骨牌效應。
"惠譽表示，恆大5720億人民幣的貸款為銀行等金融機構持有，但銀行或許對恆大的供應商有間接曝險，這些供應商的商品和服務欠款6670億元人民幣。
惠譽說：「對恆大或其他脆弱開發商曝險較大的小型銀行，可能面臨不良貸款大幅增加，這取決於涉及恆大的信貸事件如何發展。」"
房地產與家庭財富的高度重疊讓整個泡沫破滅的地產業成了燙手山芋。
"Currently, more than three-quarters of household wealth in China is tied up in real estate, and Beijing has a strong incentive to make sure that such wealth doesn’t go down in an exploding bubble. A collapse of Evergrande could be detrimental to property values, which would deal a blow to consumer wealth and in turn lead to a slowdown in consumption and investment, in addition to other consequences. Because the CCP has focused its attention on de-risking the property sector and other developers have done good jobs of reducing their debt burdens so far, it should reduce the effect of an Evergrande collapse. Nonetheless, the firm is so big that this ripple effect is possible."
https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/is-chinas-evergrande-group-too-big-to-fail/
看到這些數字才對影響規模有些具體概念...
"恆大員工達20萬人，在中國數百座城市中有數千個開發項目，間接影響380萬人就業，恆大破產不僅衝擊數百萬購房者，以及大量供應商、建築商的利益，還將重創就業市場，尤其恆大負債涉及超過128家銀行與121家非銀行機構，恆大倒閉也將重創中國金融市場和金融系統的穩定。"
「在更早之前，中共在歷經2014因為限購令等因素造成房價出現明顯跌幅後，還是選擇飲鴆止渴又走上依賴房地產拉動經濟的老路才是今天這個局面的禍首。從2016開始，中共想出的新方法是搞更新類似西方貧民區的棚戶改造，雖然在手上法是更有創意。
這類的棚戶改造是由國家開發銀行領頭，提供進行改造的融資。具體進行的方式是拆除原來居民的棚戶，並以每平方米約3000人民幣的價格給予補償，但這個補償的金額不是直接撥給居民，而是撥到一個第三方託管帳戶。然後在棚戶居民選好要購買哪一棟新的在原址改好的公寓後，帳戶的款項便直接付給開發商。同時購買搬入新公寓的居民還能獲得一個當地的戶口。雖然帶頭貸款的是國開行，但該行也是依靠人民銀行提供的低息融資，從2015年中到2017年底，人民銀行便提供了大概2兆人民幣的貸款給各地這類的項目。各地方政府擁有的商業銀行也跟進提供了大量資金。
換言之，直到貿易戰和美中對抗開始前，是中共自己主動養大這個已經變成怪獸的房地產泡沫來換取光鮮亮麗的短期經濟成長，而不是去進行代價高昂的痛苦改革來調整經濟體質，才造成今天這個無法收拾的局面。」
https://voicettank.org/%E6%81%86%E5%A4%A7%E5%8D%B3%E5%B0%87%E5%B4%A9%E6%BD%B0/
這麼大的危機事件, 即使沒有一整套完整解決方案, 好歹也要表個態吧? 但北京當局到目前為止都是作壁上觀, 好像在等最大尋租利益出現, 比外資更像外人.
“we think it is imperative for the government to provide clear communication on the plan regarding Evergrande and to shore up confidence among home buyers, suppliers and contractors, banks and other nonbank financial institutions,”
今天傳出以海航模式處理的最新傳聞:
"《Asia Markets》報導，中國政府消息人士透露，中國政府正在介入恆大債務危機，恆大有可能被分成三個實體，最終決定或將在幾天內宣布。
報導指出，房地產巨頭有可能轉變為國有企業；根據消息人士透露，這項協議的用意在於保護購買恆大房產的一般民眾，以及恆大財富的投資人，最重要的是防止恆大破產對中國經濟的衝擊，這項重組計畫與恆大5年期債券利息到期日有關。"
不曉得匯豐踩得有多深...
