《犬儒理论》摘录

第二部分：权力政治

1.权力万能论

Postmodernism is characterized politically by its intense focus on power as the guiding and structuring force of society, a focus which is codependent on the denial of objective knowledge. Power and knowledge are seen as inextricably entwined—most explicitly in Foucault’s work, which refers to knowledge as “power-knowledge.” Lyotard also describes a “strict interlinkage”31 between the language of science and that of politics and ethics, and Derrida was profoundly interested in the power dynamics embedded in hierarchical binaries of superiority and subordination that he believed exist within language. Similarly, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari saw humans as coded within various systems of power and constraint and free to operate only within capitalism and the flow of money. In this sense, for postmodern Theory, power decides not only what is factually correct but also what is morally good—power implies domination, which is bad, whereas subjugation implies oppression, the disruption of which is good. These attitudes were the prevailing mood at the Sorbonne in Paris through the 1960s, where many of the early Theorists were strongly intellectually influenced.

Because of their focus on power dynamics, these thinkers argued that the powerful have, both intentionally and inadvertently, organized society to benefit them and perpetuate their power. They have done so by legitimating certain ways of talking about things as true, which then spread throughout society, creating societal rules that are viewed as common sense and perpetuated on all levels. Power is thus constantly reinforced through discourses legitimized or mandated within society, including expectations of civility and reasoned discourse, appeals to objective evidence, and even rules of grammar and syntax. As a result, the postmodernist view is difficult to fully appreciate from the outside because it looks very much like a conspiracy theory. In fact, the conspiracies it alludes to are subtle and, in a way, not conspiracies at all, since there are no coordinated actors pulling the strings; instead, we’re all participants. Theory, then, is a conspiracy theory with no conspirators in particular. In postmodern Theory, power is not exercised straightforwardly and visibly from above, as in the Marxist framework, but permeates all levels of society and is enforced by everyone, through routine interactions, expectations, social conditioning, and culturally constructed discourses that express a particular understanding of the world. This controls which hierarchies are preserved—through, say, due process of law or the legitimizing mechanism of scientific publishing—and the systems within which people are positioned or coded. In each of these examples, note that it is the social system and its inherent power dynamics that are seen as the causes of oppression, not necessarily willful individual agents. Thus, a society, social system, or institution can be seen as in some way oppressive without any individual involved with it needing to be shown to hold even a single oppressive view.

The postmodernists do not necessarily see the system of oppression as the result of a consciously coordinated, patriarchal, white supremacist, heteronormative conspiracy. Instead, they regard it as the inevitable result of self-perpetuating systems that privilege some groups over others, which constitute an unconscious, uncoordinated conspiracy inherent to systems involving power. They believe, however, that those systems are patriarchal, white supremacist, and heteronormative, and therefore necessarily grant unfair access to straight, white Western men and work to maintain that status quo by excluding the perspectives of women and of racial and sexual minorities.

Put more simply, one central belief in postmodern political thought is that powerful forces in society essentially order society into categories and hierarchies that are organized to serve their own interests. They effect this by dictating how society and its features can be spoken about and what can be accepted as true. For example, a demand that someone provide evidence and reasoning for their claims will be seen through a postmodernist Theoretical lens as a request to participate within a system of discourses and knowledge production that was built by powerful people who valued these approaches and designed them to exclude alternative means of communicating and producing “knowledge.” In other words, Theory views science as having been organized in a way that serves the interests of the powerful people who established it—white Western men—while setting up barriers against the participation of others. Thus, the cynicism at the heart of Theory is evident.

在后现代主义主义看来，权力像上帝一样，无所不在，无所不能，权力塑造了知识和语言，决定了是非与善恶。有权者凭借权力控制着整个社会，以及维护自己的利益，不仅如此，权力还控制了人们的语言，规训了人们的行为。这种控制和规训无所不包，包括那些最基本的文明礼貌，最基本的生活常识，和最基本的做人道理。比方说，如果人们认为在谈话时要讲文明，有条理，注重证据，这在后现代主义看来就体现了西方白人男性的权力规训(科学和理性的推行者是白人男性)。

这几乎就和阴谋论一样了，事实上，在外人的眼里看来就是如此。只有理解后现代主义者的思维，才能理解这些人为什么会有这种病态的想法：在后现代理论中，权力不是一种明确的自上而下的强制力量，而是一种微妙的，无形的势力，每个人都参与其中，权力影响着人们的说话方式，制造着特定的社会期待，渗透着所有人的日常生活，并且借助科学和法律维持着特定的社会体制。后现代主义认为，个体的行为是不重要的，社会体制和其内在的动态权力才是压迫的根源，换句话说，在一个社会中，即便没有人从事任何压迫的行为，也没有人持有任何压迫的观点，这个社会依然可以被视为充满压迫的社会。这是一种没有阴谋者的阴谋论。

2.视个体为权力的载体

In particular, criticism from any position deemed powerful tends to be dismissed because it is assumed either to be ignorant (or dismissive) of the realities of oppression, by definition, or a cynical attempt to serve the critic’s own interests. The postmodern belief that individuals are vehicles of discourses of power, depending on where they stand in relation to power, makes cultural critique completely hopeless except as a weapon in the hands of those Theorized to be marginalized or oppressed.

后现代理论倾向于否认针何对自身的批评，如果批评来自于弱势的一方，批评者就会被认为是蠢货，因为他”看不清压迫的本质”，如果如果批评来自于强势的一方，批评者就会被认为是坏人，因为他”想维护自己的特权)。这是因为后现代主义认为个体是没有什么能动性的，无非只是权力话语的载体。这使得后现代主义能够无视一切批评。

3.”权力无所不在”

Power is everywhere,” Foucault writes, “not because it embraced everything, but because it comes from everywhere.”17 For Foucault, power is present on all levels of society because certain knowledges have been legitimized and accepted as true. This leads people to learn to speak in these discourses, which further reinforces them. Power works like this, for Foucault, “not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another.”18 This view has gone on to become one of the core beliefs of applied postmodernism and Social Justice activism today: unjust power is everywhere, always, and it manifests in biases that are largely invisible because they have been internalized as “normal.”19 Consequently, speech is to be closely scrutinized to discover which discourses it is perpetuating, under the presumption that racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, or other latent prejudices must be present in the discourses and thus endemic to the society that produces them. (This is circular reasoning.) These “problematics” need to be identified and exposed, whether they manifest in a president’s address or in the decade-old adolescent tweet history of a relative nobody. The widespread slang term “woke” describes having become aware of and more able to see these problematics.

