Fabian Hoffmann on the role of "risk" in ongoing warfare and highlights the West's problematic approach to risk management.

ℹ️ The West's approach to supporting Ukraine, especially such key players as Germany and the USA, was to supply the necessary equipment while minimizing the risks of escalation.

ℹ️ These considerations were brought to the fore when discussing Taurus and ATACMS deliveries. Scholz and Biden have made it clear that they consider the risks associated with the supply of this type of weapons to be too significant.

ℹ️ The desire to eliminate risks for one's country and people is understandable. After all, this is the oath they took when they took office. However, this approach ignores important lessons from the history of the Cold War about how to deal with the crisis we are facing now.

ℹ️ In the current situation, there are no solutions without risks. This is the essence of the challenge we face in our relations with Russia. Decision makers must evaluate the risks they can or "should" take and those they should avoid. A categorical refusal to take risks is not a manifestation of leadership.

ℹ️ During the Cold War, Western leaders understood this. This is why the US, France and Britain ignored Khrushchev's ultimatum in 1958 to withdraw their troops from West Berlin, and why the US did not let Soviet tanks through at Checkpoint Charlie in 1961.

ℹ️ Those who made decisions were aware that this confrontation could turn into a military confrontation. However, they understood that it is impossible to give up prematurely. This would demonstrate a lack of determination and a penchant for blackmail, which would weaken future negotiating positions.

ℹ️ During the Cold War, there were several crises of this nature. These scenarios are called "risk competitions". This type of crisis involves the participation of at least two nuclear powers and tends to escalate until one of the parties gives in, leading to a de-escalation of the crisis.

ℹ️ Risk-based competition highlights the paradox of the nuclear age: to prevent nuclear conflict, you must signal to your counterpart that you are, in principle, willing to wage nuclear war and thus take some risk – even if neither side wants this result.

ℹ️ This logic influenced nuclear powers during the Cold War and remains very relevant today, as demonstrated by the war in Ukraine. Both NATO and Russia possess significant nuclear arsenals, making direct military confrontation virtually unthinkable.

ℹ️ And yet the West must convincingly demonstrate that it is not afraid of confrontation with Russia. An open display of risk aversion and fear of escalation could encourage aggressive behavior by Putin and facilitate Russian escalation, possibly also directly against NATO countries.

ℹ️ This is why the current position of Scholz and Biden is so unfortunate. They are right that an escalation caused by the supply of Taurus/ATACMS cannot be ruled out - just as, by the way, was the case with previous arms deliveries.

But the risks associated with supply must be carefully weighed against the risks associated with non-supply, and not just in a military sense.

ℹ️ The real damage from the refusal to supply Taurus/ATACMS can be seen primarily in the political consequences of this decision.

First, it will undermine the West's confidence in deterring Russia.

How can we convince Russia of our steadfast resolve when the crisis may escalate (as well as escalations in the future) with such apparent intolerance for such risks?

Second, it sends alarming signals to our Eastern European allies.

How can states bordering Russia trust their defense to countries that signal that they put their own security above all else?

ℹ️ In this context, it is not surprising that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland talks about the potential need for US allies to start their own nuclear weapons programs. Poland is using its nuclear latency to signal an urgent need for credible security commitments.

@ukrainejournal