IETF list is seeing some action.

Daniel J. Bernstein (of curve25519 fame) has lodged a complaint about the transparency of their process:

https://cr.yp.to/2025/20251006-transparency.pdf

Following an earlier complaint which he filed about their rejection of so-called "hybrid encryption" (combining post-quantum encryption with classical encryption so that it is conjectured to be safe against quantum computers, but also it uses classical encryption so it is clearly no less safe than plain classical algorithms. It is implied that the NSA could have a hand in resisting hybrid encryption because it would (self-evidently) be quite a bit more secure than an unproven "post-quantum" algo.

https://cr.yp.to/2025/20250812-non-hybrid.pdf

A funny thing about encryption is that there isn't really a way to *prove* it's secure, you believe it's secure when after 10 or 20 years, no mathematicians have found any tricks to break it...

So I think Bernstein's position, at least in favor of hybrid encryption, is a fair one. I would upgrade SSL to use some fancy schmancy quantum computer resistant encryption algorithm IF it was also going to encrypt with regular old encryption at the same time.

Regarding the complaint about the complaint, no idea who is in the wrong here, but I can easily imagine the IETF acting like a cabal ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
Follow

@cjd My understanding was the good old RSA was secure against quantum with sufficient key size. I.e. a 4096 bit key requires a 4096 qbit quantum computer to solve. 4095 qbits does not "mostly" solve it.

Big keys are helpful, but there are also algorithms which are conjectured to be entirely safe against quantum computers. But it'll take a few decades before we find out if they're safe at all...
There are some "quantum gadgets" like that factor the number 15, but we don't know if it's possible at a meaningful scale.

That's why bolting on an additional algo to your existing one makes sense, it's a little extra computation for future proofing...

But switching to a potentially insecure algo makes no sense at all...
I think the IETF's real risk here is that they ignore DJB, which they can, and THEN the post-quantum algo they select has a "heartbleed moment", because people are going to be looking for a witch to burn, and the IETF has made a very nice paper trail leading back to their house...

@cjd
I'll believe it when someone actually uses a quantum computer to do something. So far I've seen nothing.
@dcc @customdesigned

@ned @cjd @dcc Why would this hypothetical user of crypto breaking quantum computing let anyone know of their success? This is a case where "seeing is believing" is bad policy.

This is not an unreasonable perspective, but it opens a can of worms with no bottom. How can we know that they don't have ... anything?

How can we know they don't read your mind, or have microphones in your walls, etc...

But we might as well take this the opposite direction... Why would the NSA publicly admit that quantum computers are even theoretically possible? Why not keep the entire field of research classified?

So while seeing-is-believing might be a "bad policy", the only other option is to believe in things you can't see - which is a worse policy.

@cjd @dcc @ned Who needs microphones in the walls when they have microphones in your pockets and purses.

@cjd @dcc @ned In an ideal world, the goal of the NSA is to prevent foreign adversaries from spying on US businesses (and individuals, but you know they only care about Big Business).

In the 80s, crypto was classified as a munition and export controlled. On the bright side, this meant US citizens had a 2nd amendment right to it. When PGP came out, there was a kerfluffle over export controls and open source. So the source code was published in a book, and the NSA gave up on that battle.

So now it is an arms race, and it is in the interest of even a corrupt NSA to foresee and warn US interests of potential external advances.

@cjd @dcc I saw article on a working 128 qbit gadget. I figure govts are probably secretly up to 256 or 1024. The difficulty of getting a bunch of qbits together increases exponentially with number.

Per my memory, breaking 128 bit ECC requires somewhere around 4000 qubits, so no mainstream encryption is considered to be endangered as of today...

@cjd @dcc So barring some mathematical discovery, 256bit ECC is on par with 4096 or 8192 RSA?

Sign in to participate in the conversation
Qoto Mastodon

QOTO: Question Others to Teach Ourselves
An inclusive, Academic Freedom, instance
All cultures welcome.
Hate speech and harassment strictly forbidden.