这是另一个来自福柯的思想，福柯认为，权力存在于社会的方方面面，权力正当化了特定的知识体系，使得人们开始使用特定的话语，这些话语反过来又强化了权力本身。对于福柯而言，这并不是因为掌权者控制了一切，而是因为权力存在于每一时刻，每一交互。这一思想后来被实用后现代主义者和”社会正义”(Social Justice)活动人土继承了下来，他们认为不正义的权力无所不在，无形无状，之所以无形无状，是因为它们被”内化”了。这些人先是预设种族主义，性别主义，恐同主义无所不在，然后又根据这种预设刻意地寻找种族主义，性别主义，恐同主义，然后再宣称这是不正义社会的产物。

5.把科学理解为压迫

This understanding of the oppressive role of science can be largely traced back to Michel Foucault. Foucault studied the production of “power-knowledge”—how knowledge is socially constructed by discourses, in the service of power—and was particularly concerned with “biopower”—how the biological sciences legitimize the knowledge that the powerful use to maintain their dominance. In his four-volume study, The History of Sexuality,14 Foucault argues that, since the late seventeenth century, far from suppressing speech about sex (as neo-Marxist thinkers like Marcuse had argued), there has been an explosion of talk about sex—both the act and the biological concept. As scientists began to study and categorize sexuality, Foucault claims, they simultaneously constructed it and created the sexual identities and categories that accompany these constructions.

“The society that emerged in the nineteenth century—bourgeois, capitalist, or industrial society, call it what you will—did not confront sex with a fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire machinery for producing true discourses concerning it.15”

Foucault’s view was that the discourses produced by this “machinery” gained social legitimacy as “truth” and then permeated all levels of society. This is a process of power but not, as the Marxist philosophers had claimed, one in which religious or secular authorities enforce an ideology on the common people. In Marxist thought, power is like a weight, pressing down on the proletariat. For Foucault, power operated more like a grid, running through all layers of society and determining what people held to be true and, consequently, how they spoke about it. The view from Foucault, thus Theory, is that power is a system we’re all constantly participating in by how we talk about things and what ideas we’re willing to consider legitimate, a system into which we are socialized. The prime culprit for legitimizing knowledge—and thus power—in Foucault’s view was science, which held prestige in society for exactly that purpose. This is what Foucault referred to as “biopower,” claiming that scientific discourse “set itself up as the supreme authority in matters of hygienic necessity,” and “in the name of biological and historical urgency, it justified the racisms of the state” because “[i]t grounded them in ‘truth.’”16 Foucault argues that power runs through the whole system of society, perpetuating itself through powerful discourses. He called this the “omnipresence of power.”

作者认为，把科学视为一种压迫的这种想法很大程度上可以追溯到米切尔·福柯，福柯发明了”权力知识”这种说法，认为权力通过话语建构了知识，使其为自己服务，他尤其关注”生物权力”对知识的建构，认为生物学通过生物知识维持了自身的统治地位。在《性史》一书中，福柯认为，自17世纪晚期以来，人们就对于性展开了非常多的讨论，并与此同时建构了性和性别身份。

福柯的看法是，”机制”建构了话语，话语又借此成为了”真相”，并渗透了社会。这和马克思主义者的看法很不相同，马克思主义者认为，权力是自上而下强加与无产阶级的，福柯则认为，权力类似于一种网格，存在于社会的各个层面，权力建构了合法知识，影响着人们的说话方式，并借此巩固自身地位。科学就是这样一种权力，这种权力使科学知识合法化，并且使种族主义合理化。

6.把科学视为一种特权

Social Justice scholars attempt to justify this with an attitude that sees science and reason as unjustly privileged—regardless of their ability to accurately describe reality and make predictions about it—over the wide variety of identity-based “ways of knowing.” The problem, for them, is that scientific forms of knowledge production aim to be objective and universal, and (at least in most people’s view) frequently succeed at that aim. Because there are evidence-based scientific explanations for some of the social issues that impact identity groups, science often finds itself in direct contravention of the postmodern principles, especially the belief that everything important is socially constructed. In addition, many philosophers, scientists, and other scholars have offered reasoned arguments that identify flaws in Theory and in Social Justice scholarship’s assumptions, methods, and conclusions. This type of criticism does not tend to go down well with the postmodernism at the heart of Social Justice scholarship and activism, so Social Justice–based attacks on science and reason are usually open and direct. This is not only because science and reason have an irritating habit of revealing the flaws in Theoretical approaches; it is also because they are universal and thus violate the postmodern knowledge principle and the postmodern theme of centering group identity, around which Social Justice scholarship is organized.

This violation is dealt with through the postmodern political principle. Because science has such a high prestige as a reliable producer of knowledge—and because postmodernists from Lyotard to Foucault have disparaged it as a discourse of power for the last fifty years—it is commonly regarded with deep suspicion by Social Justice scholars and activists. Often, this is rationalized by pointing to the fact that people have sometimes attempted to use science and reason to prop up injustices—especially if you read the history as cynically as possible.16 Claims like this often refer to much earlier periods of science—citing, for example, nineteenth-century arguments in support of colonialism that would now be dismissed as pseudoscience. At other times, the suspicions result from the fact that science has discovered things that do not conform to social-constructivist ideas, such as that differences between the sexes exist. And sometimes these objections are based on alleged discrimination: “formal and informal barriers to the participation of women and racial minorities in scientific enterprises [that] have had the effect of disproportionately favoring white males’ presence and influence in science.”17 These complaints, however, are often vague, begin with the cultural constructivist assumption that all inequalities must be the result of oppression rather than, say, men and women having different interests on average, and are typically accompanied by appeals to attitudes and problems that have not been much in evidence for decades.

社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)认为，科学和理性拥有着与之不相称的威望和特权，相反，那些基于群体身份的知识体系则受到了不公正待遇。他们之所以会这么认为，一方面是因为科学有着令理论家恼人的习惯：它总是会揭示那些抽象理论的谬误，而且它的结论总是与后现代主义的信条，例如社会建构论直接冲突。另一方面，科学提供的是客观，普世的解释，这又是与后现代主义的知识原则相冲突。因此，毫不奇怪，后现代主义者，以及社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)十分敌视科学。

面对科学与后现代理论的冲突，社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)的做法是以一种十分犬儒主义的态度阅读历史，使科学显得不正义：通常，他们会指出，科学在早期的发展阶段，例如在19世纪，曾经被用来替殖民主义辩护(即便这些说法现在已被视为伪科学)。因此，如果科学与后现代理论相冲突，社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)就会将这科学视为一种歧视，认为它代表了白人男性的霸权。

6以玄学代替科学

Instead of science, Social Justice scholarship advocates for “other ways of knowing,” derived from Theoretical interpretations of deeply felt lived experience. It argues that reason and evidence-based knowledge are unfairly favored over tradition, folklore, interpretation, and emotion because of the power imbalances baked into them. Without the slightest awareness of the racist and sexist implications, Theory views evidence and reason to be the cultural property of white Western men.

Examples of this are common. Dotson famously called the dominance of reason and science a “culture of justification” in 2012 and argued instead for a “culture of praxis,” which would incorporate multiple ways of knowing in order to include more diverse groups of people in philosophy.18 Other scholars have argued that rational and scientific approaches limit Anglo-American epistemologists from accepting broader and multiple ways of knowing.19 Still others recommend emotion, as an unjustly neglected means of arriving at reliable knowledge. Allison Wolf calls this the “reason/emotion divide” and describes it as a construct of the Western philosophical tradition. She advocates foregrounding feelings as a way of knowing.20

This approach is alarming, patronizing, and potentially dangerous. Nevertheless, the underlying concept of experiential knowledge is not entirely without merit. Quite often, it is more important to know how things are experienced than what the facts of the matter are. For example, if a friend’s father has died of a heart attack, we generally want to know how she is feeling and how we can help her through her grief. Factual information about myocardial infarctions is probably of less importance at that time. Nevertheless, there are facts that can be known about heart attacks, and it is important that these facts be accurate. Such knowledge cannot be gleaned simply by the experience of a heart attack or of losing a loved one to a heart attack. Sometimes we need to empathize with the person who has lost her loved one to a heart attack and sometimes we need to consult a cardiologist.

