Physicalism is complete: there is no phenomenon that we can communicate that physicalism can't explain

For people who are pointing to the hard problem of consciousness: if you have two apparently regular, functional, typical people in front of you, and one person is "conscious" (wiki: "have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences") and one person is not "conscious" (ie: no subjective experience, etc), then what can you do to distinguish between them? Afaik there is *literally* nothing you can do to distinguish between someone who has "subjective" experiences and one who doesn't. Keep in mind: if you perform any test on them, then you've just performed a physical test. If the test shows a result, then that result is a physical result. (note: beware semantics of "subjective" and "conscious" in this paragraph)

Notice that *neurological consciousness* definitively and obviously exists! Human brains are physically / neurologically conscious and even philosophical zombies (physical humans without metaphysical consciousness) have physical consciousnesses. When you fall asleep, take drugs, etc your physical consciousness changes. You can remove from someone's brain the parts whose representation on an MRI scan diminishes when they go from awake to asleep, and awake to on drugs (or whatever), and they will no longer be physically conscious. They *may* be metaphysically conscious (ie: conscious in some way the physical world cannot explain), but we apparently cannot measure metaphysical consciousness in any way, so it cannot be communicated as something distinct from regular physical consciousness

Again: if you can communicate something, then that thing must be grounded in the physical world, and we cannot attribute it to anything but the physical world. There certainly may be other aspects of reality that aren't part of a physical reality, and the physical world might supervene on something non-physical, but everything in the physical world

(!solipsism trigger warning!) Now, assuming there *are* metaphysical consciousnesses (MPCs) attached to physical consciousnesses, then imagine how those MPCs must feel (if they *can* feel: feeling is a physical thing; MPCs might just be along for the ride). An MPC would know its a part of a larger reality, but could do literally nothing to prove that to others. Hell, even its knowledge of others would be obtained through the physical world, so it could never be sure of the existence of other MPCs. Even its knowledge itself is a physical thing. It can't be sure that it is an MPC (because its physical body and physical consciousness is the one that would be sure)

If everything I said above isn't bullshit and physicalism is complete as I described it, then all problems in the metaphysics of consciousness are solved! \*dusts off hands\*

Another important note: aesthetics aren't evidence