If the court makes a mistake, then they should correct it immediately. And if the mistake is a long-stand precident, then it should be corrected by the people via Congress enacting law or by constitutional amendment, not arbitrarilly by scotus.
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@Pat
Prior to roe v wade the long standing precedence was that there were no legal protectiona for abortion. So by your logic you oppoaes roe v wade since scotus shouldnt be changing long standing precedence.
The Roe opinion was a total mess. Privacy? That’s just absurd. It should have been based purely on the liberty clause of the 14th Amendment without reference to privacy. Casey wasn’t much better. The overarching problem is Congress shirks its responsibility so they don’t have to face voter backlash and they just push everything onto the Court, which is unaccountable to the voters. Then SCOTUS ends up twisting and tweaking itself into a corner trying to legislate.
Also, as you have noted elsewhere, we a need a clear definition as to personhood, which would resolve the issue definitively.
Well, now the ball’s in Congress’ court (pun intended) so let’s see if they have the balls (pun intended) to fix it.
@Pat
Yes agreed congress is a mess and they arent living up to their reaponsibility of addressing this. Id happily support a ammendme t which gives limited protection to abortions. Not sure basi g it on liberty alone is going to cut it as liberty is enumerated in the constitution and doesnt include abortions sadly.
@Pat @freemo I’m gonna take a somewhat contrary opinion here, at least on the definition of person-hood (totally agree the supreme court is an absolute nightmare for loads of reasons which freemo may or may not remember from one of my earlier posts).
Why should the definition of person-hood be based on anything other than our shared human nature? I’ve never seen this question answered well. How can we justify basing it on a (possibly mutable) list of criteria which could be used to justify stripping other individuals of their rights/legal protections?
It seems to me that the only reasonable definition of person, is that all humans are persons by default. Thus, it stands even unborn humans are persons. If we abandon this notion of universal person-hood, does that not allow the justification of all sorts of evils we’ve witnessed in the past? Blacks weren’t persons, nor were slaves of any race, Jews, Roma, disabled, LGBT, etc. just pick a regime and you’ll find places where certain characteristics were used to exclude people from their rights. It seems the unborn are the excluded group du jour, but why is this any more justifiable than the previous alternatives?
This is the problem I have with the current perspective on abortion: mainly, it seems to ignore the actual moral dilemma and seeks to reason from desired effect to cause, rather than from moral principle to outcome. That is, “we want full bodily autonomy for women, thus we can ignore the humanity of the children they’re carrying” instead of “all humans have inherent worth and value, so despite the unfortunate circumstances, taking this human’s life is still unacceptable, and we will provide assistance/alternative options to prevent further unwanted pregnancies and help new mothers raise/adopt their children”. While I understand the whole “helping people with government programs” thing isn’t super big on the republican priority list, I think this is where some bipartisanship can help people in the trigger-law states who no longer have access to abortions be better able to care for their children.
Don’t get me wrong, I think there are loads of cases when any empathetic individual could reason that an abortion would be beneficial to the mother. However too much empathy can be just as bad as too little. If we strip the weakest and least defensible among us of their most foundational natural right (i.e. life), can we not justify similar abuses to others? What then? What prevents the powerful from restricting person-hood such that it loses all meaning, thus returning us to the time when only the ethnic majority, wealthy, males are the only “people” in society?
While that last bit may seem like a slippery slope, I posit it’s the logical conclusion of allowing person-hood to be arbitrarily restricted: i.e. powerful people will make the weaker people defenseless, and I think it may set a dangerous precedent. What do y’all think?
The problem of using humanness as a determinant for the acquisition of rights is that it is arbitrary and limited. The reason why it is wrong to violate someone’s rights is not because they are a biological entity with a particular sequence of DNA. It’s wrong because that individual can be harmed by the violation.
There are, or could be, individuals who may not be human (or may not even be biologically based) who may be capable of being harmed and who’s rights should be respected, for example, an AI who becomes sentient, or people in the future who have modified their DNA beyond the human species, or possibly sentient life who are not from Earth and not human. (Not to say that sentience is necessarily a determining attribute for assessing the existence of the potentiality of harm.)
