台灣備戰需要雙重加速: 爭取短期內購入軍備與強化軍員實戰能力.
"U.S. officials, former Taiwanese military leaders and security experts say they believe that means Taiwan needs to do more to ensure it can inflict enough damage to discourage an invading force or hold it off until the arrival of help—possibly from the U.S. After years of increases in military spending, China now has around 100 times as many ground force personnel as Taiwan and a military budget 25 times as large, according to Pentagon data."
中國武裝攻擊前,致力打擊台灣自衛信心的動機: PLA逾卌年無實戰經驗,且有印太鄰國的包圍壓力。
"Launching a full-scale amphibious incursion 130 kilometers from the mainland would be a daunting exercise, and the PLA has not had major combat experience since 1979. Beijing would risk major resistance from Taipei as well as a devastating military response from Washington. In addition, it would do grave, if not, irreparable damage to its ties with the United States and the European Union, not to mention the four militarily and economically formidable democracies it counts as neighbors: Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea. Indeed, it is hard to think of an action that would do more to jeopardize China’s long-term strategic prospects. It would be far less risky for Beijing to continue its present lines of efforts: increasing its bilateral military advantage across the Taiwan Strait, working to undermine Taipei’s self-confidence, and persuading Taiwan that it will eventually have to acquiesce to resolving cross-strait tensions on China’s terms."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/taiwan-at-the-nexus-of-technology-and-geopolitics/
回顧過去的美台中三方交戰:
「在金門823砲戰爆發後,美軍太平洋空軍司令庫特納(Laurence S. Kutner)曾主張,一旦兩岸爆發武裝衝突,美方就應率先朝中國大陸投擲原子彈,但僅限空軍基地,認為如此便不會引起美國政府中疑戰者的反對。與此同時,當時的美國官員不否認,此舉極有可能導致中國盟邦蘇聯進行核武反擊,但美軍官員寧可如此,也不願冒險輸掉金門。
時任美國參謀首長聯席會議主席垂寧(Nathan Twining)還曾表示,若攻擊中國空軍基地無法遏阻中方軍事行動,美方就不得不增加核武攻擊選項,最北應將上海納入轟炸目標。他坦承,這麼做勢必會讓台灣、甚至沖繩淪為核武攻擊的目標,但若美國國家政策是捍衛(台灣)離島,就必須接受這個後果。
時任美國國務卿杜勒斯(John Foster Dulles)當時亦向參謀首長聯席會議坦言,離島淪陷就代表中共更進一步。
最終,時任總統艾森豪駁回諸位將領的建議,仍決定先採用傳統武器。不過,由於當時的美國政府已不想再打一場類似韓戰的傳統戰爭,美方官員一致相信,除非中共停止奪取金門的行動,否則美軍下一步就會動用核武反擊。」
金門砲戰作為檢驗台敵友的定位點:
“吳崇涵、翁履中、陳冠吾三位學者的投書文章〈抗中不等於保台 川普賣槍不賣命〉,認為美國主流民意向來反對美軍涉入海外爭端,更別提是與美國沒有直接利益的台灣;對中國抱持反感與支持出兵協防台灣,沒有一定的相關性;川普面臨連任壓力,打抗中牌是在轉移防疫不力的批評;美國歷任總統基本上都是透過出售武器來挺台,避免給予台灣太過明確的軍事安全承諾。
這種論述背後,有著不可言明的預設:美國不可信任;川普政府的政策起心動念是選情或出於政治動機;美國「賣槍不賣命」,不會動用武力履行對台安全承諾,干犯中國,因為中國太過強大。可是三位學者卻沒有仔細分析,美國近年來對於台灣安全的看法,是否已經大幅改變?預設「美國不會出兵挺台」,但如何解釋歷史上美國於1958年金門炮戰中協防台灣及金門、1996年台海危機中派遣航母戰鬥群駛往台海巡弋、近來以軍艦通過台灣海峽與戰機偵蒐等實際行動對應中國軍事活動的增加?”
共機騷擾作用力與敵視中國反作用力:
"A poll by Taiwan’s state-funded research institute Academia Sinica, conducted in May, found that roughly 45% of local respondents see the Chinese government as an enemy of Taiwan, up from 25% in 2018."
趙君朔剖析路透社那篇解放軍犯台六套劇本,將重點放在馬祖攻防效應:
三個月後果然就看到解放軍開始對馬祖蠢蠢欲動了:
"The aircraft’s low flight path suggests it was trying to avoid being detected by radar, said Su Tzu-yun, an associate research fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a Taipei-based think tank that is backed by the Taiwanese military."
"In the days since, Taiwanese media blasted the military for not doing more to keep the public informed. A former vice air marshal in the Taiwanese air force, Chang Yan-ting, echoed that criticism, adding that the incident also showed Taiwanese military leaders had allowed themselves to be distracted by Chinese military activity elsewhere."
資訊戰攻擊從馬祖試探滿符合低成本高效益:
"Fourteen submarine cables extend from Taiwan, with some buried about 6 feet beneath the seabed. The cables, which are bundles of fiber-optic lines the thickness of a garden hose, provide roughly 95% of the island’s data-and-voice traffic and connect much of Asia to the internet."
這就是台灣版的烏東吧...
"幾週前,連江縣長王忠銘還前往福州訪問,告訴福州官員和中國移動通信集團副董事長,希望在馬祖及福州之間鋪設一條海底纜線,王忠銘強調,福州基本上已經答應了,剩下的就交給我們了。"
需求催生出供應,某方面來說也是中國搞破壞逼著台灣設法自給自足往前進...
"為便利離島居民通訊品質,中華電信陸續針對澎湖、金門、馬祖鋪設3條海底電纜,而台澎金馬四號光纖海纜建置案,細分為台澎金、台馬各1條,合計全長500多公里,預計2026年鋪設完工,前3條均為外商得標,首次有本土離岸風電業者得標。"
外島對付無人機騷擾的破洞:
“後續國防部規劃26套要給外島,目前期程是2024年完成13套,2025年13套,會看國防部的指導。邱國正說,中科院現在有什麼就先出,後面程序照走。”
https://def.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/4517608