美軍撤離阿富汗議題後的種種反應，其中之一是阿富汗籍翻譯員及其家庭的移民申請。
"Roughly 17,000 former Afghan interpreters and their families are awaiting word on their applications for U.S. immigrant visas, according to No One Left Behind, a nonprofit that advocates on their behalf. On average, two former Afghan translators have been killed a month since the beginning of the year, according to No One Left Behind.
The U.S. hasn’t said publicly how it would keep them safe in the event of a Taliban takeover. But the State Department has said it is aware of the risk and is committed to moving their visa applications forward."
"美軍為了對付恐怖份子游擊戰，這20年來調整了許多過往習慣的戰略觀念，就連指揮系統，也從2000年以前強調的指揮、通信、情報、管制、計算機（C4I：Command、Control、Communication，Computing，& Intelligence），演進到C4ISRT，把前五個項目加上了監視（Surveillance）、偵察（Reconnaissance）、目標鎖定（Targeting），後面加的這三個項目，以往全部都是參二情報官的業務，獨立出來是因為有了新工具，而且更需要即時而精準的反應，以免造成過多的「附帶傷害」，傷及無辜。"
阿富汗以後只能改吃中國空餉了。
"根據美國政府的機密報告，阿國軍警號稱共三十五．二萬人，但實際員額卻僅二十五．四萬。美國政府審計單位指控阿國軍方高層長期「灌水」，Ａ美國人的稅金，使華府要求阿國政府必須在提交包括指紋和臉部掃描在內的個資，才可撥款援助。"
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/paper/1466934?utm_medium=R&utm_campaign=SHARE&utm_source=FACEBOOK
【在反游擊戰的概念裡，政府軍並須保持最少3比1的人數優勢來對抗游擊隊，而游擊隊保有戰場主動權與出奇不意的優勢來決定戰鬥的時間與地點。而把美軍的空中火力支援抽掉後，阿富汗正規軍與特戰也等於失去了對塔利班戰鬥的優勢，而很多人會問，美國在阿富汗作戰的20年間，為何不幫助阿富汗政府建構強而有力的空軍?答案是阿富汗人民的識字率在10%至20%間，所以非常難找到合適的人來做飛行與維修支援的訓練。
同樣的問題也發生在建構砲兵部隊上。 我曾親手訓練過阿富汗六個步兵營與兩個機動打擊營。在間接火力支援配備上，這些單位配有俄製82mm與SPG-9無後座力炮。 與我一起工作的羅馬尼亞訓練小組告訴我SPG-9無後座力炮雖然可以運用在直射與曲射火力支援上，但我們並沒有教阿富汗部隊如何運用曲射火力支援的方式，根本的原因在於他們大部分的人並沒有足夠的教育程度去了解如何讓間接火力有效的發揮。 】
https://www.facebook.com/DTMMAG/photos/a.163939113650510/4480203468690698
【阻礙阿富汗重建的另一大主要原因，還是源於該國群山造就的部落化心態。由於千百年來各地難以互聯互通，散落在群山之間的各個村莊宛如一個個「獨立共和國」，擁有武裝、毛拉（神職人員），族長是最高話事人。事實上，該國從未成功建立起一個強大的中央政府，總統或國王的影響力往往只能輻射到自己人掌控的大城市。阿富汗諺語「院子里的一條好狗，比首都的好國王更有用」，就充分體現了這點。
在這樣一個歷史上缺乏有力集權機構和國家意識的國家，很難在戰亂後迅速搭建其一套具有廣泛動員力的權力機構，尤其是在經歷了長久戰亂後，許多民眾會更加依賴自己部落的軍閥所提供的安全網絡。】
阿富汗土地經過多年戰爭(有地雷+未長期維護灌溉運輸等建設)後難以發展正常農業，靠本小利多的罌粟是最便利的來錢途逕。美國在阿富汗這些年不是沒有打擊鴉片交易，但在沒有更好替代作物，很難令阿富汗人脫離罌粟產業的誘惑。
"U.N. officials reported that the Taliban likely earned more than $400 million between 2018 and 2019 from the drug trade. A May 2021 U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan (SIGAR) report quoted a U.S. official as estimating they derive up to 60% of their annual revenue from illicit narcotics."
"Mansfield says his field studies show the most the Taliban can earn from illicit opiates is about $40 million annually, predominantly from levies on opium production, heroin labs and drug shipments."
"Washington spent an estimated $8.6 billion between 2002 and 2017 to throttle Afghanistan's drug trade in order to deny the Taliban funds, according to a 2018 SIGAR report. Apart from poppy eradication, the United States and allies backed interdiction raids and alternative crop programs, airstrikes on suspected heroin labs and other measures."
"那天清晨的赫拉特看來像伊朗貧民窟。所有東西都在最近緊急建造完成。平坦的屋頂上有蓋到一半的購物商場，成串光禿禿的鋼筋如同蟲足，牆壁顏色就跟路上飄來的沙塵一樣。這就是政治角度下的伊斯蘭教建築，展現了馬克思主義及清教神學的綜合體，配上土褐色蘇聯磚頭。這裡大部分的人都穿髒黑色或褪色的咖啡色衣服，像伊朗鄉下人。我不喜歡這城市。為了打發時間我去市集買步行用枴杖。
橫越巴基斯坦時我拿著理想的步行枴杖。那枴杖長五呎，由磨光的竹子製成，兩端均為鐵製。我用那枴杖徒步走了九個月，但沒有帶進阿富汗。這叫做「當」（dang），賈特人（一支來自印度旁遮普的農村種姓）直到十二世紀中葉前仍在使用「當」，一部分是為了自我防衛。許多巴基斯坦及印度旁遮普地區的人家中都還保留著祖父的枴杖。年輕人喜歡拿我的枴杖玩，在身體旁邊畫圈，幻想在敵人頭上加速畫弧線來擊敗對方。有人跟我說他的曾祖父使用「當」殺死了旁遮普最後一隻獅子。我喜歡使用自己的「當」徒步行走，每走四步敲一下地面使我的行動有了節奏。爬山的時候「當」可以有效地分散集中在左膝的重量。但現在除了鎮暴警察，沒人使用「當」了。「當」這個字有著陳舊的風味，我用這個字時大家都大笑。]
https://www.books.com.tw/web/sys_serialtext/?item=0010756460&page=5
不僅伊朗, 北韓與阿富汗其實面臨同樣的外交困境:
[ There is a misconception in Iran’s foreign policy that merely being a part of the different regional bodies in neighborhood regions, including Eurasia, could spontaneously break the “sanctions wall” and lead to diversified fruitful foreign relations. It is hard to imagine any real, meaningful accomplishments will result from multilateral platforms such as the SCO, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), rather than Iran’s bilateral relations with Russia and China. Instead, Iran’s insistence on having a seat at the table only generates more leverage for Moscow and Beijing to bolster the country’s overreliance on the East.
Efforts to gain a seat in these largely ineffective initiatives, where Russia and China are the dominant stakeholders and it is nearly impossible for Tehran to seek tangible and achievable goals, does nothing but waste the limited diplomatic resources of the country. In terms of trade and economics, which matter the most to Iran, Eurasian great initiatives like the Russian-led EAEU and China’s BRI haven’t even brought about even significant developments in Beijing-Moscow bilateral relations or even regional institutional coordination of the two initiatives, despite lip service in that regard.]
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/why-is-iran-so-keen-on-joining-the-sco/