社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)主张以其它知识体系取代科学，例如传统习俗，神话故事和个人情感。他们认为，这些非科学的知识体系之所以没有科学受欢迎，是因为科学代表了西方白人男性的强势权力。

这种说法实际上就是在把科学视为西方白人的独有资产，然而鼓吹这种说法的社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)却丝毫没有意识到这种说法本身就是种族主义和性别主义的体现

作者在这里给了三个例子，第一个例子是Dotson在2012年呼吁要打破科学和理性的统治地位，以便于增加知识多元性和种族多元性，第二个例子是一批学者宣称科学和理性限制了盎格鲁美国人的认识，要把主观情绪当作知识的来源，第三个例子是Allison Wolf认为理性和情绪的区别是一种”建构”，要重视基于情绪的知识。

18.Kristie Dotson, “How Is This Paper Philosophy?” Comparative Philosophy 3, no. 1 (2012).
19.Code, “Epistemic Responsibility.”
20.Allison B. Wolf, “‘Tell Me How That Makes You Feel’: Philosophys Reason/Emotion Divide and Epistemic Pushback in Philosophy Classrooms,” Hypatia 32, no. 4 (2017): 893–910, doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12378.

7.立场认识论(2)

Standpoint theory operates on two assumptions. One is that people occupying the same social positions, that is, identities—race, gender, sex, sexuality, ability status, and so on—will have the same experiences of dominance and oppression and will, assuming they understand their own experiences correctly, interpret them in the same ways. From this follows the assumption that these experiences will provide them with a more authoritative and fuller picture. The other is that one’s relative position within a social power dynamic dictates what one can and cannot know: thus the privileged are blinded by their privilege and the oppressed possess a kind of double sight, in that they understand both the dominant position and the experience of being oppressed by it. As the feminist epistemologist Nancy Tuana puts it:

Standpoint theory was designed to be a method that would render transparent the values and interests, such as androcentrism, heteronormativity, and Eurocentrism, that underlie allegedly neutral methods in science and epistemology, and clarify their impact. Such attention to the subject of knowledge illuminated the various means by which oppressive practices can result in or reinforce epistemic inequalities, exclusions, and marginalizations. In this way, feminist and other liberatory epistemologists aimed to transform the subject of knowledge in the sense of focusing on knowledge obscured by dominant interests and values and thereby to identify and provide tools for undermining the knowledges and practices implicated in oppression.24

Standpoint theory often finds itself criticized for essentialism—for thinking something like “all black people feel like this.”27 This isn’t quite wrong because it rests, in a way, on a concept we’ve encountered before: strategic essentialism, wherein members of an oppressed group can essentialize themselves (or, here, the authenticity of their lived experience in relationship to power) as a means of achieving group political action. Its advocates don’t defend it that way, however. They generally get around this accusation by arguing that the theory does not assume all members of the same group have the same nature but that they experience the same problems in an unjust society, although they can choose which discourses they wish to contribute to. Members of these groups who disagree with standpoint theory—or even deny that they are oppressed—are explained away as having internalized their oppression (false consciousness) or as pandering in order to gain favor or reward from the dominant system (“Uncle Toms” and “native informants”) by amplifying Theoretically dominant discourses.

Standpoint theory is at the root of identity politics and it is the main thing that fundamentally differentiates it from the liberal civil rights movements. For influential black feminist Patricia Hill Collins, the relationship between standpoint theory and identity politics was explicit and represented a crucial element of progress.28 Similarly, but perhaps more profoundly, Kristie Dotson, arguably the most influential black feminist Theorist of knowledge, argues that it is almost impossible for dominant social groups to see outside of their own system of knowledge, which is simply considered knowledge per se by mainstream society. In her 2014 paper “Tracking Epistemic Oppression,” she sets out orders of oppression. The first two are Fricker’s two forms of epistemic injustice. The third and most profound order is “irreducible.” By this, she means it is an epistemic injustice that cannot simply be attributed to an unjust social system but that exists within the system of knowledge itself. Hence, changing it from within is almost—if not entirely—impossible.29 For Dotson, the systems of knowledge—“schemata”—have been specifically set up to work for dominant groups and exclude others, but, because they work for the dominant groups so smoothly, they do not even realize that there are things they don’t know, things that can only be known from within the knowledge systems that they oppress.30

Dotson ultimately asserts that knowledge is inadequate unless it includes the experiential knowledge of minority groups. This knowledge is assumed to be consistently different from that of dominant groups because of the power dynamics between the groups. Furthermore, the knowledge produced by dominant groups—including science and reason—is also merely the product of their cultural traditions and is not superior to the knowledge produced by other cultural traditions. Dotson explicitly proceeds from the two postmodern principles. Her argument, which is central to standpoint theory, denies that science and reason belong to all humans and are the same for all humans and, in effect, assigns them to white Western men.

Dotson goes further than this. The logical implication of her third-order oppression is that if someone from a dominant group does not agree that her knowledge-producing systems are limited by their failure to include experiential knowledge from outside them, that is because she is unable to step outside of her own culture. In other words, legitimate disagreement is not an option.

立场认识论有两个基本前提，第一个前提就是，群体身份相同的人，经历也都相同，对经历的理解也都相同。第二个前提则是，在权力系统中的相对位置决定了此人的认知，也就是说：拥有特权的人群因为特权而被蒙蔽了两眼，相反，被压迫的人群因为被压迫而拥有双倍的洞察力。

立场认识论因此被指责为本质论，以为所有的黑人经历都一样，面对这种指责，立场认识论者会辩称：虽然经历未必一样，但他们面临的压迫是一样的，至于他们希望参加哪些话语，那是他们自己的选择。说是这么说，可是，一当这些群体内部真的有人不同意立场认识论，或者不认为他们受压迫，立场论者就认为他们”将压迫内化了”，产生了”错误觉悟”，或者在同压迫者”串通一气”

立场认识论可以说是身份政治的核心，也是身份政治与民权运动最本质的区别，Patricia Hill Collins，Kristie Dotson这些影响最深远的黑人女权主义者都把立场认识论视为身份政治的”伟大成就”，Dotson更极端，她认为那些占优势地位的身份群体(白人男性)无法看到他们知识体系以外的任何事物。她认为，优势群体(白人男性)的知识体系(包括科学和理性)，仅仅是他们文化的产物，因此相比其它文化的产物没什么优越的地方。她否认科学和理性属于全人类，否认科学和理性的普世性，认为它们只属于西方白人男性。

Dotson甚至更进一步地说道：如果来自优势群体的人(白人)不同意她的认识论，而坚持逻辑和理性，这将是因为他局限于自身所属的文化，无法接受其它文化的知识体系，换句话说，他不被允许拥有合理的反对意见。

8.不可证伪性

The radically relativist answer—that two or more contradictory statements can be simultaneously true—is sometimes attempted, but it does not, after all, make much sense. Instead, what Social Justice scholars seem in practice to do is to select certain favored interpretations of marginalized people’s experience (those consistent with Theory) and anoint these as the “authentic” ones; all others are explained away as an unfortunate internalization of dominant ideologies or cynical self-interest. In this way the logical contradiction between radical relativism and dogmatic absolutism is resolved, but at the price of rendering the Social Justice Theory completely unfalsifiable and indefeasible: no matter what evidence about reality (physical, biological, and social) or philosophical argument may be presented, Theory always can and always does explain it away. In this sense, we are not so far, in fact, from the apocalyptic cults who predicted that the world would end on a specific day, but reaffirmed their beliefs with added fervor when that day passed uneventfully. (The spaceship coming to destroy the earth really did come, but the extraterrestrials changed their minds when they saw the cult members’ devotion.)

