MILITARY & STRATEGIC:
THE STORY OF VUHLEDAR

In essence this is as much about a lack of western aid as anything else.
Problem one for Ukraine is that the 72nd Brigade defending the town was the only one that was fully mobile, and the rifle brigades that flanked it, were non-motorised infantry.
The aid that is arriving is being consumed in the Pokrovsk salient for the most part, but valuable units that could have helped in such a wide and open area of territory, such as the British supplied Challenger-2 were being wasted in Kursk defending nothing important.
The Russians wanted to get around Vuhledar and cut it off, capturing the defenders. They tried to cut off the last road out of the town but were unable do so, though they did have a high degree of fire control over it, which they failed to use properly.
Instead they were forced to fight their way through the forward defences and urban zones suffering incredibly high casualties because of the mines and fortifications.
By the time they reached anything of significance the Ukrainians had gone, leaving booby traps and rubble in their wake.
To break into the town the Russians used relentless amounts of artillery, newly trained Spetznaz special forces accompanied infantry assaults to ensure they finally broke through - all supported by heavy drone attacks.
Because of the close nature of the fight aerial bombing wasn’t viable.
It was not an easy withdrawal.
Drones harassed and destroyed multiple vehicles but for the most part the escape out of the town was a success thanks to the resistance of the flanking forces which prevented the Russians from closing the pincers.
Part of the Russians problem was they had no metalled roads for supply and their nearest supply points were 18-30km behind the lines. This caused a sort of stop-start as fuel and ammo was brought forward - lulls in fighting the Ukrainians used to their advantage.
There was never going to be some sudden Russian breakthrough because the town fell. The area is vast and rural, with hundreds of square kilometres of fields, gullies and hilly ridges before meeting any settlement. There are no roads other than the one to Vuhledar.
I’ve heard it described as a Phyrric victory for the Russians, but that’s not fair or true.
A Phyrric victory is where the cost of a successful attack is so great that you have no means whatsoever of pursuing the benefits of that victory and nor can you find enough forces to defend what you have won. Kursk is such an example for Ukraine.
The Russians will take their time but they will consolidate and eventually move forward at Vuhledar.
Ukrainian strategy is to give land for the maximum price they can extract from the Russians.
It’s a process that works but the Russians seem to be quite happy to have the crap beaten out of them over and over again, rendering the strategy of wearing them down almost impossible to accomplish.

Both sides have cracks appearing in their ability to wage this war. The Russians have made a vast effort this year and despite our general derision for their methods, which are deserved, they have still made major and significant advances - don’t measure it in terms of square kilometres but in terms of strategic points taken.
The victory at Avdivka - in the end wasn’t just lost because of a lack of aid to Ukraine - that was a factor - but the Russians tactically undermined the fixed defences and the use of underground tunnels broke key positions.
Ukraine handed them victory at Ochertyne through bad comms and poor command, then continued to let the same crap commanders run the show as Russia pushed them further and further back.
Yes Ukraine has caused huge losses in men and material and Russian forces are still not winning decisive victories.
What we have to remember is they don’t expect to win such victories- that’s not their strategy. They have accepted it’s a long slow grind and that’s exactly what they are working for. So you have one side trying to make it a long slow and expensive grind, while the other accepts that’s exactly what it is and doesn’t care.