We no longer have any active servers in France and are continuing the process of leaving OVH. We'll be rotating our TLS keys and Let's Encrypt account keys pinned via accounturi. DNSSEC keys may also be rotated. Our backups are encrypted and can remain on OVH for now.

Our App Store verifies the app store metadata with a cryptographic signature and downgrade protection along with verification of the packages. Android's package manager also has another layer of signature verification and downgrade protection.

Our System Updater verifies updates with a cryptographic signature and downgrade protection along with another layer of both in update_engine and a third layer of both via verified boot. Signing channel release channel names is planned too.

Our update mirrors are currently hosted on sponsored servers from ReliableSite (Los Angeles, Miami) and Tempest (London). London is a temporary location due to an emergency move from a provider which left the dedicated server business and will move. More sponsored update mirrors are coming.

Our ns1 anycast network is on Vultr and our ns2 anycast network is on BuyVM since both support BGP for announcing our own IP space. We're moving our main website/network servers used for default OS connections to a mix of Vultr+BuyVM locations.

We have 5 servers in Canada with OVH with more than static content and basic network services: email, Matrix, discussion forum, Mastodon and attestation. Our plan is to move these to Netcup root servers or a similar provider short term and then colocated servers in Toronto long term.

France isn't a safe country for open source privacy projects. They expect backdoors in encryption and for device access too. Secure devices and services are not going to be allowed. We don't feel safe using OVH for even a static website with servers in Canada/US via their Canada/US subsidiaries.

We were likely going to be able to release experimental Pixel 10 support very soon and it's getting disrupted. The attacks on our team with ongoing libel and harassment have escalated, raids on our chat rooms have escalated and more. It's rough right now and support is appreciated.

It's not possible for GrapheneOS to produce an update for French law enforcement to bypass brute force protection since it's implemented via the secure element (SE). SE also only accepts correctly signed firmware with a greater version AFTER the Owner user unlocks successfully.

We would have zero legal obligation to do it but it's not even possible. We have a list our official hardware requirements including secure element throttling for disk encryption key derivation (Weaver) combined with insider attack resistance. Why aren't they blaming Google?

In Canada and the US, refusing to provide a PIN/password is protected as part of the right to avoid incriminating yourself. In France, they've criminalized this part of the right to remain silent. Since they're criminalized not providing a PIN, why do they need anything from us?

@GrapheneOS it's also illegal to fail to provide encryption keys in the UK. I assume you'll be exiting here too?

@falken It's an example of their stance towards privacy and individual rights. UK has similar issues with starting to demand encryption backdoors but France is way worse. UK is not going after us in any way.

We're very likely moving both servers we have in the UK elsewhere. One was only a temporary stopgap because it was provided as a sponsored dedicated server as an update mirror. The other is an instance for our ns1 anycast cluster and we've determined Amsterdam is likely better for anycast.