From "The Analyst":

KHARKIV STRATEGY

The Russians started the operation with attacks on more of the bridges over the Seversky-Donetsk river (running south) and the Vovcha which runs east-west through the town of Vovchansk into the former.
Their targets, designed to prevent Ukraine from crossing back and forth and reinforcing either of the two offensive zones, were primarily the main dam on which they used a HH-38 guided missile with a 200kg warhead. This bridge is crucial as it links Kharkiv with Vovchansk.
The missile was impossible to intercept as it came from inside Russia and was fired at just 30km so nothing could stop it at such short notice.
The only remaining crossing is much further south and doubles the distance Ukrainians will have to travel from Kharkiv to Vovchansk.
The whole point of doing this was to make it easy to seize Vovchansk - that was the main goal of this operation and would allow further expansion down the river and towards Kupiansk, slicing the whole section of front off from Ukraine.
The original plan was to encircle the town and capture it intact rather than do what they usually do and flatten it. To this end they began an encircling operation.
Many forget that Russian tanks and BMP’s are technically amphibious with the right kit in use and would have no trouble, if properly prepared, in crossing the narrow Vovcha river to its west.
The plan was to take the forest on the south side of the river. Artillery prepared the crossing point, but it seems the Russians really didn’t think about what they were about to do. To reach the crossing point, the amphibious prepared armour had to cross 5km of open farmland - the very reason then Ukrainians didn’t bother defending it because it was so exposed. The Russian armour was hunted down by drones and artillery; the entire assault group of five T-90 and five BMP, along with two supply trucks never reached the river bank.
With Ukrainian forces surging into Vovchansk area, the idea of encirclement rapidly fell apart.
The Russian combat troop allocation for the operation is around five thousand - far fewer than needed, and while they got into the town and appeared to take much of the northern sector (it is just 5km from the border), as soon as the Ukrainian reinforcements arrived it became clear the Russians hadn’t got as far as was imagined or they were claiming. That’s when the artillery turned itself on to the town, the Russians gave up on capturing it intact and began their usual practice of destroying everything to deny it to the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians have sufficient force to stop the Russians and the northern section is more of a contested zone than under Russian control, not at all how this was supposed to go at this point in their offensive.
Baring in mind the relatively light forces the Ukrainians had, right at the start, the Russian failure to encircle Vovchansk is extraordinary. Add to that they didn’t expect Ukrainian reinforcements to be so rapidly deployed and stop them in their tracks.
This shows that rumours the Ukrainians had gained intel on what was planned was likely true, that their own plans, rather then being chaotic as western media tried to make out, suggesting unpreparedness, were in fact a series of options based on what happened in the opening phase, and they reacted accordingly.
The result was the Russian strategic plan to swoop in to Vovchansk after surrounding it in a lightning attack went totally wrong, leaving them undermanned and stuck in a battle they never wanted or expected for the town.
The distraction attack towards Kharkiv itself - aiming for Liptsy, a key village due to its being in tube artillery range of the city, also ground to a stop.
Yet again we see the Russian ‘what’s in the box’ mentality play out. The commanders are given x amount of resources and as they get used up there’s no more. As resources and losses mount at a staggering and unexpected level Russia is faced with persisting and doubling down on it or withdrawing and returning to the border status quo. CONTINUES…