his fob and published the image online so he would not have to carry the fob around.
As for Schneier's suggestion that anonymity added protection, a contemporary report noted that the owner of the FobCam site was trivial to identify3.
Every security system involves trade-offs. I have a password manager, but with over a thousand passwords in it, the process of navigating and maintaining becomes a burden. The number of 2FA tokens I have is also rising. All of these security factors need backing up. Those back-ups need testing4. It is an endless cycle of drudgery.
What's a rational user supposed to do5? I suppose I could buy a couple of hardware keys, keep one in an off-site location, but somehow keep both in sync, and hope that a firmware-update doesn't brick them.
Should I just upload all of my passwords, tokens, secrets, recovery codes, passkeys, and biometrics6 into the cloud?
The cloud is just someone else's computer. This website is my computer. So I'm going to upload all my factors here. What's the worst that could happen7.
🫠 
The neologism "doxing" hadn't yet been invented.
As was written by the prophets: "Only wimps use tape backup: real men just upload their important stuff on ftp, and let the rest of the world mirror it"
I in no way imply that I am rational.
Just one more factor, that'll fix security, just gotta add one more factor bro.
This is left as an exercise for the reader.
Some ideas are timeless. Back in 2004, an anonymous…
Terence Eden’s Blog
Beyond the Hook: A Technical Deep Dive into Modern Phishing Methodologies 
https://blog.quarkslab.com/technical-dive-into-modern-phishing.html
A technical exploration of modern phishing tactics, from basic HTML pages to advanced MFA-bypassing techniques, with analysis of infrastructure setup and delivery methods used by phishers in 2025.
#pishing #MFA #2FA #maliciousinfrastructure #maliciousemal #redteam
Is it a good idea to backup your Authenticator app like Microsoft Authenticator? Or is it a security concern?
Context: I need to switch phones and I would like to avoid manually switching my 2FA to the other phone.
(I’m not looking for advise on the best 2FA physical token or app, I’m only looking for advise on if backing up for subsequently restoring the Authenticator app has any security concerns while switching phones)
Thank you.
Dein Facebook- oder Insta-Konto ist nicht so sicher, wie Du denkst? In meinem neuen Blogbeitrag zeige ich Dir, wie Du Dich effektiv vor Kontodiebstahl schützt! 
#sicherheit #facebook #instagram #phishing #2FA #meta #onlinesicherheit #kontoschutz #offengesprochen #blog 
Kontodiebstahl auf Facebook und Instagram ist keine…
Offen Gesprochen
@martinsteiger@chaos.socialDatenpanne bei #Brack?
https://www.inside-it.ch/brackch-untersucht-moeglichen-daten-breach-20250407
Empfehlung von Brack gemäss @inside_It:
«Ihr Passwort bei uns und allen anderen Online-Plattformen prophylaktisch zu erneuern.»
Wieso bei «allen anderen Online-Plattformen»? 
Beim Login werde ich übrigens nicht aufgefordert, das Passwort zu ändern.
Wenn man das #Passwort ändert, sollte man auch die #2FA neu aufsetzen.
Разрабы #gotosocial закрыли наконец-то ишшуйку с фичреквестом на #totp #2fa. PR тут.
В общем УРА УРА!!!
currently, authentication is entirely password based.…
GitHub