頗懷疑這時候放出金融穩定法風聲，是為了接下來的違約潮與更嚴苛的資金管制做準備。前者可能是不認帳或轉移損失，後者可能是將各方面資金限制檯面化降低流動。
"中國銀行央行副行長劉桂平也在3月的1篇文章敦促改革，他指出，中國的金融規則過於分散，可以借鑑美國的《多德—弗蘭克法案》及其他主要經濟體的金融改革經驗。劉桂平認為，中國需要一致的金融穩定法。
劉桂平已向全國人大呈交提案，並建議在條件成熟時盡快出台。但北京威諾律師事務所合夥人Yang Zhaoquan指出，完成這項法案可能得花上3到5年的時間，他稱，由於風險事件接連出現，不僅損害市場，還波及金融及社會穩定性，因此迫切需要更多且強大法律工具。
《彭博》指出，像共產黨這樣執著於「掌控」的政府，在監管金融機構的行為似乎不太一致，一方面是疏忽對華融的監管，導致該公司爆發財務危機，一方面卻又警告像螞蟻集團這樣的公司影響力過大。"
中國巨型企業遭遇國有化威脅的同時, 逃過倒閉潮的倖存小型企業則面臨金流不足的危機.
"Close to 19% of China’s small businesses shut down last year, compared with 6.7% in 2019, according to a study released in March by Tsinghua University involving more than 50,000 companies nationwide."
"While the insolvency rate is expected to be better this year, many companies still face serious cash-flow constraints. A survey of more than 10,000 small businesses released in March by Peking University and Ant Group Co. found that 15% have sufficient cash flow to sustain operations for six months or longer, down from 19% in the third quarter of 2020, though some expect revenue to pick up as the year progresses."
https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-chinas-small-businesses-life-is-still-far-from-normal-11619953204
小翠介紹的CSIS所發布這篇報告, 指出了社會主義的中國如何將治理國家套入公司化模式, 讓中共這個列寧式組織得以順利滑入現代化這個軌道:
" this CSIS report distills key observations about the changing nature of China’s domestic economic management and the international behavior of Chinese companies, state organizations, and financiers. Changing national mechanisms for extending Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authority over the economy and a proliferation of new financial institutions underpin a CCP Inc. ecosystem with a unique internal logic and new adaptability to respond to policy shifts. The strength of this ecosystem allows CCP Inc. to compete internationally as a well-resourced group of coordinated actors."
https://www.csis.org/analysis/ccp-inc-reshaping-chinas-state-capitalist-system
軍民融合方針也可視為共黨政權把國防政策公司化的具體表現:
[ “Civil-military fusion,” as China’s government calls it, isn’t wholly new, but it has come into sharper focus for the U.S. during the decadelong leadership of Xi Jinping.
Previously, China relied mostly on often-lumbering state-owned enterprises to supply and equip its military. But under Mr. Xi, the government has increasingly sought to break down barriers between private businesses and the military’s needs. It has provided fresh incentives for more-nimble companies to align themselves with political priorities and to cash in on fat state handouts for businesses focused on national-security priorities. ]
