進入網路世紀, 中國特有體驗也從糧票升級到房票了...

"綜合中華網財經等媒體報導,武漢市房管局28日發布「關於加強購房資格管理工作的通知(徵求意見稿)」意見的公告,徵求意見時間至8月6日。這項通知被業界戲稱「武漢進入憑票買房的時代」。"

cna.com.tw/news/acn/2021073000

一邊緊控買方市場一邊賣方破產上升的恐怖房市氣球遊戲...

"亞洲旅宿大數據研究院統計發現,中國近三年聲請破產的房企呈現上升趨勢,二○一九年有三七七家房企宣告破產,二○二○年有四七○家,今年才過七個月,宣告破產房企已達二四九家。

該研究院首席分析師高松元表示,聲請破產的絕大多數為地方型小房企,二四九家中,廣東省數量最多、達四十六家,其次為江蘇的廿一家、浙江二十家;按過去經驗,下半年破產房企會更多,進入八月第一天,就有雲南新立邦房地產開發公司、天津松江興業房地產開發公司、天津松江恆泰房地產開發公司三業者聲請破產。

儘管宣告破產大部分是中小型房企,但A股五十家已披露半年業績預報的上市房企中,也有近半預告虧損。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/14

"在此之前,中國監管機關目標,主要是包括萬達、安邦、復星和海航等在海外大肆併購的集團,然而,沒想到恆大才是金融體系最薄弱的一環,而且很可能傷害到中國在疫情後的經濟復甦。壓力爆發的關鍵在2020年12月,文件顯示,恆大集團主要境內子公司恆大地產有2057億人民幣的未償還商業票據,成為中國應付票據存續規模最高的房企。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

這些外資要當恆大的接盤俠也不錯啦,親中外韭死一個是一個~^^

[ The widening regulatory crackdown that sparked a big selloff last month in the shares of internet-technology and education companies has also weighed on Chinese credit markets, pushing down prices of even investment-grade bonds. The moves show China is getting more serious about reining in companies whose business practices are seen at odds with national priorities. Investors are now actively looking for sectors that might be next in the crosshairs.

“A lot of the tension is focused on the property sector, and it’s really been driven by [China’s] policy,” ]

wsj.com/articles/chinas-corpor

外媒很關注恆大欸~

"路透報導,港交所公告,中國恒大利潤主要構成為:房地產開發業務虧損約為人民幣40億元,恒大汽車虧損約為人民幣48億元,出售持有恆騰網絡部分股份及持有其其餘股份按市價估值之盈利合計約人民幣185億元。...

...目前正深陷財務風暴的中國恒大集團,近期傳出將賣房籌錢。彭博引述消息表示,恒大有意出售其位於香港灣仔的集團總部大樓中國恒大中心,喊價約20億美元,以紓緩財困。據稱有兩家公司正與恒大談判,尚未作出任何決定。"

money.udn.com/money/story/5604

不准唱空政策出檯後,恆大就坦率說準備要違約了:

"恆大股價也因財務暴雷,今年已下跌71%。

《彭博》報導,恆大正出售上市電動汽車和物業管理部門的股權與資產,並積極尋求新投資者,挹注資金。恆大坦承,部分房地產開發應付款項逾期,導致部分項目停工,目前公司正在與供應商和建築承包商談判以恢復工作,會盡最大的努力按計劃完工。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

不是財經網美貼文還真不知道恆大金服爆了的傳聞....

"聽說欠了八兆台幣 大約3000多億美金"

pttweb.tw/s/3QDuPe

前幾天被接連調降評等的新聞或許是傳聞肇因之一?

「9月6日星期一,評級機構穆迪又調降了恆大及其子公司的評級,理由是:“在違約的情況下,恆大債權人獲得賠償的前景不佳”。周二,國際第三大評級機構惠譽緊隨其他評級機構的腳步,也給恆大降了級。自2021年年初以來,恆大股價的下跌幅度超過了75%,恆大的股價及其債券的價值因而跌到了它2015年時的水平,尤其是那些應該在2023年償還的債券。」

