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#GameTheory question for everyone...
Is there a name for when an optimal strategy is avoided because the optimal strategy is easily defended against when you know the person is using it in the first place?
Or the reverse, where someone might intentionally use a very poor strategy specifically because the user would never expect a user to pick a poor strategy and thus, at least when assumed it wont be used, becomes a strong strategy?
@freemo this is at least adjacent to the Nash Equilibrium. When parties will act in response to each other repeatedly there will emerge an optimal strategy that in general is not a single action, but a statistical distribution of actions that do not allow the other party to predict with certainty the next action.
For example in baseball, a pitcher's best pitch might be a fastball, but he will only throw it 70% of the time even though other pitches have worse individual outcomes because he must ensure the batter doesn't just sit on the fast ball.