For the same reason, just because something has the chemicals cytosine, guanine, adenine, thymine bound together in a particular sequence does not mean that that macromolecule(s) could experience moral harm. So whether or not something or someone does or doesn’t have a human sequence of DNA doesn’t automatically include or excuse an obligation of respecting a right not to be harmed.
If you’d like to learn more about this, I suggest reading works by Tom Regan, who has written volumes on who is, or who becomes, a moral patient; and Michael Shermer’s “The Moral Arc”, which develops a coherent, reasoned, and science-based framework for why we should respect rights at all, and how to determine who or what those rights-respecting obligations should be extended to. (Remember that irrespective of each of our own religious beliefs, the law needs to be based on rational that doesn’t favor one religion over another, and is based on reasoned, evidence-based arguments.)
@Pat @freemo This is certainly an interesting argument I’ve not heard before; however, we must consider that science is poorly equipped to determine morality, as per the “is-ought” distinction. Science can only tell us what “is” not what “ought” to be in a moral sense, and in that case, we must accept some other axiomatic framework to impose the oughts onto what is.
I think this inevitably falls to religion, as without transcendent meaning ascribed to the universe, we’re sort of stuck: if we reduce our moral understanding to sole materialism, it’s trivial to make the case that nobody has rights or value period. We are simply pockets of relatively low entropy moving toward steady state in a cold, uncaring universe with no purpose. Good luck pulling anything resembling human (or otherwise) rights out of that hat. (And then, of course, we must determine which religion, if we go this route, but that’s a different discussion entirely).
But moving forward from the top of your argument, first of all, how do we define harm? Is it through inflicting stimuli that trigger nociception? If so, does that mean giving someone food with capsaicin has caused them harm, even if they requested it? Is it through causing fear? Does that make horror movies harmful? Is it through the termination of the existence of that “thing”, whatever it may be? And going back to the whole materialism argument, why are any of these actions morally objectionable in such a universe? If I can kill a bug, or a cow, etc, why does killing a person matter? They’re simply creatures with different genomes after all.
Secondly, in what cases is it reasonable to cause harm to human/non-human entities? In the human case, we can rely on the natural rights philosophy, in that I can only violate your rights if you are actively seeking to violate mine. This is because if we all have equal intrinsic value, your rights and my rights are also equal at each level of the hierarchy of rights. But this presupposes the idea of inherent value which is deserving of protection, which can’t be found in a gene sequence or with a brain scan. Even worse, how does this apply across species (or does it at all)?
Finally, if we only consider human morality as it relates to other humans (as a convenience to ignore possible futures for now, we can deal with them as they arise) we still have the issue of deciding which humans to protect and which to discard as medical waste. From your argument, this is determined based on harm; however, can you say I’ve truly harmed someone by ending their life while they’re unconscious? Does that make killing people in their sleep acceptable? Or better yet, if they were simply unaware I was slowly suffocating them with nitrogen, so they got sleepy and took a nap they never woke up from, did I cause harm then? If so, it was only in the last sense of the word mentioned earlier: terminating their existence, but it was done in the most peaceful, painless way possible. And since this outcome was inevitable anyway, and we don’t have evidence-based intrinsic meaning, how can it be definitively proven wrong?
I’ll certainly check out your suggested readings, but color me skeptical at the outset. Regardless though, I think we should err on the side of caution, rather than assuming potentially bad ideas are correct because some experts believe them (like doctors thinking babies don’t feeling pain while being circumcised…no idea how they came to that conclusion, they literally faint from the pain). Anyhow, thanks for the discussion and reading material :3
Also, what does 2that mean?
@cirnog @freemo @Pat First of all "armpit" 😂
Secondly, I think that's a dangerously large jump. I could make up an arbitrary response to any of those tough questions and call it a day as long as I can get people to believe it (Scientology anybody?), so there must be some set of criteria by which we judge the religion's explanation, and at least in certain instances, we can do this when they make claims about the material world that do not bear out (e.g. the "scientific miracles of the Quaran" which don't really exist). In other cases, we can evaluate how they align with our experiences, such as the distinction between Buddhism's desire to eliminate want and attachment vs other religions that view material wealth as a gift to be enjoyed and well used in the service of our family and others.
