#GameTheory question for everyone...
Is there a name for when an optimal strategy is avoided because the optimal strategy is easily defended against when you know the person is using it in the first place?
Or the reverse, where someone might intentionally use a very poor strategy specifically because the user would never expect a user to pick a poor strategy and thus, at least when assumed it wont be used, becomes a strong strategy?
That would mean that it's not an optimal strategy, no?
This reasoning makes me think of probabilistic strategies: for some classes of games there is no best deterministic strategy, but there _is_ a best probabilistic one. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategy_(game_theory)#Mixed_strategy for something related.
@freemo @robryk Ok, not adjacent.
This is exactly the kind of game Dr. John Nash was describing. His Nobel Prize winning paper on the subject is here: https://www.cs.upc.edu/~ia/nash51.pdf