@malin
Yeah, here's the handout:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CGHM-bpYBpfz730z7JeZtMdHa6YwTNuE6q1OS9w4kZ8/edit?usp=sharing

I've also got a new voting system idea, which I'm calling Burn From Both Ends. The idea is to combine STV and VTS by taking the percentage of people who put a candidate as their first choice, then subtracting the percentage who place them last to give them a total score. The candidate with the lowest score is then removed and the scores are recalculated and this is repeated until only one candidate remains.

So far it's returned the Condorcet winner for the two tests I used to break STV and VTS, and it's also shown a noticeable difference in that a polarising candidate (one who is always at the extreme end of each voters preference ranking) doesn't always come first or last. It seems part of Arrow's theorem is that this always follows from unanimity and independence of irrelevant alternatives, and leads to dictatorship. I'm pretty sure BFBE doesn't violate unanimity, so I guess it must violate independence of irrelevant alternatives, which is probably the condition I'm most prepared to sacrifice anyway.

@anguslm show me the tests sometime if you have time. I took a game theory course on it, but I failed. I think I lacked stone if the basic Maths I needed.