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There are some 900 British soldiers deployed in the country as part of a multinational NATO force at the Tapa air base west of Tallinn; France also has troops there. The British government has pledged to have its 4th Brigade Combat Team on stand-by for rapid deployment. NATO has created battlegroups in most eastern member countries, and plans to expand those groups in Latvia and Lithuania. It hasn't made that commitment in Estonia due to a shortfall in the British Army, which has only two armored brigades available.

If Russia were to strike, it's unlikely the NATO force in Tapa, supplemented by Estonia's 7,700 active personnel (boosted to 43,000 in the event of war), would have enough firepower to repel an offensive.

What's more, a recent visit by a Belgian delegation focused on how to evacuate its nationals, neglecting to seriously discuss how troops can be quickly sent to defend the Baltics, Belitšev said.

“I think the awareness is not there as much we have it,” he said of his country's allies. “It wasn’t there in 2008 [when Russia invaded Georgia], it wasn’t there in 2014 [when Crimea was annexed] and it’s not there now … people don’t understand the actual situation.”

For Tallinn the question of what to do about its big neighbor to the east is existential.

The smallest Baltic state is already spending 3.4 percent of its GDP on defense and plans to ratchet that up to 3.7 percent next year, far ahead of bigger EU countries.

The fear in Tallinn is what happens after the war in Ukraine is settled, and if Russia uses any pause in the fighting to attack a vulnerable NATO country.

That threat makes policing the border all the more important.

"When the invasion occurs it’s already too late," Estonia's Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur said in Tallinn. "We need to look into the early warning system, and be clear in advance that if the first person comes over the border then we will respond immediately."

Estonia has long and bitter experience of being a Russian colony. It only regained its independence in 1991 as the Soviet Union collapsed, and has since rushed to tighten links to the EU and NATO.

The danger posed by Moscow was highlighted in 2014, when security services officer Eston Kohver was kidnapped and imprisoned by Russia; he was released a year later in a prisoner swap.

“Can we be certain that something like that doesn’t happen again?” said Belitšev, standing on the Narva River bridge, looking past Estonia's recently-installed anti-tank dragon's teeth defenses.

Belitšev said the plan is to cover every meter of Estonia's 338-kilometer border with Russia with surveillance technology.

That's easier said than done.

First, there’s a 77-kilometer stretch running along the Narva River. Russia's removal of border buoys this summer caused incursions into Estonian territory to spike from 18 the preceding two years to 96 this year.

Without the floating markers, Estonia’s guards have trouble distinguishing between accidental trespassers and brazen attempts to break into the EU. “If the buoys are not there in the river it causes lots of mistakes,” said Belitšev.

Russia’s blocking of GPS signals in the area also makes it tough to track aircraft or drones and detect smugglers, while also making it impossible for guards to accurately pinpoint locations out in the wilderness.

South of Narva, the border runs 126 kilometers through Lake Peipus after which it snakes south a further 136 kilometers through two road crossings at Koidula and Luhhamaa, near where Kohver was snatched, cutting through swampland. While the soggy terrain provides a natural barrier in summer, it hardens in freezing temperatures.

“It’s like an airfield in the winter time,” Belitšev said. "You can land an airplane there if you want."

A €157 million program is aimed at bolstering border protection at Narva.
Belitšev said Estonia is building what he calls a “drone wall” that uses digital systems to block enemy drones.