"對於這波中國地產股崩跌，凱爾巴斯在推特上用「banking crisis」是一語雙關，除了銀行因為放款給地產公司而慘遭倒帳的危機之外，從他標記匯豐銀行就暗示著，這些銀行還可能涉嫌非法貸款、超貸給這些地產公司，恐面臨司法上的調查和整肅，是另一種的「banking crisis」。"
【恆大們出列！一天暴跌87％不能再高了 華爾街大佬點名香港這家銀行涉超貸】
出處：信傳媒( https://www.cmmedia.com.tw/home/articles/29912 )
對匯豐執行長的空虛發言只想翻白眼：
「據報導，匯豐資產管理部門、貝萊德、瑞銀等公司一直是恆大債券的最大持有者。根據《彭博》彙編數據，匯豐約持有2億美元的恆大美元債券。」
WSJ這篇新加坡出的稿被不救派認為是證明:
[ The officials characterized the actions being ordered as “getting ready for the possible storm,” saying that local-level government agencies and state-owned enterprises have been instructed to step in to handle the aftermath only at the last minute should Evergrande fail to manage its affairs in an orderly fashion. ]
汪浩簡單點出恆大債務危機之所以是系統性風險而非單一企業或產業問題的成因：
「中國房地產是中國經濟支柱產業，穩增長必備：拉動GDP三成，貢獻財政四成，創造信用五成，是中國經濟內循環的核心動力。房地產的問題，絕不只是來自房地產，而是中國經濟增長模式、貨幣發行模式、信用創造模式、財政運行模式、國家和社會治理模式等種種問題的集中表現。 隨著人口懸崖和債務大爆發，房地產不斷的金融化，成為債務密集度畸高的行業。從拿地到開發，基本上都是依靠債務－－房企開發貸+居民按揭貸。
中國的債務型經濟增長模式，經過金融深化與金融自由化，已經具備所有金融危機的動因。 中國房地產的高槓桿屬性，銀行放貸失控火上澆油，房價上漲抵押物升值會進一步助推銀行加大放貸，甚至主動說服客戶抵押貸、放槓桿。在世界歷史上，歷次房地產泡沫中銀行業都深陷其中，房地產危機既是金融危機也是經濟危機。」
這篇認為當中國政府意識到投資效益低下後試圖用提高內需拉抬效益, 當投資集中於房市開始過熱後又嘗試以三條紅線等政策降溫, 於是地產開發商龍頭就這麼卡住了:
"Since 2008, it has needed ever more debt to deliver the same increment to economic output. Between 2008 and 2019, total debt—government, household and business—rose from 169% to 306% of gross domestic product, but GDP growth fell from 10% to 6%. Productivity growth adjusted for the expanding stock of buildings, machinery and other capital was 2.6% a year from 2000 to 2010. It has been negative since 2015, a sign of how inefficient much of that investment has been.
A few years ago Beijing recognized this model was unsustainable and has sought in fits and starts to shift to “higher quality” growth more dependent on consumers. That process was bound to be disruptive; indeed, it triggered a disorderly devaluation of the yuan in 2015, but it did succeed in slowing the buildup of debt.
Last year, to tide the economy through the pandemic, credit was loosened again. Yet Chinese officials see soaring housing prices as a threat to financial and social stability so they laid out a three-year timetable for lending to the red-hot property sector to be reined in. Just as the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate increases eventually popped the U.S. housing bubble over a decade ago, those regulatory restrictions, with a lag, popped China’s, said Gene Ma, head of China research at the Institute for International Finance. Evergrande was an early casualty since it is one of the most leveraged developers, he said."
等著看金融業者能雙邊失血支援多久。
"花旗集團估計，至今年底，中國銀行系統約41%資產直接或間接與房地產有關，房價走跌恐引發銀行資產的連鎖反應。中國銀行提供給開發商及購屋者的未償付貸款估計達50兆人民幣（215.27兆台幣）。"
"知情人士披露，官員要求銀行不可全面切斷對開發商的融資，應持續對營建中的計畫提供支持，並批准購買預售屋者的抵押貸款。"
WSJ這篇用圖表具體指出中國房市泡沫與恆大事件的規模: 前者是美國2005年房市泡沫的翻倍($847 billion v. $1.6 trillion), 後者的開發項目樓地板面積總和約相當於513棟帝國大廈.