社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)把弱势群体的经历捧得很高，然而在实际上，社会正义学者(Social Justice scholars)只把赞同自己理论的经历视为真实的，而把不赞同自身理论的经历视为”压迫的内化”或是”利益的驱使”。

这就使得社会正义理论(Social Justice Theory)成为了一种不可证伪的学学，不论对方提供了多少证据，社会正义理论(Social Justice Theory)都将其解释为压迫的内化和利益的驱使。从这层含义上看，社会正义理论(Social Justice Theory)与那些预言世界将在某日终结的末日邪教几乎没有什么区别。这类邪教无视反面证据，事实上，预言与事实的冲突恰恰加深了末日教徒的信仰，他们会解释道：”世界之所以没有毁灭，正是因为教徒们信仰虔诚。”

9.理工科亦未幸免

Even science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects have been affected. Since 2010, there have been an increasing number of proposals from within engineering, arguing for the use of Social Justice concepts in that profession. One 2015 paper proposes that an engineer should “demonstrate competence in the provision of sociotechnological services that are sensitive to dynamics of difference, power, and privilege among people and cultural groups.”24 In the book Engineering and Social Justice, published by Purdue University Press, we read many variations on the same theme and a worrisome recommendation: “getting beyond views of truth as objective and absolute is the most fundamental change we need in engineering education.”25 Meanwhile, arguments have been made that mathematics is intrinsically sexist and racist because of its focus on objectivity and proof and because of disparate outcomes in mathematics education across racial groups

Drawing upon Indigenous worldviews to reconceptualize what mathematics is and how it is practiced, I argue for a movement against objects, truths, and knowledge towards a way of being in the world that is guided by first principles—mathematx. This shift from thinking of mathematics as a noun to mathematx as a verb holds potential for honouring our connections with each other as human and other-than-human persons, for balancing problem solving with joy, and for maintaining critical bifocality at the local and global level.26

It is unclear how this could improve mathematics, but the political agenda here is obvious—and alarming. Similar curricula are under serious consideration for implementation in public schools at all levels in the Seattle area.2

24.Ben Cohen, “The Rise of Engineering’s Social Justice Warriors,” James G. Martin Center for Academic Renewal, January 3, 2019, www.jamesgmartin.center/2018/11/the-rise-of-engineerings-social-justice-warriors/.
25.Donna Riley, Engineering and Social Justice (San Rafael, CA: Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 2008), 109.
26.Enrique Galindo and Jill Newton, eds. Proceedings of the 39th Annual Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education (Indianapolis, IN: Hoosier Association of Mathematics Teacher Educators, 2017).
27.Catherine Gewertz, “Seattle Schools Lead Controversial Push to ‘Rehumanize’ Math,” Education Week, October 22, 2019, www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/10/11/seattle-schools-lead-controversial-push-to-rehumanize.html.

社会正义理论(Social Justice Theory)的影响不仅局限与人文学科，传统的理工科(STEM)也受其影响。例如在2015年，工程学的一篇论文就写道：一位工程师应当具有社会技术上的资质，要能敏感地发现不同群体中存在的权力与特权差异。由普渡大学(Purdue University)出版的《工程学与社会正义》则建议道：”工程学需要超越客观真理这一陈旧概念”。还有的说法认为数学是种族主义的体现，因为数学注重客观证据，而且不种族族的人数学成绩不一样。

这些是我在《犬儒理论》中所做的摘录，由于这本书涉及的内容很多，我将对它们进行分类呈现。在原文的下方是我的简要概括。

第一部分：”犬儒理论”对于科学和理性的敌视

1.后现代主义对知识的态度

For Foucault, a statement reveals not just information but also the rules and conditions of a discourse. These then determine the construction of truth claims and knowledge. Dominant discourses are extremely powerful because they determine what can be considered true, thus applicable, in a given time and place. Thus, sociopolitical power is the ultimate determiner of what is true in Foucault’s analysis, not correspondence with reality. Foucault was so interested in the concept of how power influences what is considered knowledge that in 1981 he coined the term “power-knowledge” to convey the inextricable link between powerful discourses and what is known. Foucault called a dominant set of ideas and values an episteme because it shapes how we identify and interact with knowledge.

In The Order of Things, Foucault argues against objective notions of truth and suggests we think instead in terms of “regimes of truth,” which change according to the specific episteme of each culture and time. As a result, Foucault adopted the position that there are no fundamental principles by which to discover truth and that all knowledge is “local” to the knower28—ideas which form the basis of the postmodern knowledge principle. Foucault didn’t deny that a reality exists, but he doubted the ability of humans to transcend our cultural biases enough to get at it.

The main takeaway from this is that postmodern skepticism is not garden-variety skepticism, which might also be called “reasonable doubt.” The kind of skepticism employed in the sciences and other rigorous means of producing knowledge asks, “How can I be sure this proposition is true?” and will only tentatively accept as a provisional truth that which survives repeated attempts to disprove it. These propositions are put forth in models, which are understood to be provisional conceptual constructs, which are used to explain and predict phenomena and are judged according to their ability to do so. The principle of skepticism common among postmodernists is frequently referred to as “radical skepticism.” It says, “All knowledge is constructed: what is interesting is theorizing about why knowledge got constructed this way.” Thus, radical skepticism is markedly different from the scientific skepticism that characterized the Enlightenment. The postmodern view wrongly insists that scientific thought is unable to distinguish itself as especially reliable and rigorous in determining what is and isn’t true.29 Scientific reasoning is construed as a metanarrative—a sweeping explanation of how things work—and postmodernism is radically skeptical of all such explanations. In postmodern thinking, that which is known is only known within the cultural paradigm that produced the knowledge and is therefore representative of its systems of power. As a result, postmodernism regards knowledge as provincial and intrinsically political.

This view is widely attributed to the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, who critiqued science, the Enlightenment, and Marxism. Each of these projects was, for Lyotard, a prime example of a modernist or Enlightenment metanarrative. Ultimately, Lyotard feared that science and technology were just one “language game”—one way of legitimating truth claims—and that they were taking over all other language games. He mourned the demise of small local “knowledges” passed on in narrative form and viewed the loss of meaning-making intrinsic to scientific detachment as a loss of valuable narratives. Lyotard’s famous characterization of postmodernism as a “skepticism towards metanarratives” has been extremely influential on the development of postmodernism as a school of thought, analytical tool, and worldview.30

This was the great postmodernist contribution to knowledge and knowledge production. It did not invent the skeptical reevaluation of well-established beliefs. It did, however, fail to appreciate that scientific and other forms of liberal reasoning (such as arguments in favor of democracy and capitalism) are not so much metanarratives (though they can adopt these) as imperfect but self-correcting processes that apply a productive and actionable form of skepticism to everything, including themselves. This mistake led them into their equally misguided political project.

