紐時也注意到兩國關係緊張：
“Even before the scuffling, India was feeling increasingly hemmed in by China’s expanding economic and geopolitical influence in South Asia.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/world/asia/india-china-border.html?referringSource=articleShare
這篇報導提到五月份雙方首次摩擦的時間點是在本串首嘟05/11事件之前的05/05晚。雖說媒體的均提到雙方有針對邊界問題建立溝通機制，同一個月內發生三次以上衝突，即使在此時仍顯異常。
“The PLA and Indian Army soldiers clashed at the feature called Finger 5 in the northern flank of the Pangong lake on May 5 night.
A few days later, personnel from the two armies clashed again near Naku La in Sikkim.”
同樣是看衝突，影片可以看的門道很多。
「影片中顯示一艘印度Tampa快艇（從美國進口）攔截懸掛中國國旗的模擬中國巡邏船的演習畫面，印度快艇使用了名為“漩渦戰術”，用高速快艇不斷繞代號LX系列的“中國巡邏船”轉圈航行，將目標船隻困在水流中，迫使其開始陷入渦流時返回。依目前情況來看，該湖西部45公里長的部份地區在印度的控制下，其餘部份則在中國控制之下。
該報道引據軍事評論員黃東分析，解放軍在班公錯湖出動928D巡邏艇，行內俗稱“西海艦隊”，已集結5,000多士兵，已是一個旅的兵力，印軍也不相伯仲，“雙方已經有1萬人，可以打一場不大不小嘅戰爭”。 」
😮😮😮
[ The protest against Chinese apps comes after India in April said stricter screening rules will apply to foreign direct investments from China, worrying investors there. China has said the policy is discriminatory.
"Previous boycott calls have focused on Chinese goods, whereas this one especially targets Chinese apps, which could impact Chinese technology companies who have seen India as a crucial market," ]
https://twitter.com/adityakalra/status/1267806547725279237?s=21
“传统上和平的加勒万河现在已经成为一个热点，因为这是实控线距离印度沿着什约克河（Shyok River）修到斗拉特别奥里地（Daulet Beg Oldi）的新道路最近的点。斗拉特别奥里地是拉达克地区的实控线沿线最偏远、最薄弱的地区，”
The Diplomat對最近兩國緊張情勢的分析。
“It is true that China does not consider India to be its primary strategic competitor. However, some Chinese veterans are of the opinion that China has a history of adjusting its strategic direction and has more often than not benefitted from solving contradictions in a secondary direction first, rather than the contradictions in the primary direction.”
https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/what-is-china-saying-about-the-china-india-border-stand-off/
WAPO一篇報導對這段衝突期間作出淺白說明的分析：
“If Beijing fears other nations may view China as weak or distracted by the coronavirus and the economic aftershocks, the Chinese leadership may feel it has to take a hard line against any potential challenge to Chinese sovereignty. This is true not only regarding the border with India but also with regard to Taiwan, Hong Kong and the South China Sea.”
對印中邊界的衝突，米方態度簡單清楚：
“The Chinese Communist Party has been on this effort, on this march, for an awfully long time,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said last week. “They’ll certainly use a tactical situation on the ground to their advantage.”
“中共为此，为这次推进已经努力了很长时间，”国务卿迈克·庞皮欧(Mike Pompeo)上周表示。“他们肯定会在实地利用战术优势。”
https://cn.nytimes.com/world/20200608/china-india-border-himalayas/dual/
上星期推出的共和黨國安戰略報告裡，印太重點策略的定位不變。
「”中国（中共）的宏伟战略‘中国梦’是要将国际体系转变为由中共领导的体系。” 报告建议至少从五个方面反击中国。第一，抵制中国的工业间谍活动、盗窃知识产权以及其他恶意的经济行为。第二，制止中国的恶性政治影响和虚假信息宣传运动。第三，抵制中国的侵犯人权行为。第四，应对中国的全球军事现代化。第五，加强在印度太平洋地区的联盟。」
https://www.voachinese.com/amp/rsc-report-chinese-high-ranking-officials-20200611/5459206.html
米軍的太平洋空防將被視為要務，川川連任與否都不會改變這個基礎。
“白宮送交國會的最新一份國家安全報告，名稱是《美國對中華人民共和國的戰略方針》，從公開的內容已可預見，美中兩國的戰略競爭將會進一步白熱化，過去只是少數派理論的「美中新冷戰」恐怕很快會走向現實。中國所積極發展的極音速（Hypersonic）飛彈與新一代戰略轟炸機轟-20，都讓美國必需更重視太平洋方向的空中防禦。”
從米軍的防務觀點看，扼住地圖上的南海尖端與菲律賓海的交界處，幾乎就掌握了西太平洋的交通關隘。
https://twitter.com/esperdod/status/1272579703921086467?s=21
太平洋威懾倡議的操作：
［ to create a “deterrence by punishment” framework. This would see the U.S. and its allies not only focus on strike missions on PLA military targets, but further threaten Chinese commercial shipping, impose harsh economic sanctions, and undertake other measures. The goal would be to broaden an immediate conflict into one that not only aims to defeat the PLA’s immediate military objectives, but also “punishes” Chinese political and economic leadership. ］
https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/getting-the-pacific-deterrence-initiative-right/
但我覺得米軍武器的威懾力比國會強很多... 