rfi.fr/tw/%E5%B0%88%E6%AC%84%E

骨牌效應。

"惠譽表示,恆大5720億人民幣的貸款為銀行等金融機構持有,但銀行或許對恆大的供應商有間接曝險,這些供應商的商品和服務欠款6670億元人民幣。

惠譽說:「對恆大或其他脆弱開發商曝險較大的小型銀行,可能面臨不良貸款大幅增加,這取決於涉及恆大的信貸事件如何發展。」"

cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202109150

房地產與家庭財富的高度重疊讓整個泡沫破滅的地產業成了燙手山芋。

"Currently, more than three-quarters of household wealth in China is tied up in real estate, and Beijing has a strong incentive to make sure that such wealth doesn’t go down in an exploding bubble. A collapse of Evergrande could be detrimental to property values, which would deal a blow to consumer wealth and in turn lead to a slowdown in consumption and investment, in addition to other consequences. Because the CCP has focused its attention on de-risking the property sector and other developers have done good jobs of reducing their debt burdens so far, it should reduce the effect of an Evergrande collapse. Nonetheless, the firm is so big that this ripple effect is possible."

thediplomat.com/2021/09/is-chi

看到這些數字才對影響規模有些具體概念...

"恆大員工達20萬人,在中國數百座城市中有數千個開發項目,間接影響380萬人就業,恆大破產不僅衝擊數百萬購房者,以及大量供應商、建築商的利益,還將重創就業市場,尤其恆大負債涉及超過128家銀行與121家非銀行機構,恆大倒閉也將重創中國金融市場和金融系統的穩定。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

「在更早之前,中共在歷經2014因為限購令等因素造成房價出現明顯跌幅後,還是選擇飲鴆止渴又走上依賴房地產拉動經濟的老路才是今天這個局面的禍首。從2016開始,中共想出的新方法是搞更新類似西方貧民區的棚戶改造,雖然在手上法是更有創意。

這類的棚戶改造是由國家開發銀行領頭,提供進行改造的融資。具體進行的方式是拆除原來居民的棚戶,並以每平方米約3000人民幣的價格給予補償,但這個補償的金額不是直接撥給居民,而是撥到一個第三方託管帳戶。然後在棚戶居民選好要購買哪一棟新的在原址改好的公寓後,帳戶的款項便直接付給開發商。同時購買搬入新公寓的居民還能獲得一個當地的戶口。雖然帶頭貸款的是國開行,但該行也是依靠人民銀行提供的低息融資,從2015年中到2017年底,人民銀行便提供了大概2兆人民幣的貸款給各地這類的項目。各地方政府擁有的商業銀行也跟進提供了大量資金。

換言之,直到貿易戰和美中對抗開始前,是中共自己主動養大這個已經變成怪獸的房地產泡沫來換取光鮮亮麗的短期經濟成長,而不是去進行代價高昂的痛苦改革來調整經濟體質,才造成今天這個無法收拾的局面。」

voicettank.org/%E6%81%86%E5%A4

這麼大的危機事件, 即使沒有一整套完整解決方案, 好歹也要表個態吧? 但北京當局到目前為止都是作壁上觀, 好像在等最大尋租利益出現, 比外資更像外人.

“we think it is imperative for the government to provide clear communication on the plan regarding Evergrande and to shore up confidence among home buyers, suppliers and contractors, banks and other nonbank financial institutions,”

wsj.com/articles/chinas-regula

今天傳出以海航模式處理的最新傳聞:

"《Asia Markets》報導,中國政府消息人士透露,中國政府正在介入恆大債務危機,恆大有可能被分成三個實體,最終決定或將在幾天內宣布。

報導指出,房地產巨頭有可能轉變為國有企業;根據消息人士透露,這項協議的用意在於保護購買恆大房產的一般民眾,以及恆大財富的投資人,最重要的是防止恆大破產對中國經濟的衝擊,這項重組計畫與恆大5年期債券利息到期日有關。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

不曉得匯豐踩得有多深...

