Show newer

Belarusian “Cyber Partisans” claim large-scale cyberattack on major fertilizer producer Grodno Azot, demand release of political prisoners.

The Belarusian hacktivist collective known as “Cyber Partisans” announced a large-scale cyberattack on Grodno Azot (“Hrodna Azot” in Belarusian), a state-run fertilizer producer. The group demanded the release of political prisoners arrested by the regime of sixth-term self-proclaimed dictator Alexander Lukashenko, who remains in power in Minsk despite the wave of massive nationwide protests that followed the country’s most recent falsified election in 2020.

Cyber Partisans reported that the attack encrypted internal mail, document flow, and hundreds of Grodno Azot computers. Backups of databases, servers, emails, and document flow have also been erased. Security systems and surveillance cameras were hacked, and the work of the boiler room has been disrupted, according to the group.

The Cyber Partisans also hacked into the company's website. To confirm their actions, Cyber Partisans published screenshots of hacked surveillance cameras, a video with the inscription “We control the boiler room,” and a letter to the chairman of Belneftekhim — Grodno Azot's state-owned parent company. The letter says that the hack has severely disrupted nitrogen fertilizer deliveries.

Cyber Partisans have offered to recover the data if their demands are met. The group is calling for the release of all political prisoners from Grodno Azot, in addition to 75 political prisoners who are in very poor health but have no connection to the company. The latter will be determined at the discretion of the group.

“Since 2020, the management of Grodno Azot has been involved in bullying, pressure, and political repression of the company's employees. We have not forgotten [the] punitive raids, reports [to the police] and mass layoffs. Now it's your turn to pay. The stakes are higher. [...] Now, we worked carefully and used only a small part of our capabilities. If you refuse, next time the stakes will be even higher. [...] 4 years of intimidation, repression and politically-motivated layoffs are on the conscience of Grodno Azot management. For this, they get our own cyber sanctions.”

The group also threatened the management of other enterprises, institutions, and organizations involved in political repression in Belarus with similar attacks.

In 2020, the management of Grodno Azot, Belarus’ largest nitrogen producer, greenlit mass layoffs of the company’s employees for their participation in anti-government protests. The Belarusian police also detained up to ten participants in a strike at Grodno Azot itself.

Grodno Azot is the only Belarusian facility to produce carbamide — a water-soluble nitrogen fertilizer. In 2006, the United States imposed sanctions against nine Belarusian companies — including Grodno Azot and its affiliate, Grodno Khimvolokno — for “undermining the democratic process.” The company has been under EU sanctions since December 2021 for firing and intimidating workers who participated in protests after the 2020 presidential election. As a result, Grodno Azot was prohibited from selling its products to the EU.

In 2023, reports by the Belarusian Investigative Center and the Lithuanian independent investigative center Siena confirmed that Grodno Azot used multiple shell companies to circumvent the sanctions and supply its products to the European Union.

Source

@freerussia_report

Abibas is back. Russia is once again flooded with low-quality goods and counterfeit goods.

The world continues to expand bans on the supply of a variety of goods to Z-landia, and the Z-authorities say that they are coping with the sanctions. Formally, imports have indeed returned to the pre-war level, but the main thing is not visible behind the dry statistics - the quality of these goods is completely different.

Instead of branded goods, they buy their cheap analogues or counterfeit ones, they actively take Lada again, and the equipment is increasingly repaired, instead of buying a new one.

It is even more difficult for industrial enterprises – the launch of new production facilities is postponed, factories save equipment because spare parts are not available, or switch to simpler equipment.

Numbers: In total, imports of goods and services are estimated at $379 billion in 2023 - almost the same amount ($380 billion) it was before the invasion. It doesn't seem so bad, but at a closer look the growth in imports was mainly not due to consumer demand, but due to the state circumventing sanctions: in 2023, more machinery, equipment, and vehicles, were imported, these categories accounted for $27 billion out of the $30 billion growth in total imports.

Of the consumer spheres, only imports of textiles and footwear have grown. But food products and agricultural raw materials were imported even less than in the first year of the war, as well as chemical products, timber and pulp and paper products.

Secondly, these figures say little about the quality of imported goods.The main increase in imports of goods came from China — as in the 90s, Putinistan began to be filled with the flow of Chinese consumer goods. Asia carries its own goods, but also serves as a trade hub for products from the EU and the US.

Russians have been switching from expensive to affordable brands — even "in fairly sensitive categories, such as alcohol or children's products, where there used to be a high level of distrust in domestic production".

The share of counterfeit goods on marketplaces has increased by 40%. 23% are fake auto parts, that are used more often, as demand for car repairs grow, especially many problems with the maintenance of Chinese brands.

The same increase is observed for the repair of household appliances and electronics, indicating that the quality of equipment is declining or becoming obsolete, and can't be replaced by new. Although on average the incomes of the population grew, so did people's debt to banks. Most of them are pensioners, whose incomes have noticeably decreased.

Not only the population suffers, but also production. Manufacturers were seriously dependent on imported equipment and raw materials. The share of imports in ruZZian products is highest (+ 50%) in textile and pharmaceutical products, electrical equipment, cars and computers. Before the war, about half of the added value in imports came from the EU and North America, and the other half came from China. The reorientation of the market leads to lowering the quality of materials and technologies.

There is an increase in costs due to the lack of alternative suppliers and firms trying to stock up imported components and raw materials. Still, oil companies for example admit not to be working at full capacity, because it will be difficult to find spare parts. Not only repairs, but also modernization and expansion of production are postponed.