这里，作者举的是福柯和利奥塔的例子。福柯认为，”话语” 拥有巨大的权力，它建构了知识，决定了何为真假，因此，在福柯的分析中，决定事物真伪的不是它与现实的契合度，而且政治(和社会)权力。他为此特地发明了一个词叫”权力知识”，来体现强势话语与知识之间的联系。在《词与物》中，他反对真理的客观性，并主张把真理视为一种随着文化和时间改变的”体制”。福柯认为，不存在什么发现知识的基本原则，任何知识都局限于其拥有者。

作者认为，后现代主义的怀疑是极端怀疑，而不是合理怀疑。什么是合理怀疑？合理怀疑指的是，在下结论之前先问自己：”我怎么知道这个假设是正确的？”而且只有在假设经过多次实际的检验之后，才将其视为临时真理，科学研究采用的方法就是合理怀疑。后现代主义采用的极端怀疑则把一切知识都视为构建，只对构建的方式感兴趣。后现代主义错误地认为，科学并不比其它判断真伪的方式更可靠，更严谨，并且错误地把科学包装成了”元叙事”。对后现代主义而言，知识局限于文化的圈子，体现的是该文化圈子的权力体系。正因如此，后现代主义者认为知识是区域化的和政治化的。

这类思想很大程度上也受到了利奥塔的影响，利奥塔同时批判了科学、启蒙运动和马克思主义，在他看来，这些都是现代主义的”元叙事”。他把科学当作一种”文字游戏”，并且害怕它会取代其它的”文字游戏”，利奥塔认为，知识有很多种，科学只是其中的一种，科学的统治地位挤占了其它”知识”们的生存空间，后现代主义就是要怀疑”元叙事”。

作者总结到，对现有信念的怀疑并不是什么新鲜事物，不同的是，后现代主义并没有意识到，科学和归纳推理并不是元叙事(虽然采用了元叙事)，它们虽不完美，却有着自我纠正的机制，它们怀疑世界万物(包括它们自已)，然而这种怀疑(合理怀疑)是有益的，有可操作性的。

2.后现代主义对事实和逻辑的态度

Put more simply, one central belief in postmodern political thought is that powerful forces in society essentially order society into categories and hierarchies that are organized to serve their own interests. They effect this by dictating how society and its features can be spoken about and what can be accepted as true. For example, a demand that someone provide evidence and reasoning for their claims will be seen through a postmodernist Theoretical lens as a request to participate within a system of discourses and knowledge production that was built by powerful people who valued these approaches and designed them to exclude alternative means of communicating and producing “knowledge.” In other words, Theory views science as having been organized in a way that serves the interests of the powerful people who established it—white Western men—while setting up barriers against the participation of others. Thus, the cynicism at the heart of Theory is evident.

这里，作者认为，后现代主义的核心思想之一就是，权力通过话语控制社会，以谋取利益。假如一个人要求他人在提出观点时摆事实，讲逻辑，那么在后现代理论看来，这就是在参与那些注重事实和逻辑的人的话语系统，而创造这些话语系统(比如科学)的人就是西方的白人男性，因此，摆事实，讲逻辑就是在助长西方白人男性的权力。后现代主义的犬儒本质在此一览无遗。

3.立场认识论

This is a form of standpoint theory—the belief that knowledge comes from the lived experience of different identity groups, who are differently positioned in society and thus see different aspects of it.26 For decolonial scholars, both “Eurocentric forms of knowledge” and “the epistemological authority assigned uniquely to the Western university as the privileged site of knowledge production”27 are problems, and “the point is not simply to deconstruct such understandings, but to transform them.”28 In other words, by using activism to achieve a symbolic “textual” aim, affecting the statuary on campus, decolonization activists also attempted to bolster their ranks, while “reforming” education to rely more explicitly on their applications of Theory.

作者在这里初步介绍了在后现代主义中十分流行的”立场认识论”，这种理论认为，基于群体身份的生活经验是知识的来源，由于不同的群体在社会中处在不同的位置，于是他们便能看到社会的不同方面，对于主张”去殖民’‘的学者而言，”欧洲主心主义”的知识(科学)就是他们的敌人。

4.”学术正义”

Research justice acts upon a belief that science, reason, empiricism, objectivity, universality, and subjectivity have been overvalued as ways of obtaining knowledge while emotion, experience, traditional narratives and customs, and spiritual beliefs have been undervalued. Therefore, a more complete and just system of knowledge production would value the latter at least as much as the former—in fact, more, because of the long reign of science and reason in the West. The 2015 book, Research Justice: Methodologies for Social Change, edited by Andrew Jolivette, is a key text here. Jolivette, professor and former department chair of American Indian Studies at San Francisco State University, defines the aims of this method in his introduction:

“[R]esearch justice” is a strategic framework and methodological intervention that aims to transform structural inequalities in research…. It is built around a vision of equal political power and legitimacy for different forms of knowledge, including the cultural, spiritual, and experiential, with the goal of greater equality in public policies and laws that rely on data and research to produce social change.38

This is activism. It seeks not only to revolutionize understandings of knowledge and rigor in university curricula—not necessarily to improve them—but also to influence public policies away from evidenced and reasoned work and towards the emotional, religious, cultural, and traditional, with an emphasis on lived experience. It seeks to challenge the core understanding of “scholarly research” as the gathering of empirical data for analysis, in order to better understand social issues. This theme comes across most strongly in the 2004 book, Decolonizing Research in Cross-Cultural Contexts: Critical Personal Narratives,39 which focuses on indigenous studies and is edited by Kagendo Mutua, professor of special education at the University of Alabama, and Beth Blue Swadener, Professor of Culture, Society and Education / Justice and Social Inquiry at the University of Arizona. Citing Homi Bhabha, the editors introduce the essays by claiming,

These works stand at the center of the “beginning of the presencing” of a disharmonious, restive, unharnessable (hence unessentializable) knowledge that is produced at the ex-centric site of neo/post/colonial resistance, “which can never allow the national (read: colonial/western) history to look itself narcissistically in the eye.”40 (emphasis in original)

This means that the authors of the essays within this volume are not obliged to make sense, produce reasoned arguments, avoid logical contradiction, or provide any evidence for their claims. The normal expectations of scholarly “research” do not apply when pursuing research justice. This is alarming, and it is justified Theoretically.

