Wittgenstein and the liar

“In what follows, a reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks will be offered according to which Wittgenstein subscribes to a form of dialetheism (that is, the view that there are sentences that are both true and false). In contrast to modern dialetheist approaches to the Liar, however, some of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest combining a dialetheist position with what is called ‘logical nihilism’ (that is, the view that there are no universally valid inference rules).”

Bromand, J. Wittgenstein and the liar. Synthese 204, 8 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04620-0 #OpenAccess #OA #Research #Article #DOI #Philosophy #Wittgenstein #Academia #Academic #Academics @philosophy