頗懷疑這時候放出金融穩定法風聲，是為了接下來的違約潮與更嚴苛的資金管制做準備。前者可能是不認帳或轉移損失，後者可能是將各方面資金限制檯面化降低流動。
"中國銀行央行副行長劉桂平也在3月的1篇文章敦促改革，他指出，中國的金融規則過於分散，可以借鑑美國的《多德—弗蘭克法案》及其他主要經濟體的金融改革經驗。劉桂平認為，中國需要一致的金融穩定法。
劉桂平已向全國人大呈交提案，並建議在條件成熟時盡快出台。但北京威諾律師事務所合夥人Yang Zhaoquan指出，完成這項法案可能得花上3到5年的時間，他稱，由於風險事件接連出現，不僅損害市場，還波及金融及社會穩定性，因此迫切需要更多且強大法律工具。
《彭博》指出，像共產黨這樣執著於「掌控」的政府，在監管金融機構的行為似乎不太一致，一方面是疏忽對華融的監管，導致該公司爆發財務危機，一方面卻又警告像螞蟻集團這樣的公司影響力過大。"
中國的私人上市企業國有化早已開始：
“中國《21經濟網》報導，從數據上看，中國國有資本瘋狂掃貨A股上市公司股權，主要是地方國資，控制權易主成國資的統計（已完成過戶），2018年有16家、2019年34家從民企業變國企，而2019年更佔當年民企易手數量的6成，2020年有40家，佔易手民企的51.95%。”
“這些國資在取得控制權後，就會透過協議轉讓及表決權委託的形式，公司控制權轉移到各地政府手上。
這些上市公司控制人易主給國資，幾乎都是大股東「甩賣」資產，而國資「撿漏」成老為老闆，不過，其中的背景之一是，2018年IPO審核從嚴，逼得民企只能四處融資或引進新的資金，產生「國資紓困潮」，一堆民營公司「被易手」成國資公司，2019年不止融資更嚴，且經濟下行壓力加大，民企流動性危機加劇，致使控制權易手數量再創新高。”
WSJ關注孫大午案並對審判做了報導:
[“Is it dangerous when private businesses grow big? Is it not dangerous when state-run enterprises grow big?” Mr. Sun told the court on Wednesday, according to a transcript provided by the defense team. “I really hope that Dawu Group’s experience can let President Xi know that the implementation of socialism can work and can withstand examination from everyone.”
In his statement, Mr. Sun sought leniency for his company. “It’d be best for me to admit guilt and wrongdoing, for me to bear the burden,” he was quoted as saying. After the verdict was announced, Mr. Sun told his lawyer that he wants to appeal against his conviction, according to the defense team.]
BBC和美聯社也沒漏掉孫大午案:
"Other charges against him include illegally occupying farmland, assembling a crowd to attack state agencies and obstructing government workers from performing their duties. He was also fined 3.11 million yuan ($478,697; £343,227).
Sun's company is among China's biggest, with businesses ranging from meat processing and pet food to schools and hospitals.
He was reportedly detained last year, along with 20 relatives and business associates, over a land dispute with a government-run farm.
At the time, he said dozens of his employees were injured in an incident with police related to the dispute, according to an AFP report."
WSJ分析則認為中國政府評判製造業優於網路業:
[ But in the view of Chinese leaders, consumer internet companies inflict costs on society that aren’t reflected in private market values. Companies such as Ant threaten the stability of the financial system, online education feeds social anxiety and online games such as Tencent’s represent an “opium for the mind,” as one state-owned publication put it this week.
Conversely, Chinese leaders think manufacturing confers social benefits that market values don’t reflect. For decades, it has been how the country created jobs, raised productivity and disseminated essential skills and know-how. Now, to achieve parity with the West, they think China must be able to make the most advanced technology, and will use subsidies, protectionism and forced technology transfers to achieve that.]
從雞娃轉為雞父母~🤣 🤣 🤣 🤣
" 新東方創始人俞敏洪日前在社群媒體轉發新東方素質成長中心升級啟動的消息。中心下設藝術創作、人文發展、語商素養、自然科創、智體運動、優質父母6大類，其中優質父母智慧館受眾人群為小學至高中生的家長，主要授課內容包括家庭教育、育兒方法、時間分配、高效學習等。"
補教業的倒閉潮:
"中國《財經》報導，今年以來已有約14萬教育培訓公司註銷。且知名的補教業巨頭上海啟文教育、傑睿教育、趣口才等一眾公司近日也宣布破產；而已有27年歷史的老牌業者「巨人教育」也在8月31日透過公眾號發文宣佈倒閉，且無法退費。"
從八月以來接二連三打擊非製造業的各類新興行業其後果開始顯現:
"So far, recent waves of layoffs appear to have hit the tech, property and education sectors harder than many other areas of the economy. The urban unemployment rate was 5% in November, below its level in December 2019, at the start of the pandemic, according to official data.
Still, other figures signal stress emerging in some corners of the labor market. The unemployment rate for those ages 16 to 24 was 14.3% in November, up from 12.8% a year earlier.
Income growth for those working in cities has stayed relatively soft. Urban disposable income per capita increased by 11.4% and 9.5% during the first six and nine months of this year from a year earlier respectively, trailing China’s overall economic growth of 12.7% and 9.8% during the same period, according to China’s National Bureau of Statistics. In 2019, urban wages grew faster than China’s gross domestic product."
