A Real Mobilization to Follow Putin’s Bogus Election?.
By the end of last year, Russia was able to restore the number of its armed forces personnel despite the massive losses of 2022–2023. Quantity, however, does not mean quality.
Now that Putin has secured reelection in an unfair and unfree election, and killed off his primary political rival, Alexey Navalny, he faces a serious dilemma. How can he maintain a field force of around 200,000 men to wage aggressive war against Ukraine when his spendthrift generals launch offensives that can cost 1,000 dead and wounded every day?
Russian ground forces in Ukraine have become a hodge-podge of regular units whose ranks have been topped up by mobilized soldiers, and those who signed contracts for military service to manage their family debts. Convicts and irregular volunteer formations under the umbrella of the Ministry of Defense make up the balance.
There might be 150.000-200.000 men in Russian-occupied Ukraine, including support units, based on the available data and the history of modern warfare.
Nevertheless, if the loss rate remains at last year’s levels, the Kremlin leadership will have to decide on how to get more manpower. Each of the five options comes with a practical problem or a political price.
1) Recruit 20.000–30.000 soldiers a month during 2024, despite the inevitable deficit of convicts (now largely dead or wounded) who formed a crucial element of recruits in 2023;
2) decrease losses through negotiations;
3) use an “escalation-for-de-escalation” approach in the Baltic region, with the aim of forcing negotiations;
send conscripted soldiers currently excluded from the war to the front; and
4) begin another wave of mobilization.
The last is also the final option — mobilization was highly unpopular among Russian society in 2022 and will be avoided unless the Kremlin believes other efforts are not producing results. By the summer we will see if the self-proclaimed dictator has been forced down this route. The fourth alternative — sending young conscripts — would break Putin’s promise not to, although it remains possible.
Why there are so few troops available? Double-count, prisoners, civil personnel, etc.
The conscripts might provide a short-term solution as do the prisoners as Z-leadership needs to find new manpower. Firstly, if average losses remain the same as in 2023, Russia needs to recruit at least 20,000 new soldiers/volunteers a month. If maintaining meat assaults this number rises to about 30.000/month.
Secondly, Russia would welcome a temporary respite from the war, or at least decrease its intensity through negotiations. In February, Putin twice discussed his negotiating conditions, throwing in another bout of nuclear blackmail for good measure. Any pause would allow a restructuring and restoration of military vitality, and reduce the recruitment crisis.
Thirdly, there is the seemingly simple option of sending conscripts, who officially don’t participate. The expansion of the Southern military district to include the occupied territories of Ukraine from March 1 means that conscripts can easily be relocated to any part of the district without public attention.
The same is true towards the re-establishment of the Leningrad military district, which would be the launching point for any military action in the Baltic region. Considering Russia’s paradoxical belief in “escalation-for-de-escalation”, the prospect of a direct clash with NATO should not be underestimated.
Such aggression could use conscripts even without a massive mobilization, at least at first. It is true the conscripts are poorly trained, but so are the mobilized soldiers and prisoners; conscripts are also younger, which is a significant advantage.
It might not be the Z military leadership’s favored approach as it prefers to pressure conscripts to become contracted soldiers. We can expect such pressure to increase in 2024.
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