Points of no return
One of Putin's achievements is claiming a massive return to the international stage as a global actor, intending to catch up with, and perhaps even outrun, the USSR in dominance in various parts of the world. This implies the post-Soviet space, as well as the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. In all these regions, Russia would initially pompously enter with a set of default template offers: security guarantees in exchange for resources or political loyalty. The scheme used to work for as long as Moscow had some savings from the fat rich 2000s, but the war on Ukraine ultimately shrank the Kremlin's coffers. Financial reserves, weapons arsenals, or mercenary gangs of mercenaries don’t just come out of a bottomless jar. As they are being exhausted, Russian influence keeps evaporating.
As a result of Moscow’s own weakening, the network of pro-Russian regimes is also gradually crumbling, while cases where someone snubs Russia’s patronage offers increase. If we talk about the latter, it’s worth mentioning the actual withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO. Prime Minister Pashinyan said his country essentially sees itself outside the military bloc, since relations with Russia have passed the point of no return. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov referred to this act as a sovereign decision, emphasizing that the doors to the CSTO remain open for Armenians. In this organization, Armenia has turned intoSchrödinger's cat. A dangerous precedent has emerged, where “Dead Souls” have emerged in the CSTO (if you get the Gogol reference…) Now Moscow’s other alleged allies, like Kazakhstan, which is shifting toward China and Türkiye, may follow Armenia’s suit.
Meanwhile, some dramatic processes for Putin are unfolding in Georgia. After pro-Russian loyalists with the ruling Georgian Dream party made a U-turn on the country’s European integration path, nationwide protests have broken out. Public demands that the results of the October parliamentary elections be cancelled due to violations and vote-rigging that distorted the outcome. The Georgians are taking to streets without a clearly shaped core of leaders, so at the moment this remains an unstructured movement for freedom and the rejection of Russian dictate as such. The Kremlin is extremely wary of the victory of a leaderless revolutionin Georgia as it would be capable of inspiring a similar uprising inRussia. It is likely precisely due to this that certain pro-Kremlin political strategists are now taking steps aimed at launching snapelections to the State Duma in 2025.
Besides Armenia and Georgia, which are falling out of the Russian orbit of influence, developments in Syria seem to be even more disastrous for Russia. Under pressure from rebel forces, Assad's army first fled Aleppo, and on December 5, they pulledfrom Hama. The pace at which the Syrian dictator is losing control of the situation is so intense that neither the Russian aerospace forces nor Iranian reinforcements can guarantee that Assad will this time retain power. After Hama, the spearhead of the offensiveby anti-government forces is targeting Homs. If it falls, Damascus will be cut off from Latakia, home to Russian military bases.
The fate of these bases will be jeopardized and, accordingly, all Russian influence in the Middle East will collapse as quickly as in the South Caucasus. Next will come the turn of African nations as Russian supply routes lie precisely through Syria.
In order to preserve its modern quasi-empire, the Kremlin urgently needs to deploy mercenaries to Syria, but Russian generals have no idea how to transfer any manpower without it leading to the collapse of their front in Ukraine. It seems that the entire era of Russian hegemony is drawing to a close. Many key gears inPutin's machine of aggressive geopolitics have broken and it isnow plunging towards the point of no return.
