From "The Analyst":

RUSSIAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS PRODUCTION FALLS SHARPLY

Russian is very much dependent for its great power status on its nuclear weapons. A recent review of what they have claimed and lauded compared to the somewhat starker realities, show a strained industrial base. Facing lack of private investment, a shortage of state funds, insolvency, manpower shortages caused by mobilisation, international sanctions and an inability to overcome technical delays on one side. On the other state giants such as Roscosmos which make sections of the strategic Sarmat missile for instance, have lost 50% of their workforce due to lack of state funds and resources, and the complete disappearance of foreign contracts for satellites and space launches. On top of that rampant corruption has reared its head with no less than six serious cases of multi-million dollar level fraud haunting the company. Most of those cases are bogged down in corruption as those up the chain and down it, do their best to sideline investigators.
One of the suppliers who provide the primary stage of the Sarmat missile, Proton-PM, is on the point of bankruptcy, unable to pay its suppliers and barely getting by let alone supplying dozens of missile sections. Only one missile is actually expected to enter service this year, despite it being a high priority.
The second stage producer, Chemical Automatics Design Bureau, is actually bankrupt and going through the court process to dissolve its business. The reason? ‘A chronic shortage of working capital’. That’s no state or bank funds and interest rates being so high it can’t afford to borrow. Add to that the state is terrible at paying its bills and these companies cannot survive.
The Kazan Aviation Plant is supposed to be upgrading ten of the old 1980’s Tu-160 strategic bomber to ‘M’ standard and has only delivered one. The company is also supposed to be building ten new ones to the same standard having restarted the line.
So far only one test plane has been delivered and the most they can produce is 1.25 per year - if they get the approval in 2024. A second aircraft is said to be under testing. The target was to build ten per year through to 2027. That seems beyond impossible at present. The government just doesn’t have the money. In addition the modernised plant was supposed to have been finished in 2020 but COVID delayed it. Then sanctions hit in 2022 and the availability of machine tools and equipment from western sources dried up.
The latest Borei-A class SSBN is also way behind schedule - two more were supposed to be laid down. The Knyaz Pozarsky was supposed to enter service in 2023 but will only just manage late 2024 - and even then she may have no missiles unless another Delta-IV class is decommissioned to provide them. The eleventh and twelfth in the 16 planned submarine class, each of which carries 16 SLBM’s, were due be laid down for completion in the 2030’s but it hasn’t happened. They haven’t been cancelled but if they don’t get started then the experienced labour force will likely be considered mobilisation fodder and their skills permanently lost.
So we see above how in real life the sanctions on technology and mechanical/engineering equipment, technology and finance have seriously impacted Russian nuclear weapons plans. This equipment should never have been sold to them in the first place and should never be ever again.
Imagine too, how deep these problems run in Russian military industries generally. Over time the economic costs have and are hitting ever deeper into the Russian military industrial complex. Despite their best efforts to get around it, huge capital intensive and high tech industries are buckling under the strain. Government funding is clearly stretched - even for their pet projects that are considered next to god in terms of national prestige and importance.
It may not look like it every day, but slowly and surely the sanctions are digging deep. We need to pile on the pressure. Not letting up. It DOES make a difference!