"若以兩枚AGM-158C反艦飛彈攻擊一艘敵方艦艇的情況來計算，B-1B轟炸機所掛載的24枚飛彈能同時攻擊12個敵方目標，這已經是整個艦隊的規模。...。這款反艦反艦會先攻擊航空母艦、大型驅逐艦等價值較高的目標、或是判斷防空能力最強的艦艇，先瓦解對方的防禦網，同時也會放棄已經被擊毀的敵方艦艇，轉而選擇還有作戰能力的艦艇，不會白白浪費飛彈。這樣的設計能讓已發射的反艦飛彈擁有最大的攻擊效益。"
"The US is professing support for these countries' rights in those areas. Now, if the US wants to come to support an ally or partner in the South China Sea which is getting pushed around by China, now it has the legal justification to say China's actions are illegal in our view... even though Pompeo has previously indicated these are coercive actions by the Chinese, he probably would not have said they are illegal, now he can,"
南海成為美中最可能直接的引爆點.
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/13/politics/south-china-sea-pompeo-announcement/index.html
"1架/1min升空跟1架/10mins升空，是完全不同的概念，讀者自己想像一下，60架全部升空，前者代表第一架滯空了60mins，後者代表600mins，也就是10小時。
呃，還沒發現問題在哪的，問題可大了，因為油箱跟載彈量是固定的，用維基百科的資料，J-15作戰半徑達1200km，但台灣的反艦飛彈射程已經確定超過300km，這還不包含開戰前台灣的艦隊基本上都會進入太平洋。意即，這兩艘解放軍的航母艦隊，他位置要放在哪個地方？
讀者要明白，三三兩兩跑來台灣東部攻擊那叫做射火雞，形成足夠的作戰編隊才有意義，距離跟航程還有油料，這可以繪製成一個作戰時間圖表，很容易知道到底其同一時間可以發揮多少戰力。
這還不算真的開戰時會有戰損，損失到一個階段的航母群會連護衛機的數量都不夠，一個不好被逆襲，說不定艦隊全部覆滅。"
"聯兵營的規模變的更小，那要如何發揚更強大的火力來彌補這個問題。以先進國家的發展經驗，這完全要依賴配合度更高的三軍聯合作戰訓練，由地面部隊的聯絡官，引導陸航的武裝攻擊直升機、空軍的戰機進行火力打擊。
甚至在濱海地區作戰時，還能協調海軍艦艇進行艦炮炮擊或以艦上防空飛彈掩護岸上的部隊。"
"在華府智庫「戰略暨國際研究中心」（CSIS）近日舉辦的一場視訊研討會上，麥康維爾表示，做為美國威懾戰略的一環，他將「長程精準火力」（long-range precision fire）列為當前最優先要務，評估在印太地區部署這類武器系統的各類選項。這些兵力部署變革也包括「成立全方位聯合作戰部隊」"
"國軍已著手進行後備制度改革，包括將隸屬國防部的全民防衛動員室和後備指揮部合併，成為「動員局」，並且重新劃分地方後備指揮部歸屬，還有增加後備軍人參與國軍演訓的規模、頻次等，都在討論之列。"
「以往天駒部隊(經國號戰機)，大概到了秋冬的時候就會撤回往本土，你這個時候派16戰機過去，說真的想必F-16戰機性能有特別之處。」
https://news.cts.com.tw/cts/politics/202008/202008262011666.html
飛一小時就要花掉四萬四美金! (彷彿每秒都看到機尾噴七張百元美鈔出來....
"Plus, as the Air Force buys these new F-35s, it must also pay to fly them—and that isn't cheap. Each F-35 costs an eye-popping $44,000 an hour to fly. That translates into an investment of $44 million for every 1,000 hours of flight time, or just under one-third the cost of the plane itself. "
合理懷疑是為了省錢.... 
"航空自衛隊計劃引進F-35A以及可短距離起飛和垂直降落的F-35B型共147架F-35戰機，替代將要退役的現有F-15等戰機。青森縣三澤基地到2020年末已部署其中首批約20架F-35戰機。"
航空自衛隊又一款戰機退役, 高齡五十載, 從岐阜新聞的影片看保養絕佳, 真不愧是日本啊~
"報導指出，3架戰機降落時，空自基地出動消防車舉行「交叉水柱」洗塵儀式，而一旁在停機坪的軍方成員也為即將退役的F-4EJ鼓掌。
而在飛機停妥後，執行F-4EJ最後一次飛行任務的飛行員對「幽靈」致意，稱「長期以來實在辛苦了」，地勤人員則將酒澆在戰機雷達罩上，一旁的隊員見狀也高呼「幽靈最棒」。"
@nil 五十年過去, 很多零件大概都消失需要訂做了吧...