I agree that materialism is insufficient, but really only in the "meaning/purpose" category. Other than that, it's been pretty spot on for the last 500ish years, and all the way back to the Greeks and Mesopotamians even.
Although I am being a bit provocative, there's better non-materialist apologetics out there but the abortion question is an easy thing to solve for the religious, life begins at conception and abortion carries all the implications of ending a life.
”…how do we define harm?…”
”…can you say I’ve truly harmed someone by ending their life while they’re unconscious?”
Regan goes into great detail about this in his writings. Certainly causing pain is harm. The forbearance of the continuation of an individual’s life and future experiences can also be considered harm in most cases. Preventing someone from even coming into existence (contraception/early abortion) is an interesting case which Regan also addresses. I think that nearly anytime someone is born, that event itself forebears the existence of some others who will not come into existence simply as a result of that individual being born. (Think multiverses, counterfactuals, butterfly effect – each potential multiverse has a different mix of individuals in it.)
”…If I can kill a bug, or a cow, etc, why does killing a person matter?”
Regan wrote an entire book about this question and goes into excruciating detail about it (about 700 pages, if I remember – it’s been a few decades since I’ve read his stuff), and the conclusion is that it is wrong to harm someone even if they are not human.
”…intrinsic value…”
”…how does this apply across species (or does it at all)?”
Regan uses the criteria of whether an individual experiences a subjective life or not (among many other criterion). He calls it “subject-of-a-life”. I think intrinsic value can be derived from that.
”[In] what cases is it reasonable to cause harm to human/non-human entities?…”
A lot folks have written on that one. Self-defense is the obvious example. This also brings up the question of whether the action prevents net harm for the individual or for everyone (Mills, Utilitarianism).
”…why are any of these actions morally objectionable in such a universe?”
”…transcendent meaning…”
Shermer presents a coherent counter-nihilism argument in his book, as do many other authors. Ironically, Regan just skips over the question and basically says, “If life has no meaning and someone only cares about themselves, they’re not going to be reading this book anyway, or even considering the question.” (paraphrased)
Fortunately, many of these questions, like nihilism and existentialism, don’t need to be resolved to come up with a law addressing abortion. Approaches via objectivism or materialism often end up with similar answers as those from religion because the same human brains that invented, developed, or selected a religion are the same ones who consider materialism. So I think a consensus, or at least a substantial majority can be reached on the question either way.
(#2that means that I used the word “that” two times consecutively somewhere in the toot.)
I appreciate your careful consideration of many of my questions, but I’m still concerned about a few of the points you bring up. Also, I’m just going to ignore the whole multiverse thing, since we have no evidence of any other universe existing than our own.
It is wrong to harm someone even if they are not human.
Does that mean insects and cows qualify as “someones”? (See the next part for a followup).
Regan uses the criteria of whether an individual experiences a subjective life or not (among many other criterion). He calls it “subject-of-a-life”. I think intrinsic value can be derived from that.
I can’t prove anyone other than myself actually has this subjective experience though. Philosophically, everyone I interact with could be an automata, and I would have no way of knowing, which would make me the only “someone” in the universe. Hence, we have to assume not only that other humans, but all other (sufficiently complex?) creatures have this experience to determine whether or not they are valuable. This then leads to “what is sufficiently complex” to even warrant this consideration?
This is not evidence based, but an assumption about the nature of reality that is not provable. In fact, this opinion could be considered counter to the evidence, considering how many scientists/philosophers ignore the idea of a metaphysical self or free-will entirely. In that case, we truly are just automata, our sense of self/free-will is an illusion, and we’re back to the whole “no intrinsic value” problem as there is no self in which to refer.
“If life has no meaning and someone only cares about themselves, they’re not going to be reading this book anyway, or even considering the question.”
But here is where the crux of my argument lies. By skipping over this question and just assuming its validity, we leave the door open for this assumption to be challenged, which, when successfully done, will just blow apart the rest of the remainder of the well crafted arguments the book is based upon. I agree with his premise, but without an objective moral reference point, we have no way of supporting it.
Fortunately, many of these questions, like nihilism and existentialism, don’t need to be resolved to come up with a law addressing abortion.