"Analysts have generally indicated an Evergrande default wouldn’t spur a crisis of confidence like the one that followed the Lehman Brothers collapse. But Evergrande is the largest property developer in a Chinese real-estate bubble that has been expanding for years. Investment over the past decade in China’s residential-property market has dwarfed the U.S. housing bubble of the 2000s, at least in terms of its share of domestic economic output."
中國房市的危機點: 大城市以外的房地產仰賴泡沫支撐.
"But property construction in smaller cities ran well ahead of demand from prospective occupants for the last five years in China, leaving the market increasingly dependent on speculators and investors to buy properties, said Logan Wright, China markets research director at Rhodium Group, a research firm based in New York. About 21% of homes in urban China were already vacant in 2017, which equated to 65 million empty units, according to data from China Household Finance Survey."
? 結果在恆大之後爆的竟然是一間完全沒聽過的中國地產商...
[ 惠誉将花样年的评级从“B”调降至“CCC-”并警告称，该公司财务状况存在不确定性，面临无法在周一偿还2.08亿美元的一个更受瞩目的国际债券的“重大”风险。
不过，最初的警报是由媒体报道引发的，媒体报道称花样年错过了9月28日到期的一笔1亿美元款项支付，这笔款项本应支付给那些对私人债券行使所谓“看跌”期权的债券持有人。" ]
https://www.reuters.com/article/china-property-fantasia-idCNL4S2R0281
比較吃驚WSJ這麼快能抓出花樣年的資料來, 該不會把中國前一百大的地產商資料都備好了吧...
"When compared with Evergrande, Fantasia is significantly smaller in size. Its sales in the first nine months of 2021 ranked 73rd among its domestic peers, while Evergrande was in third place, according to a market report by research firm CricChina."
不知道野村的預估是否包含影子銀行部位。
「野村預估，截至今年6月，中國開發商的債務已達5.2兆美元（約新台幣147.1兆）。最高比例為銀行貸款佔46％，債券市場則大約佔10％，包括相當於 2170億美元（約新台幣6.1兆）的美元債券，其中許多是垃圾債券。」
看樣子應該是有包括在內。
“The real-estate giants have borrowed not only from banks but also from shadow-banking outfits known as trust companies and from individuals who put their savings into investments called wealth-management products. Abroad, they became a mainstay of international junk-bond markets, offering juicy yields to get deals done.”
趙君朔這集把最近的恆大危機連帶影響整理得很詳細：
中國開發商危機名單新增佳兆業集團:
"Kaisa’s tumble takes its shares’ year-to-date losses to nearly 73% amid growing investor concerns about Chinese developers’ ability to refinance or repay billions of dollars in debt. Fitch and S&P Global Ratings both downgraded the already junk-rated Kaisa in October to CCC-plus, near the bottom of their ratings scales, citing refinancing risk."
驚訝聯準會發這個示警:
「有鑒於中國經濟與金融系統的規模，以及其與世界其餘地方的廣大貿易連結，在風險情緒惡化之下，中國的金融壓力可能會讓全球金融市場感到緊張，對全球經濟成長構成風險，進而影響美國。」
報告只有85頁, 恆大部分在第65頁:
"Stresses in China’s real estate sector could strain the Chinese financial system, with
possible spillovers to the United States
In China, business and local government debt remain large; the financial sector’s leverage is
high, especially at small and medium-sized banks; and real estate valuations are stretched. In
this environment, the ongoing regulatory focus on leveraged institutions has the potential to
stress some highly indebted corporations, especially in the real estate sector, as exemplified by
the recent concerns around China Evergrande Group. Stresses could, in turn, propagate to
the Chinese financial system through spillovers to financial firms, a sudden correction of real
estate prices, or a reduction in investor risk appetite. Given the size of China’s economy and
financial system as well as its extensive trade linkages with the rest of the world, financial
stresses in China could strain global financial markets through a deterioration of risk sentiment, pose risks to global economic growth, and affect the United States."
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20211108.pdf
有些理解為何此時示警了:
"In total, Chinese junk borrowers have about $197 billion of dollar debt outstanding, Goldman Sachs analysts have estimated. That means the ICE BofA index covers a little more than half of that total debt, implying the full losses for investors are considerably larger."
