Are you a software developer, and, if so, without looking it up, do you know what the THERAC-25 is?

@glyph No, first I'm hearing of it. Never learned about it in school.

I like that the wikipedia article leads by blaming concurrency, but the root causes section at the end has all sorts of horrifying things like this "However, some errors which endangered the patient merely paused the machine, and the frequent occurrence of minor errors caused operators to become accustomed to habitually unpausing the machine."

@aeva @glyph I once found a list of the deadliest/most costly software bugs ever, and the list compilers specifically called out THERAC-25 as the only UX bug on the list

(I think this list was made in the mid-10s, which would have been before BOTH America and Russia, in unrelated incidents, lost major naval war vessels to UX bugs)

@robryk @aeva @glyph

1. U.S.S. John McCain. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_John I found a really good article about this before but can't find it now. The ship was designed so the helm could be controlled from any of a number of touchscreen interfaces around the ship, during the accident full control of the entire boat was accidentally transferred to a random screen near the ship's rear and the ship serenely sailed into another boat while the helm tried to figure out why the controls weren't working

@reedmideke @glyph @mcc @robryk @aeva TIL that the NTSB does reports on events involving military transportation!

@robryk @aeva @glyph

2. Anders Puck Nielsen (also on fediverse btw) argues that the sinking of the Russian Federation ship Moskva in the Ukraine war ultimately happened (in echoes of the THERAC-25) due to operator fatigue caused by the design of the ship's anti-missile radar systems, which caused the ship to fail to respond to incoming missiles it otherwise had the capacity to deflect

youtube.com/watch?v=gaiVjJWOUW

@Geoffberner He is at @anderspuck (for me he turns up by profile searching his name from my instance's search box)

@robryk @aeva @glyph I thought it was but apparently it was only offline for two years. Ten people died tho so that's still pretty bad

@mcc @robryk @aeva @glyph sounds like there's a fascinating rabbit hole of failure of command in that one. In addition to tech. Redundant places to steer is not new in the US Navy.

@beeoproblem @robryk @aeva @glyph If I remember the article correctly, the screen to which control had been transferred was actually manned at the time, they just couldn't do the right thing because neither the helm screen operator nor the rudder screen operator *realized* that control had transferred. But I'm not sure I remember correctly.

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