“学术正义”是另一个来自于后现代衍生理论的概念，”学术正义”认为传统的学术界过于注重科学、理性和经验主义的作用，而忽视了主观情绪、个人经历、传统习俗、巫术和玄学的作用，为了实现”学术正义”，就应该把情绪，感觉和经历置于科学和理性之上。换句话说，根据”学术正义”的标准，做学术不需要搜集客观的数据，不需要做实证研究，只需要依照个人的主观情感，主观好恶就可以了。学术研究可以自相矛盾，可以毫无根据，不需要遵照什么客观标准。这是一种十分危险的做法，而且这种做法被理论化了。

我花两周看完了Helen Pluckrose 与 James Lindsay 共同编写的新书《Cynical theories : how activist scholarship made everything about race, gender, and identity-and why this harms everybody》

该书的名称换成中文就是”犬儒理论”，这里的”犬儒理论”指的是后现代主义，以及后现代主义的衍生物，例如后殖民理论、酷儿理论、种族批判理论、交叉女权主义理论，等等。

为什么称这些理论为”犬儒理论”呢？因为犬儒主义的核心特点就是”彻底地看穿、看透，将一切事物理解为“虚伪”的“权力操纵”，并因此否定一切可能具有普遍意义的价值和价值追求，成为一种虚无主义和绝对的相对主义。后现代主义和其衍生理论恰恰就是在把社会中的所有事物理解为权力操纵的产物，包括科学和普世价值在内。这些理论否定任何客观标准的存在，认为巫术和科学”同样正确”，也否定价值体系的优劣，主张道德相对主义。因此，用”犬儒理论”形容这些思想再合适不过了。

该书认为后现代主义的发展过程经历了三个阶段：

第一阶段的后现代主义充满了激进的怀疑主义，致力于解构西方的现代社会，同时又高度悲观。这一阶段的后现代主义局限于学术界的小圈子，兴起于上世纪60年代。最初的后现代主义者过于注重怀疑和解构，以至于把自己消耗殆尽了。

第二阶段的后现代主义者则不满足于虚无主义式的幻灭，而希望实现特定的政治目的，不满足于无限的解构，而希望重建某种乌托邦，他们希望将后现代主义变成实用工具，使其具有可操作性，这一阶段的后现代主义则被称为”实用后现代主义”。相比原始后现代主义的晦涩难懂和故弄玄虚，实用后现代主义更容易理解和掌握，因此也更容易传播，实用后现代主义走出了学术小圈子，而被社会活动人士所接受，再借助活动人士传播到了整个社会。实用后现代主义包括了后殖民理论，酷儿理论，种族批评理论等内容。

第三阶段的后现代主义则更进一步，将后现代主义视为了绝对真理。后现代主义原本是自称不承认”真理”和”元叙事”的，可是发展到了这一阶段，后现代主义本身就成了一种”元叙事”，即：

基于身份的无形权力和特权塑造了整个社会，并且通过特定的对话方式建构了知识。

后现代主义原本认为一切知识都不可靠，但现在确可以理直气壮地把这种元叙事当作绝对真理，从悲观的虚无主义者变成了虔诚和狂热的教徒。这一阶段的后现代主义被称为Social Justice Scholarship(社会正义研究)

尽管后现代主义经历了许多变化，但主宰着后现代主义的两大核心原则和四大旋律一直没变：

两大原则：

1.后现代主义的知识原则：强烈怀疑人们是否能获得客观的知识，并且致力于文化建构主义。

2.后现代主义的政治原则：认为社会由权力机构和等级制度塑造而成，权力塑造着人们的认知。

四大旋律：

1.模糊事物的边界

2.相信语言有着神奇的力量

3.文化相对主义

4.否定个人，否定普世价值

后现代主义的危险在哪里？我们为什么要对其抵制？

本书认为，后现代主义的危险之处在于，它与现代文明的根基：自由主义为敌。这里的自由主义并不是在单指某个学说，而是指广义上支撑着近现代民主制度的基本原则，包括但不限于：个人自由、机会公平、法律面前人人平等、言论自由、公开辩论，等等。

作者看来，后现代主义与自由主义不是简单地存在冲突，而是在根本上水火不容：自由主义认为知识是我们对现实世界的认知，后现代主义则认为知识是人们用来维持特权而编造的故事；自由主义区分事物的边界，力求清晰明确，后现代主义则糊事物的边界，人为地故弄玄虚；自由主义重视个人权利和普世价值，后现代主义眼中则只有身份政治；自由主义以人的尊严为核心，后现代主义则以受害情节为核心；自由主义欢迎商讨和辩论，视其为通向真理的道路，后现代主义则反对商讨和辩论，认为不同的人有不同的真理；自由主义相信进步，后现代主义则极度犬儒；自由主义欢迎批评，后现代主义敌视批评。

后现代主义者的知识原则使其彻底地与现实脱离，丧失基本的说理能力；后现代主义者的政治原则使其将政治理解为零和权力斗争，并因此变成为达目的不择手段的威权主义者；后现代主义者对于语言的畸形认识使其容不下他人的意见，反对沟通和辩论；后现代主义者对个人权利和普世价值的忽视则使其鼓吹百害无一利的身份政治。这些有害的思想兴起于大学校园，占领了整个左翼圈子，侵害了整个学术界，教育界和媒体行业，并且已经走进了普通人的目常生活当中。在腐化民主制度，恶化人与人之间的矛盾的同时，也使更多的人倒向右翼威权主义，形成恶性循环。

自由主义使得人们能够通过妥协和沟通解决争端，实现和平的权力交替，防止权力的滥用，保障言论自由和个人权利，通过法律的改变和科技的发展改善人们的生活，实现渐近而稳健的进步。这一切都依赖与人们对一些基本原则的共识，例如对科学和知识的尊敬，对言论自由的维护，以及交流与沟通的意愿，等等。后现代主义，以及它的衍生理论，则不停地在破坏，污蔑，摧毁这些基本原则，并试图以一种乌托邦取代原有的制度，如果这些人成功了，那么这条路的尽头就是极权主义。

解决方案是什么：

本书认为，我们应该以自由主义面对反自由主义的倾向。”犬儒理论”之所以能在美国呼风唤雨，一部分是因为自由派自身的失职，要对”犬儒理论”展开反击，真正的自由主义者就应该站出来，破除禁忌，揭露”犬儒理论” 的实质。要让人们知道，反对”Social Justice”运动，并不意味着反对社会正义，反对’‘种族批判理论”，并不意味着支持种族主义。如果某种理论本身漏洞百出，那么不论它使用的理由多么的好听，或是把自己标榜的多少高尚，它依然是一个低劣的理论。自由主者义应该坚持原则，用事实和逻辑证明”犬儒理论”的荒谬性。

「 The request to listen, that's fine. the request to "shut up and listen" , that's a completely different ask. It is "shut up, listen, and do not criticize, we are automatically right." 亅

「 I don't really care what anybody self-identify, my problem is if you are compelling people to acknowledge it. If you have a sporting agency that is saying: "ok, we have to acknowledge your self-identification" , now people are compelled to have to acknowledge somebody else's self-identification. 」

据说是Android 12的截图 ，我不喜欢这种风格，配色还行，圆角太圆，通知之间的空隙太大，不知道谷歌是怎么想的，非要空出一大块，总之一言难尽。

https://www.xda-developers.com/android-12-first-look-screenshots/

https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/02/technology/biden-reality-crisis-misinformation.html