"Including cash from bond interest payments, the index has generated a total return of minus 28% so far this year, putting it on course for its worst performance since 2008. But this year’s selloff is much bigger in dollar terms, affecting far more investors. The total face value of the ICE BofA Asian Dollar High Yield Corporate China Issuers Index was just $3.2 billion at the end of 2008."
恆大的許家印還算肯負責的:
"報導指出，恆大在過去3天內總共出售了在香港上市的恆騰網絡集團有限公司約5.7%的股份，總計籌集約1.45億美元資金。上個月，恆大傳出出售兩架私人飛機，套現5000多萬美元。
在此之前，恆大於9月間出售了盛京銀行17.5億股的股份，取得99.93億元資金；恆大創辦人許家印日前傳出，已賣掉香港豪宅，用以償還已到期的債務。"
苟延殘喘到十二月終於正式開爆:
"當恆大公告無法履行一筆2.6億美元（約台幣73億）債務後，無疑開啟債務違約大門，廣東省人民政府約談許家印後，隨即宣布派出工作組進駐恆大摸底。不到半小時，央行、銀保監會、證監會、住建部等部門都發表立場，支持廣東省政府。"
外界比較像把人行這波操作看作示警而非救火:
"The central bank’s move, which came sooner than some economists expected, signals growing concern about an economy that is losing momentum, particularly because of the weakening property market, which accounts for about a quarter of China’s economic activities. Sales by China’s top 100 developers dropped for the fifth straight month in November, shedding 37.6% in value from a year earlier, according to China Real Estate Information Corp."
趙君朔也在昨天提到了人行調降存款準備率的不妙:
有些驚訝人行這麼快連兩波操作, 看來底層經濟情況確實不太妙?
"中國金融業界分析，人行下調支農、支小再貸款利率，將有助於降低中國中小銀行的資金成本、引導這些中小銀行降低「三農（農業、農村和農民）」和小微企業貸款利率；此外，人行希望在保持貨幣總量適度寬鬆情況下，透過結構性工具，針對性支持實體經濟。"
"根據中國人行網站公告，這次降準共計釋放長期資金約1.2兆元人民幣（約5.2兆台幣），金融機構加權平均存款準備金率將由8.9%降至8.4%；其「穩健」貨幣政策取向沒有改變，釋放的一部分資金將被金融機構用於歸還到期的中期借貸便利（MLF），還有一部分被金融機構用於補充長期資金。
瑞銀經濟學家汪濤等人報告指出，中共中央政治局政策基調的調整明確表明，中國高層領導人認識到了「經濟下行壓力」，中國人行雖重申穩健貨幣政策立場，但此次降準實際上發出了「貨幣政策寬鬆」的明確信號。"
WSJ對之前人行降率放水的效果不甚看好:
[ Chinese leaders appear to realize that to implement additional painful reforms at this point risks cutting economic growth further—in a politically sensitive year when President Xi Jinping is widely expected to seek a third term in power. Thus, to ensure political stability, Chinese leaders are likely to put on hold new forms of tightening, as well as changes aimed at narrowing social inequalities.
“The chance for Beijing to launch new hawkish regulations is getting much less likely this year,” says Robin Xing, chief China economist at Morgan Stanley.
Many economists expect Beijing to set a growth target of at least 5% to help stabilize expectations ahead of the party congress, to be held sometime in the fall.]
現在介於「放怕逃、收怕死」之間的為難狀態:
"In face of downward economic pressure, China’s top economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, said Tuesday that Beijing is expediting the rollout of major infrastructure projects to counter uncertainties early in the year.
To some economists, the past two months’ rate cuts, while welcome, are still rather modest in scope when compared with the magnitude of the woes facing the economy.
In particular, the five-basis-point cut in the five-year loan prime rate was smaller than expected, a decision that economists at Citigroup said could reflect regulators’ reluctance to bail out the real-estate sector with more stimulus."
