"中國在東南亞的長期目標，就是要成為最具主導性的強權（the dominant power），並使所有東南亞國家成為事實上的附庸。這會是一種具有中國特色的「芬蘭化」（Finlandization with Chinese characteristics）。要讓東南亞「芬蘭化」，必得中立化（neutralizing）、先發制人（preempting）、威懾（deterring）和抵制（resisting）該區域對中國的任何批評，並且默許中國對南海主權的主張。"
美國要扭轉這種芬蘭化中國影響力的吃力點在於東南亞政治體質本就介於民主與獨裁之間搖擺動盪:
"At a deeper level, Southeast Asian and American perceptions diverge to varying degrees on the question of exactly what threat China poses. While it fears a future of Chinese hegemony, the region has little appetite for the predominant U.S. view of its competition with China, as part of a global battle between democracy and authoritarianism, a framing that was echoed in the AUKUS announcement."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/what-does-the-new-aukus-alliance-mean-for-southeast-asia/
這篇則點出東南亞國家暗地支持AUKUS但同時不表態以免變成夾心餅乾:
"most Southeast Asian governments would learn to live with the agreement – even if not, like the Philippines, actively embracing it – and turn it to their advantage. (For instance, some Malaysian experts have suggested that the defense establishment is quietly supportive of the AUKUS pact.) At the same time, those nations that are most delicately poised between China and the U.S. can’t be seen to support it publicly."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/malaysia-to-seek-chinese-views-on-new-aukus-security-pact/
美軍時間不夠, 盟邦聯防來湊:
"Better yet, leveraging the rising enthusiasm about the potential for Quad-based cooperation, Japan can propose to work closely with the U.S. and Australia to look for ways to create a similar security cooperation framework among the Quad partners."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/aukus-lessons-for-japans-defense-industry/
"The Western democracies and many of China’s neighbors do want to contain China as it exists today, although few will say it. Specifically, they want to contain the Chinese Communist Party. Much of the world is aghast at China’s treatment of minorities such as Uyghurs and Tibetans, credible evidence of forced organ harvesting, technology and IP theft, and the CCP’s increasing obsession with state control over the daily lives of individuals.
Most topically, China’s refusal to cooperate openly and professionally with a scientific investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic will remain an open sore for decades to come in the minds and hearts of many around the world, particularly among those who have lost loved ones to the disease."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/chinas-aukus-response-highlights-beijings-bunker-mentality/
賴怡忠這篇點出了美國將遠交軍事同盟與在地經濟同盟的雙分印太策略:
"美英澳同盟的出場，最直接的受益者就是既有的「四方安全對話」（QUAD）。這是因為QUAD與AUKUS存在互補關係。當軍事色彩極強的AUKUS出場後，馬上使得QUAD自此無須再肩負軍事合作主要推動者的功能，也更確認了QUAD之後不會演變為亞洲北約。這個走向應該能讓外界加入QUAD，或是參與QUAD+的活動後，在面對中國的指控時，就會有十足的的正當性。
必須要注意的，是當QUAD的身分會更趨向於在科技、經貿、供應鏈、衛生醫療等領域發展廣義的安全合作時，馬拉巴軍演（Malabar Exercise）還是會持續，但這就已經不會是在印太區域的唯一民主國家聯合軍事演練，而會是眾多印太民主國家的操演重點之一。
QUAD成立時被東協等國攻擊為過度軍事化，以及會傷及東協中心性。但前者的指控，在這幾年QUAD刻意發展其他非軍事領域的議題合作後，其效度已經失去不少。後者則顯得像是東協對自己的能力與存在感缺乏信心，才會一直要其他強權尊重「東協中心性」。但隨著QUAD的軍事色彩因「美英澳同盟」的出現而大幅下降後，東協國家對於QUAD的排斥態度也會下降不少。"
這篇點出東協想在美中競合賽局裡分一杯羹, 但在印太軍備競賽升溫的前提下, 不站隊者其實要承擔的是池魚風險:
"ASEAN can help to distribute public goods in a more effective manner through close consultation and coordination, either bilaterally, multilaterally with ASEAN as a whole, or minilaterally with ASEAN member states. In this way, ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific as a whole can proactively retain their voice in great power competition, playing a role in facilitating cooperation and mitigating conflicts for the interests of everyone involved."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/the-shift-in-china-us-competition/
不是這篇回顧還真不知道越戰前有這麼個組織存在過:
"There once was an Asian security body with a NATO-like name. The U.S.-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO, was formed in the 1950s to promote defense cooperation. It began crumbling during U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and was disbanded in 1977.
Today, the only formal security treaties for the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific are two-way pacts with individual allies. It has five—with Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea and Australia. "
蝦兵蟹將們的混水摸魚盤算:
"在這場競賽中，美中雙方都有隱憂。對美國來說，要團結盟邦以對抗中國，有其難度，畢竟中國龐大的市場，對許多國家來說，是難以割捨的經濟利益。特別是距離中國越遠，越沒有地緣利害關係的國家，就越不支持美國與中國的全面競爭。這最好的例子就是德國。
雖然德國因為俄烏戰爭，也開始檢討過去太依賴中、俄兩國的問題，但總理蕭茲（Olaf Scholz，港譯朔爾茨），在二十大以後立刻啟程訪問中國，並帶領大批德國企業家隨行，就可以知道德國仍然十分重視中國市場，不願意見到美中兩國的對抗傷害其商業利益。德國在歐盟處於主導地位，歐盟與北約的成員國高度重疊，也讓美國在中國事務上，難以獲得北約的全面支持。2023年中國一定會嘗試與歐盟修復關係，值得觀察這些歐洲國家的反應與態度。
同樣的情況也出現在與中國經貿關係緊密的東南亞國家中，甚至包括美國國內的許多跨國企業，都在中國有大量投資。雖然在前任總統川普執政時，已因美中貿易戰，掀起過一波出走潮，但與多年投資中國的熱潮相比，仍然只是九牛一毛。2023年投資中國的企業會不會因疫情關係與美國的制裁，選擇加速撤出中國，將是美中角力下的關鍵指標。除此之外，美國雖然想要儘快加強台灣的防衛能力，但國會的步調卻不一，100億美元的無償軍援，在撥款法案中並未列入，只剩下每年20億美元的外國軍事融資（FMF）額度，並可撥交10億美元剩餘國防物資給台灣，這無疑拖慢了美國協助台灣的整體計畫。"
https://theinitium.com/article/20230104-opinion-taiwan-strait-what-to-expect-in-2023/invite_token/MVJEYKhgPY/