From ‘The Analyst’ (Military & Strategic)

AVDIVKA FRONT: BREAKING MOMENTUM
1/2
The Avdivka front developed originally from the collapse of the long held fortified area of the town of Avdivka. Unable to imagine that Avdivka would fall, most defences were built there to defend it over the course of ten years. Ukraine simply didn’t think it could be taken.
Originally of course that was entirely reasonable as a thought, but it was a devastating assumption - and the one thing I cannot abide is assumption. Only fools assume everything stays the same.
The war went from near static to Russian full on invasion and eventually Russia overcame Avdivka through brute force on their side and the peak of weapons shortages due to the block on American aid that could have prevented it, possibly on the Ukrainian. Over time and looking back on how Avdivka was taken, I’m less certain that aid would have stopped its loss.
The collapse of the Avdivka salient led progressively to the situation on what has become known as the Avdivka or Central Front.
The semi-perpetual Ukrainian retreat has been a combination of saving lives at the cost of lost land, and a lack of prepared defences in a very rural area in which to anchor any resistance.
The scale of Russian manpower utilisation has been extraordinarily high. Their losses have been dramatic and intense, a willingness to lose whatever it took to gain as much land as possible - death of thousands means nothing to them.
Western aid undoubtedly contributed to slowing things down. Lack of Ukrainian manpower after two years of bumbling about and ideological hand wringing over mobilisation, is the real cause. Ukraine didn’t and doesn’t have enough men in the field and it has itself to blame. If there is one policy issue that Zelensky and his government screwed up on big time, failure to properly mobilise - and still not doing it to their fullest ability - has been the most egregious mistake.
Ukraine has had no choice but to ‘bend like a reed’ as Tsun Zhu would describe it.
Eventually as you bend, the enemy front expands and his manpower advantage thins out and becomes weak in places, strong in others, eventually his reserve are drawn in, attrited down and the frontal attack starts to fade out.
And that’s exactly what seems to be happening now.
The Russians had transformed the Avdivka command to what they term a Central Manoeuvre Force, giving it unprecedented resources and decision making power to exploit the capture of the city and the weak Ukrainian defences beyond.
They knew they had an opportunity here to make major inroads into Ukraine and they set about doing it.
The Ukrainian forces themselves gave the Russians what they sought - the failed rotation at Ochertyne was a disaster. This literally led to an undefended section of front line.
As an analyst you have to give the credit to the Russians for seeing it, analysing it was not a trap and exploiting it at lightning pace. Let it be a lesson to everyone that by this stage in the war the Russians have become far more adept at seeing and understanding their opportunities, far more rapidly and effectively than we would like to give them credit for. It’s how they go about that exploitation that becomes so destructive to their own forces.
Yet we have to put this all into perspective. Over three months and at the cost of tens of thousands of Russian lives - the estimate is around 80,000- they advanced just 12km (7.8 miles).
As the advance became slower, they diverted the 27th Motorised brigade from the central part of the front to the north and used it to make a dash for the village of New York, which again took Ukraine by surprise and was again, caused by operational failure during a rotation. Rather than cut off this spike attack from the base they chose to contain the spearhead, which they have barely managed to do - again short on manpower not willpower.
At this point the Russians seemed to have lost the key strategic concept that they had made work so well.
It’s very simple because in the end it’s all about simple maths.
CONTINUES…