趙君朔對廿大後的中國局勢預測:
“ (1)除了少數受惠於國家政策支持和補貼的部門，中共經濟會繼續下滑。(2)房地產部門的問題國家沒有要積極介入的跡象，這會讓偏遠省分賣地收入大幅下降的地方政府很快開始接連出問題。（3）要道開始出現小規模的財政和金融危機後，中央政府才會在不得以下介入救援，但在缺乏全面的強力方案下，這只是延緩了大規模社會和政治動盪爆發的時間點。（4）一旦經濟不見好轉，人民史無前例的開始勇敢出來抗議政府的劣政，習近平很可能靠對外挑起衝突甚至發動戰爭來替自己解圍，時間點在2024年中左右。”
WSJ也注意到國台辦人馬退出中常委的異常，不禁猜測起這次九合一選舉到底隔壁那些從國台辦到王岐山到維尼的暗樁各線會不會內鬥起來:
"In addition to the military promotions and party-charter amendment, China’s leadership excluded Liu Jieyi, director of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office, from the Communist Party’s new Central Committee lineup. Some analysts say that signaled a potential shift in Taiwan policy."
https://www.wsj.com/articles/taiwan-braces-for-grim-times-after-chinas-xi-extends-power-11666878661?st=wmrmht9bqwjvmv1&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
我是不好意思叫PROC向ROC投降啦...😆
但PROC向USA投降這很可以 
"「九二共識等於一中，沒有各表」，也在習時代確立。直到2019年「告台灣同胞書」，甚至把「九二共識」等同於「一國兩制」，像肉品市場那條趕豬上秤的鐵巷子一樣，只准台灣各黨各派來談促進一國兩制，其餘免談。至此，兩岸間除了投降談判，已經沒什麼好談的了，"
補一下台建盟的統計:
"【六都直轄市長候選人 】
民進黨六都候選人全數簽署。
國民黨和民眾黨無人簽署。"
"【非六都縣市長簽署 】
國民黨和民眾黨尚無人簽署。"
續補議員統計(資料統計至2022/11/08)
"【113人】六都直轄市議員簽署
不分六都與非六都，政黨上，台灣基進參選 24人，24人全部簽署；政黨派系，民進黨湧言會參選26位議員，全部簽署，以下不做細項說明。
六都議員，時代力量11人、小民歐巴桑聯盟12人簽署。國民黨無人簽署；民眾黨高雄、台南各1人簽署，共2人。"
續補議員統計資料統計至2022/11/08
"【58位】非六都縣市議員簽署
民進、時力、基進，皆有表態，民眾黨尚無人簽署。國民黨從上周1人(屏東)，增加1人(基隆)，累計共2人。"
選前最後一週統計不投降承諾書結果:
六都直轄市長候選人裡，國民黨和民眾黨無人簽署；
18位非六都縣市長候選人的國民黨和民眾黨都無人簽署；
147位六都議員候選人裡，國民黨無人簽署；
73名非六都縣市議員參選人裡，民眾黨無人簽署而國民黨有兩人簽署。
結論: 國民黨跟民眾黨就是投降黨，民眾黨的投降傾向比國民黨還高!
親中滅台黨立委擋國防武器關鍵預算實據:
"國民黨立委馬文君、江啟臣、吳斯懷以相關資訊不足，對實際的進度有疑問為由，針對「潛艦國造—第二階段原型艦籌建」編列的55億，提案凍結5億；
國民黨立委張育美也對「新一代輕型巡防艦—第二階段原型艦籌建」提案凍結7千萬元。
國民黨立委呂玉玲以軍種委託中科院預算編列與計畫案例不符頻傳為由，提案凍結「劍龍級潛艦戰鬥系統提升案」預算的20％。
樂山雷達挑起監測中共彈道飛彈的重任，國防部今年編列23億7千多萬元的維持費用，國民黨立委鄭正鈐和呂玉玲分別提案凍結10％預算。"
立委不能投親中的藍色國民黨白色民眾黨，否則就是自取滅亡:
"With the proposed increase, Taiwan’s baseline defense spending is set to account for slightly below 2% of GDP in 2024, or 2.5% including the special budget. That is well below the 3.5% of GDP that the U.S. spent last year on its military, and less than others in the region.
Singapore, another island country whose military trains in Taiwan, spends 2.8% of its GDP on defense. South Korea, which like Taiwan lives next to a threatening authoritarian neighbor, spends 2.7% while also benefiting from a large U.S. military presence. "