看來看去覺得美國明年緊縮貨幣這點才是致命一擊:
"中国经济形势的严峻是多重因素作用的结果。根据官方经济专家的说法，首先是疫情打击了需求，消费和投资受疫情影响较大，尤其是生活性服务业、个体工商户等到现在还处于大幅萎缩中。据统计，中国今年第三季度消费、投资的两年平均增长率分别只有3.9%和3.8%，明显低于潜在消费和投资增长。其次，美国在供应链、市场和科技三个维度对中国进行限制和打压，造成供应链中断和供给短缺。再次，西方特别是美国量化宽松政策的外溢效应，同国际能源和大宗商品价格的上涨一起，引发了中国的输入型通胀，而国内煤电矛盾和拉闸限电也影响物价，冲击供给。最后但并非不重要的是，在目前的大变革时期，当局前一阶段对教培行业的大力整顿、强化平台经济的反垄断监管、打压资本以及提出共同富裕等，导致人们对中国经济究竟怎么样了产生分歧，不确定性风险上升。此即会议所谓的“预期减弱”。
对中国当局来说，2022还是一个特殊年份，因为中共要举行二十大，习近平大概率会连任。如果经济搞得一团糟，对习总归是没面子的事。问题还不在于此，假如经济恶化，岁入减少，失业增加，而需要用钱的地方又太多，由此是否会引发社会不满乃至动荡，进而波及二十大，导致党内矛盾和斗争激发，让二十大产生变数，习无疑不希望看到这种情况出现。此乃经济工作会议为什么特别强调2022年要稳的原因。可以说，稳字当头，兹事体大，把经济稳住，就业稳住，民众收入稳住，明年经济工作就取得了成功，当局就有资格宣称，习的连任是正确的，二十大也才能顺利举行。"
用民族主義正當化過苦日子的治理手段又來了:
"The increasing attention of U.S. lawmakers and the Western public to the Chinese government’s human-rights abuses seems unlikely to go away. Meanwhile nationalist sentiment among the Chinese public—and the willingness of officials to use strident rhetoric—has rarely looked more pronounced.
At the same time that these “push” factors against Western companies in China are intensifying, the “pull” factors are ebbing. Thanks to a toxic combination of rising debt, lost income during the early months of Covid-19, high housing prices, repeated rounds of draconian measures to quash small Covid-19 outbreaks, and a brutal crackdown on some of the fastest-growing service-sector employers such as internet technology and real estate, Chinese consumption growth has rarely looked weaker and youth unemployment remains stubbornly high.
Real spending on consumer goods rose only 0.5% year over year in November, which, excluding the initial recovery from the pandemic in early and mid-2020, was the weakest since at least 2011."
用來宣洩不滿與轉移注意力的民族主義敏感點會只增不減:
"Xinjiang hasn’t been the only controversy for Western businesses to navigate. Over the past few years, foreign companies have increasingly found themselves targeted over geopolitical issues raised by Beijing, including how companies characterize Taiwan and Hong Kong. Businesspeople in China say multinationals are finding it harder to do business there now, too, because of stronger domestic competition. More recently, Chinese authorities have tightened their control over several levers of the economy, including its hold on data collection."
外商撤離中國市場正蔓延:
"據報導，不止韓國彩妝在中國挫敗，幾乎所有外資化妝品企業在中國受到了一定程度的挫敗。
中國最大的日本藥妝店可開嘉來（CocokaraFine），店內店內的產品覆蓋日本眾多一線品牌，且不乏高端產品；是中國最大的日本藥妝店，在2021年12月傳將關店並退出中國市場；日本的花王集團旗下彩妝品牌KATE，也被傳將直接撤出中國市場。
不止韓日彩妝品牌撤退，包括世界日化巨頭歐萊雅、資生堂、聯合利華、雅詩蘭黛旗下的品牌都傳出撤店退市潮，另外，LVMH集團的彩妝品牌貝玲妃（Benefit）早在2021年4月就已經被傳在全國多座城市已經撤櫃，以後也將以絲芙蘭和品牌天貓官方線上店為主。"
供應鏈轉移致使做外貿生意的工廠陷入萎縮狀態:
"根據自由亞洲電台報導，隨著中國放棄防疫清零措施和工廠重新開工，中國各地的罷工數量也以驚人的速度飆升。據總部位於香港的非政府組織「中國勞工通訊」（CLB）的統計，今年前5個月，中國至少已發生了130 起工廠罷工事件，估計這只佔中國所有集體勞工訴訟事件的5%至10%。
中國大多數罷工事件的起因是，美中關係持續緊張，中國經濟日益惡化，導致工廠資金不足。在資金短缺的情況下，許多工廠採取了不支付或拖欠工人薪資的做法，甚至還想方設法解僱工人而不支付資遣費，或將工作遷移到工人無法前往的地方，迫使工人主動辭職。
根據北京「財經」雜誌旗下產業研究中心所做的調查，2022年中國最富裕的40個城市總共有超過194萬家企業註銷，約占總數的7%。"
服務業的躺平，製造業的抗議:
"中國勞工通訊研究員周艾登（Aidan Chau）表示，武肺疫情過後，中國勞工罷工次數創新高，許多抗議都與國際貿易需求放緩有關。據統計，中國今年上半年共有七四一起抗議和罷工案件，反觀去年全年才八三○件，今年底前很可能累計超過一千三百件。抗議事件向來以建築業最常見，但今年製造業成為主要來源，光是五月份就有五十九起抗議，廣東省等沿海地區尤甚，又以電子業和紡織業工人受創最深，上半年分別發生六十六起及卅八起抗議活動，佔製造業抗議活動總數的一半以上。"