纽约时报的一名专栏作家Kevin Roose近日在该报发表了一篇文章，呼吁拜登政府响应"专家"们的号召，设立"Reality Czar"(真理官)，以应对右翼散播的虚假信息。

https://www.nytimes.com/by/kevin-roose

此文作者Kevin Roose承认这种做法听起来有点极权主义(sounds a little dystopian)，但因为"虚假信息和国内恐怖主义"过于泛滥，设立一个拥有绝对权力的"真理官"就变得很合理了。在这篇文章的另一处，一个"专家"还建议到，拜登政府应该设立一个"真相委员会"，调查1月6日国会骚乱的真相。

这带来了一个严肃的问题：谁来决定何为真相？

数世纪以来，自由民主的支持者都认为，绝不能让政府去控制什么是真相，也绝不能让政府来指导或打压人们的思想观念和宗教信仰。因为只有在政府无法通过政治权力规定什么是真相的前提下，言论自由才可能受到保障，只有当公众认为政府不应该像家长一样干涉人们的思想和信仰的时候，宽容才不会沦为一句口号。

一但国家有了足够的权力规定什么是真，什么是假，什么是对，什么是错，那么思想自由、表达自由、言论自由就危在旦夕了。设立"真理官"实际上就在建立"真理部"，这会剥夺人们判断是非对错的自由。追寻真理是生活在民主制度下的公民的一项殊荣，这既是他们伟大的权利，也是他们神圣的使命。真理不是靠自上而下的施舍，而是靠人与人之间的思索和辩论。

认为官方机构有权规定何为对错，这种思维背后是对普通人的蔑视，它不把普通人当作思想独立的个体，而是视其为心智残缺，没有道德的笨蛋。"真理官"不会仅仅满足于向人们解释"真相"，他会试图从根本上改变人们对"真相"的理解。纽约时报援引的一个"专家"说道，通过使这些人"迷途知返"，公共的健康能够得到改善。换句话说，那些相信主流媒体针对保守派的人，或是不受纽约时报和这些"专家"待见人，不仅是错误的，而且还有病。纽约时报的这篇文章暗示，那些固执的异议分子应当被视为"精神状态失常者"，也就是说，这些真相警察并不倾向于通过过话与辩论的方式寻找真相，而是倾向于通过家长式，软极权式的心理操纵扭曲人们对真相的看法。

不论假新闻和阴谋论有多么泛滥，设立"真理官"，让政治权力来决定什么是真，什么是假的这种行为，对于自由民主的威胁都要比前者大得多。这种做法并不是在客观公正地寻找真理，而是在维护主流媒体早已腐烂的道德权威，阻止公众对其产生怀疑和不信任。而且，在把不同的观点妖魔化的过程中，他们也制造了充斥着审查的恐怖气侯。

言论审查的狂热曾经只局限于大学校员，但是最近的一段时间，尤其是在新冠大流行后，这些审查的呼声已经走向了主流。拜登的支持者们所支持的作法象征着旧式政府审查的回归，这种政府审核的危险程度丝毫不亚于技术巨头的新式审查。

在自由民主的社会中，一个基本的前提就是人们通过博弈和辩论获取真相。关于这一点，约翰·密尔讲的比谁都清楚，在他的《论自由》这篇雄文中，密尔说道，就算某些观点是错的，也不应该对其进行审查。为什么？因为社会正是在真理与"谬误"的"冲突"中向前进步的。

在谎言泛滥的时代，自由辩论比以往都更加重要，它能帮助我们寻找真相。密尔知道，相比错误的言论本身，对于言论自由的限制要危险得多。一但人们失去了对言论自由的信念，公共领域也将土崩瓦解，人们就再也无法通过商讨和辩论的方式阐明真相，弄清楚他们所面临的问题了。

在著名的反乌托邦小说《我们》里，叶夫根尼·札米亚金设想了一个来自未来的诗人"R-13"，"R-13"十分迷恋于 "单一国家"和它对人类社会无所不至的严密控制，以至于花费了大量精力替那些惩罚异见人士的判决书润色，并且赞美那些反自由的"远古"宗教文化。在读到《创世纪》时，R-13解释到：上帝在天堂里让那两位作出抉择：有幸福没有自由，或是有自由没有幸福，没有第三种选择。那些白痴选择了自由。然后呢？随后的千百年里，他们一直怀念枷锁。看到了吗？世间的一切痛苦都来源于此。

想象一下，假如医生整天跟在我们后面提醒我们："要补充维生素了"，或是跑到我们家里，看冰箱里的水果蔬菜够不够，或者在我们抽烟时一把将烟夺走，我们会认为医生管得太多了，侵犯了个人的领域。医生的职责是治病，而不是保证人们的健康，如果我们要求医生保证人们健康，其实就是在侵犯医生的自由。反过来说，我们也不希望医生什么都做，因为我们都有自已的生活，不希望受到他人精细的管控。在未来的极权社会中，也许每个人都必须戴上fitbit手环，要是哪个人每天行走的步数没有达到一定的数量，医生就会拒诊。但保持健康是我们的责任，而不是医生的责任，把多少精力花在健康上应当基于我们的自主选择，由我们自己承担后果。20世纪的哲学家汉娜·阿伦特整天抽烟，但她抽烟是为了可以把更多时间花在工作上，要是她整天都关注身体健康，也许就无法留下这么多的遗产。

没有人可以在每个领域都达到完美，人生活在世界上，就必然面临着选择，而每一次选择都意味着有所放弃(我想要这个，不想要那个)。选择就必然产生后果，必然有所得失，而且有些后果和得失是难以预料的。失去了选择，也就失去了政治自由，人类的未来也就此断送了。人类的善良本性只有在不受强迫，不受官僚机构控制的条件下(它们所追求的完美完全就是谬误)，才能真正展现出来。作为人类，他不能没有自由，他不是完美的，但他有着向善的潜力。

自由主义才是更好的方案，它带来的改变虽然缓慢，却更为深远和持久，因为它改变的是人们内心的真实想法，而不是外在的行为或是说话的方式。在自由主义下，人们之所以改变看法，是因为他们受到了理性的劝服，而不是因为受到了恐惧的胁迫。

自由主义者对于人性有着乐观却又现实的看法。他们相信人的可塑性—人既不生来性善，也不生来性恶，同时又相信教育的力量—促进知识，改善社会。身份政治之所以把大学当作它的主战场，原因显而易见：自由派的教育者相信，当人们获取了足够多的信息之后，便能自己发现事物的规律，得出合理的结论。他们认为，如果人们受到了完整的，多样的，广泛的教育，便有能力自己做出良好的，尽管未必完美的决定。良好的决定顾全大局，并且把他人纳入考虑的范围。要想面对"种族批判理论"所提出的问题，我们需要的是教育，这也是为什么自由主义者总是欢迎对话与辩论，鼓励人们发表不同的观点，包括那些不受待见的观点。然而，正如Alka Sehgal Cuthbert在Letters on Liberty中写到的：

「今日的"反种族主义者"无意与肤色不同的人们沟通。广泛地阅读，深刻地思考，并且以忠于内心的方式表达自己的所思所想，这些都不被鼓励。不，"教育你自己"意味着不加批判地全盘接受一些主旨相同的书籍。要是你没读过这些书籍，你就必须装作自己看过，并且十分热爱，否则你就会被谴责为无知。亅