I agree that many of these questions don’t need to be answered to legislate; however, I think it’s foolish (not you) to believe that all current legislation actually follows anything remotely resembling moral principles, which is another problem. I do think, though, that good laws are important, and good laws must rely on good moral principles, so I think we do need an answer, so long as we want to achieve something positive in our legal system.
So I think a consensus, or at least a substantial majority can be reached on the question either way.
Finally, I think we would likely agree that consensus isn’t truth, particularly when it comes to scientific inquiry, so why does it suddenly become sufficient with respect to making (possibly) life and death decisions about morality? Like slavery, for example, was practiced by everyone in the world for a very, very long time. That didn’t make it morally reasonable though, despite the nearly universal consensus.
Yes, I appreciate your considered answers. too.
”…going to ignore the whole multiverse thing…”
The multiverse reference was not meant to be a claim that they actually exist, but more of a way to express the possible hypothetical outcomes of moral decisions and opportunity costs – that if we allow a person to be born, it has consequences that mean that some other yet-to-exist person will not be born as a consequence.
”… “what is sufficiently complex” to even warrant this consideration?”
I’m not sure that complexity on its own is the attribute that determines consciousness or a level of consciousness worthy of moral consideration. I think that consciousness is multi-dimensional and it’s a very active area of research, in philosophy and science. We haven’t figured it out yet.
“In that case, we truly are just automata, our sense of self/free-will is an illusion, and we’re back to the whole “no intrinsic value” problem as there is no self in which to refer.”
I’m not sure I understand the connect between free will and intrinsic value. I think that even if the universe is deterministic and we only appear to have free will, we still need to make decisions and those decisions are based on our perceptions and experience even if those experiences are already “baked in the cake”. So our findings regarding the existence of intrinsic value are still consequential even if those findings and the consequences of our decisions are predetermined.
“’If life has no meaning and someone only cares about themselves,
they’re not going to be reading this book anyway, or even considering
the question.’”
”But here is where the crux of my argument lies. By skipping over this question and just assuming its validity, we leave the door open…”
I was paraphrasing Regan there. I said it was ironic. The irony is that the guy spend ~700 pages talking about all this stuff, but skipped over one of the important antecedent steps in the development of his thesis. Of course that question needs to be addressed in developing moral philosophies. (But perhaps not directly when making laws.) Many authors address it. Shermer addresses it in his book, which is a soup-to-nuts argument for a moral system.
I agree that many of these questions don’t need to be answered to legislate;
however, I think it’s foolish (not you) to believe that all current legislation
actually follows anything remotely resembling moral principles, which is another >problem….
Like slavery, for example, was practiced by everyone in the world for a very, very
long time. That didn’t make it morally reasonable though, despite the nearly
universal consensus.
This is a process. We continue to learn more, develop more, philosophically and scientifically. We progress. But we need to make decisions and laws based on what we know at the time, and then revise them when we learn more. As a practical matter, laws always lag knowledge, but they eventually catch up – we eventually banned slavery.
It just takes so damn long. I don’t like it. I wish we could progress more quickly. I wish people could recognize more quickly when something needs changing, but it is what it is.
Perhaps it’s a never-ending process and we will always be able to look back at how foolish and backward we were in the past…
@Pat @freemo@qoto.org Dems have tried several times to push through a Federal Law for unlimited abortion rights. It’s failed every time. It’s where it needs to be, in the hands of the states because the Federal courts have kicked it out of their hands and the Federal legislators can’t come to any agreement.
I probably shouldn’t have used the word “personhood” in my explanation because: 1) an individual doesn’t need to be a definite “person” to have their interests respected; 2) that particular term has been used by pro-life proponents for a specific purpose, which is not how I used it; and 3) the term personhood is often confused in ordinary speech to mean “human”, which is it not.
Also, determining an exact definition to describe an individual who has acquired rights doesn’t necessarily resolve the issue of competing rights between the individuals involved. That is, if an individual acquires rights while in the body of another individual, then each of them have rights which may be in conflict. (Not to say either way whether or not an individual actually acquires those rights at that time, only “if”.)
@Pat I dunno,changing things after 50 years or more and trying to fix the past is generally a good thing.
In this case however it is debatable if they fixed a mistake as opposed to making one. Personally I dont think the court ever had the right to make the ruling in the first place, but we should have had this codified in an amendment instead.