Growing problems, because 40% of the machinery and equipment in mining, production of investment, intermediate and consumer goods, agriculture; and even more in energy industry (47%) and construction (45%) are worn out.

Source

@freerussia_report

From Zelenskyy

Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi has just delivered a report on the hottest spots of the frontline. Chasiv Yar and other key directions in the Donetsk region: Pokrovsk, Kurakhove. Also, Kupyansk direction in the Kharkiv region. Our positions, our results. I am grateful to every soldier, every commander, to all our combat units that are truly efficient and resilient. Today, the Commander-in-Chief also reported on the destruction of targets in the occupied territory – the operations carried out and the preparation of planned ones. The Russian army has to suffer losses every day, and every such day of Russian losses brings us closer to the much-needed peace. I also spoke with Defense Minister Umerov, mainly about air defense. We are doing everything possible, contacting all available partners to enhance the protection of the sky by increasing the number and quality of air defense systems at the disposal of our warriors. Every leader and country assisting us in this are real life savers.

I thank everyone who is with Ukraine and in Ukraine! Thank you to all who fight for our state and people, to everyone who helps, and to everyone who contributes to Ukrainian strength and protects lives.

(3/3)

The United States and its Western allies must provide Ukraine with regular and consistent aid and deliver new critical systems to Ukrainian forces in a timely and effective manner for Western security assistance to have operationally significant effects.

ISW has been considering a very wide forecast cone from the most advantageous to the most dangerous possible outcomes in recent months due to the uncertainty about the resumption of US aid to Ukraine.

ISW will likely be narrowing the forecast cone in the coming months as the impacts of Western security assistance become clearer in Ukraine and as the Kremlin decides how to respond.

Key Points from April 20th, 2024’s Update:

1.) The US House of Representatives passed a supplemental appropriations bill on April 20th, which is intended to provide $60 billion of assistance to Ukraine. The bill must now be passed by the Senate and signed by the president before any aid may head to Ukraine.

2.) These two requirements coupled with the logistics of transporting US material to Ukraine’s frontlines will mean the US assistance most likely won’t produce a noticeable effect for several weeks. The situation at the front will remain precarious in the meantime.

3.) Ukrainian forces may suffer additional setbacks in the coming weeks, but they should be able to blunt the overall Russian offensive once the US aid arrives.

4.) The US overcoming its political differences, at least momentarily, is a critical turning point in the war in Ukraine. However, all players involved will have to make critical decisions in the near- and long-term future.

(3/3)

(2/3)

ISW continues to assess that material shortages are forcing Ukraine to conserve ammunition and prioritize limited resources to critical sectors of the front, increasing the risk of a Russian breakthrough in other less well-provisioned sectors and making the overall frontline more fragile than the current relatively slow rate of Russian advances suggests.

Ukraine will likely be in a significantly improved operation position by June 2024 and Russian military command will most likely reconsider several aspects of their anticipated 2024 offensive in the Kharkiv region.

Ukrainian forces will likely leverage sufficient US security assistance to blunt Russian offensive operations in June 2024, which Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov recently highlighted as the likely month that Russian forces will launch their expected large-scale summer offensive effort.

The Russian military has likely been assessing that Ukrainian forces would be unable to defend against current and future Russian offensive operations due to delays in or the permanent end of US military assistance. This assumption was likely an integral part of Russia’s operational planning for this summer.

Russian forces have been establishing operational- and strategic-level reserves to support their expected summer offensive effort, but likely have been doing so based on the assumption that even badly-trained and poorly-equipped Russian forces could make advances against Ukrainian forces that lack essential artillery and air defense munitions.

Ukraine is also addressing its own manpower challenges and will likely continue to conduct rotations to rest and replenish degraded units, although it will take time for these efforts to generate large-scale effects.

Ukrainian officials have previously indicated that Russian forces will likely continue to conduct offensive operations this summer focused on seizing the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts but may also launch an offensive operation to seize Kharkiv City.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov notably signaled on April 19 Russia’s intent to seize Kharkiv City.

The Russian military command may have envisioned that simultaneous offensive efforts towards Kharkiv City and along the current frontline in eastern Ukraine would stretch and overwhelm poorly-provisioned and undermanned Ukrainian forces and allow Russian forces to achieve a major breakthrough in at least one sector of the frontline.

The Ukrainian forces with improving material and manpower supplies that will likely hold the frontline in June 2024 will undermine this operational intent of simultaneous Russian offensive operations across a wider front.

The Russian military command will likely have to consider if the intended areas and objectives of its summer offensive effort are now feasible and if the current means that Russian forces have been concentrating and preparing are sufficient to conduct planned offensive operations considering the expected resumption of US security assistance to Ukraine.

*ISW offers no forecast of the decisions the Russians will make at this time.*

The anticipated resumption of US military aid to Kyiv is a significant turning point in this war, but the Kremlin, the collective West, and Ukraine still have many difficult decisions to make. All of which will help determine the nature and outcome of the fighting.

The Kremlin still retains the ability to further mobilize its economy and population to support its campaign to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity and may determine to pursue domestically unpopular decisions should it deem them necessary.

Ukraine still faces persisting force generation, sustainment, and defense industrial challenges that will heavily affect the capabilities that it can bring to bear.

(2/3)

Show older
Qoto Mastodon

QOTO: Question Others to Teach Ourselves
An inclusive, Academic Freedom, instance
All cultures welcome.
Hate speech and harassment strictly forbidden.