畅销书《Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race》(我为什么不再跟白人谈论种族)的作者Reni Eddo-Lodge则预先将一切来自白人的评价视为权力游戏的产物。这是在说，我们只能根据肤色评价白人的意见，而不是具体的意见本身，这就使得不同种族之间失去了任何对话的可能，它将学生们囚禁在不同的牢笼和部落里，而这恰恰与教育的目的背道而驰。

教育中很重要的一点就是传播共情。很多教育者，包括我在内，都认为良好的教育不仅仅需要传授实用知识，还要传授道德准则。与此同时，我们又认为教育不同于灌输。正如Sehgal Cuthbert所言：「没错，一个白人无法与一个黑人有着同样的生活经历，但同样的道理也适用于所有人，任何一个个体都无法与另一个个体拥有同样的生活经历，如果我们真的相信"种族批判理论"所说的，认为所有的语言都是压迫的工具，那么白人除了赎罪之外便什么也做不了，这才是"教育你自己"的最终含义。」

良好的教育为自由道德提供了基础，让其茁壮成长。虽然这并不乌托邦，但长期看来有着更好的前途，它能真正地替社会带来积极，深远，和可持续的进步(而且不需要威权控制)。因为基于教育，劝解，和自由选择的道德，要比那些由外部强加的，基于恐惧的"道德"要持久得多，深刻得多。当罪恶变得不可能的时候。真正的道德便也变得不可能了。

任何强制的道德都必然是自相矛盾的，只有当人是具有自由意志和道德能动性的个体，能够选择自己的行为的时候，对其褒贬才有意义。

"种族批判理论" 的 "圣经" 之一 《White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk About Racism》(脆弱的白人-让白人讨论种族主义为就这么难)告诉我们：所有白人都有着不自觉的的偏见，一切白人皆是种族主义者，并且世代相传。他们获得救赎的唯一之路就是承认自身的罪恶，展现自己的罪恶，并且全心全意地拥抱"种族批判理论"的意识形态教条。

这在现实中有着多种体现，例如在企业中开展的"多样化训练"，以及在教育，媒体与文化行业中正推行的"去殖民化"，致力于应对"种族主义"，"仇恨言论"和"微歧视"的区域化"多元议事会"也像雨后春笋一样涌现了出来。

"社会正义理论"引出了许多问题，例如以下的这些：

首先，作为普通人的一员，人们是否有义务积极地去除身边的各种社会弊病，比方说种族主义，政治腐败，贫困，污染，失业？如果所有人都必须把精力花在解决各种社会问题上，他们还有没有时间做自己的事情？在这种期待下，所有人都必须朝着乌托邦前进，谁要是敢松懈，等着他的很可能就是监狱。

其次，我们是应该为自己没有做的事情被预设为有罪呢，还是应该在被证明有罪之前，被认为清白呢？如果是前者，那么我们证明清白的唯一方式，就是永远地接受一种乌托邦意识形态的奴役，永不停歇地追求完美。如果一种理论试将人们转化成狂热的信徒，让他们追求至善，而这"至善"又是由某些号称全知全能的少数人规定的，我们就必须对这种理论进行揭露。"社会正义理论"就是其中的一种。

想象我们都生活在独裁社会中，独裁者强迫每个人都大公无私。这样做也许真的能消灭贫困，但在这样的社会中，人们之所以帮助他人，已不再是出于一种无私的，对他人着想的意愿，而是出于一种自私的，对于道德警察的恐惧。 我们都已经知道这种做法在现实中会造成什么后果，苏联在20世所做所为便是这种"社区精神"的体现。沙特阿拉伯是一个十分"和谐"的国家，这里看不到任何异端的宗教和思想，但只有这里的本国公民(尤其是女性)，才切身地知道，为了这种表面的整齐如一，人们付出了多少代价。这样的一种"完美社会"，以对人性的悲观态度为始，以对人性的极权操控而终，也正因如此，这种社会方能够释放出那些原本只存在于理论中的人性之恶，并且让各种抽象的理论成为罪恶的借口。

管制式的道德无异于奴隶式的顺从，它基于的是恐惧和自保的本能，而不是真正的道德。而且，管制式的道德依赖于庞大的官僚机构，用以监视，恫吓和镇压公众。以上的这些性质，使得身份政治不像是在真诚地改善社会正义，而更像是神权专制或毛式文革。

「一个很奇怪的现象就是，假如你随机地问一个左派，问他对Facebook是什么看法，他会说：''噢，扎克伯格，我觉得他就是一法西斯渣滓。'' 再问他对美国联邦法院有什么看法，他会说："联邦法院是压迫者，充满了右翼法官"(没错)。再问他对美国政府的看法，他会说，哦，美国政府基本上就是由川普控制的一个法西斯独裁政府。 当你再问他：''你是否愿意给Facebook，联邦法院，美国政府更大的权力，好让他们审查你不喜欢的思想言论？'' 他会回答说："当然了，这很必要，要不然仇恨言论就会流行起来"

这些人从来就不想一想，既然这些机构在我看来是法西斯的，独裁的，压迫的，那我为什么还要给它们这么大的权力，让它们控制信息流呢？

问题之一便在于，很多人只会从左右之争的角度思考问题，看待政治，而这是一个十分狭隘的角度，因为它忽视了如此多的方面。在这些人看来，只要你给这些巨头权力，让它们审查右翼暴徒，审查右翼言论，封掉右翼理论家和右翼活动人士的账号，他们就胜利了。但他们并不明白，巨头们之所以封禁这些言论，不是因为它们是右翼言论，而是因为它们处于主流之外。遵从正统思想的言论总是受到许可的，审查总是指向那些在权力中心看来"不可接受"的观点，审查的定义就是如此，不只右派会被审查，左派同样也会被审查。姑且把道德放在一边，即便单单从策略的角度上看，让技术寡头封杀那些你不同意的人也是十分愚蠢的，因为总有一天，枪口会指向你。事实上，巨头们已经在审查左翼人士了，例如Facebook就在替以色列政府封杀那些支持巴勒斯坦的人们。左翼分子强化了这样的一种框架，却不知道这么做将会带来自我毁灭。这今人疯狂和忧虑，因为纵观人类历史，从来就不乏有人宣称自己发现了"绝对真理"，然后新一代人发现前人是错的，甚至是不道德的。如果你排除了人们挑战和质疑既有教条和规则的能(尤其是最神圣，最不容质疑的那些)，那么你就使人类失去了他最宝贵的武器，使其无法促成进步，反抗专制，挑战权威，而这正是那些"反威权主者"以为自己在做的。亅 (Greenwald)

在这之前，Facebook就有过替以色列政府封杀批评者的记录

https://theintercept.com/2017/12/30/facebook-says-it-is-deleting-accounts-at-the-direction-of-the-u-s-and-israeli-governments/

Facebook也曾经迫于土耳其宗的宗教压力，封杀了''冒犯" 穆罕默德的内容

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/27/facebook-blocks-turkish-page-insults-prophet-muhammad

除此以外，Facebook还替俄国政府封杀过俄罗斯的异见人士

https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/23/world/europe/facebook-angers-russian-opposition-by-blocking-protest-page.html

https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-43070555