"對於這波中國地產股崩跌,凱爾巴斯在推特上用「banking crisis」是一語雙關,除了銀行因為放款給地產公司而慘遭倒帳的危機之外,從他標記匯豐銀行就暗示著,這些銀行還可能涉嫌非法貸款、超貸給這些地產公司,恐面臨司法上的調查和整肅,是另一種的「banking crisis」。"

【恆大們出列!一天暴跌87%不能再高了 華爾街大佬點名香港這家銀行涉超貸】
出處:信傳媒( cmmedia.com.tw/home/articles/2 )

對匯豐執行長的空虛發言只想翻白眼:

「據報導,匯豐資產管理部門、貝萊德、瑞銀等公司一直是恆大債券的最大持有者。根據《彭博》彙編數據,匯豐約持有2億美元的恆大美元債券。」

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

WSJ這篇新加坡出的稿被不救派認為是證明:

[ The officials characterized the actions being ordered as “getting ready for the possible storm,” saying that local-level government agencies and state-owned enterprises have been instructed to step in to handle the aftermath only at the last minute should Evergrande fail to manage its affairs in an orderly fashion. ]

wsj.com/articles/china-makes-p

汪浩簡單點出恆大債務危機之所以是系統性風險而非單一企業或產業問題的成因:

「中國房地產是中國經濟支柱產業,穩增長必備:拉動GDP三成,貢獻財政四成,創造信用五成,是中國經濟內循環的核心動力。房地產的問題,絕不只是來自房地產,而是中國經濟增長模式、貨幣發行模式、信用創造模式、財政運行模式、國家和社會治理模式等種種問題的集中表現。 隨著人口懸崖和債務大爆發,房地產不斷的金融化,成為債務密集度畸高的行業。從拿地到開發,基本上都是依靠債務--房企開發貸+居民按揭貸。

中國的債務型經濟增長模式,經過金融深化與金融自由化,已經具備所有金融危機的動因。 中國房地產的高槓桿屬性,銀行放貸失控火上澆油,房價上漲抵押物升值會進一步助推銀行加大放貸,甚至主動說服客戶抵押貸、放槓桿。在世界歷史上,歷次房地產泡沫中銀行業都深陷其中,房地產危機既是金融危機也是經濟危機。」

fountmedia.io/article/129565?f

這篇認為當中國政府意識到投資效益低下後試圖用提高內需拉抬效益, 當投資集中於房市開始過熱後又嘗試以三條紅線等政策降溫, 於是地產開發商龍頭就這麼卡住了:

"Since 2008, it has needed ever more debt to deliver the same increment to economic output. Between 2008 and 2019, total debt—government, household and business—rose from 169% to 306% of gross domestic product, but GDP growth fell from 10% to 6%. Productivity growth adjusted for the expanding stock of buildings, machinery and other capital was 2.6% a year from 2000 to 2010. It has been negative since 2015, a sign of how inefficient much of that investment has been.

A few years ago Beijing recognized this model was unsustainable and has sought in fits and starts to shift to “higher quality” growth more dependent on consumers. That process was bound to be disruptive; indeed, it triggered a disorderly devaluation of the yuan in 2015, but it did succeed in slowing the buildup of debt.

Last year, to tide the economy through the pandemic, credit was loosened again. Yet Chinese officials see soaring housing prices as a threat to financial and social stability so they laid out a three-year timetable for lending to the red-hot property sector to be reined in. Just as the Federal Reserve’s interest-rate increases eventually popped the U.S. housing bubble over a decade ago, those regulatory restrictions, with a lag, popped China’s, said Gene Ma, head of China research at the Institute for International Finance. Evergrande was an early casualty since it is one of the most leveraged developers, he said."

wsj.com/articles/evergrandes-s

等著看金融業者能雙邊失血支援多久。

"花旗集團估計,至今年底,中國銀行系統約41%資產直接或間接與房地產有關,房價走跌恐引發銀行資產的連鎖反應。中國銀行提供給開發商及購屋者的未償付貸款估計達50兆人民幣(215.27兆台幣)。"

"知情人士披露,官員要求銀行不可全面切斷對開發商的融資,應持續對營建中的計畫提供支持,並批准購買預售屋者的抵押貸款。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

WSJ這篇用圖表具體指出中國房市泡沫與恆大事件的規模: 前者是美國2005年房市泡沫的翻倍($847 billion v. $1.6 trillion), 後者的開發項目樓地板面積總和約相當於513棟帝國大廈.

"Analysts have generally indicated an Evergrande default wouldn’t spur a crisis of confidence like the one that followed the Lehman Brothers collapse. But Evergrande is the largest property developer in a Chinese real-estate bubble that has been expanding for years. Investment over the past decade in China’s residential-property market has dwarfed the U.S. housing bubble of the 2000s, at least in terms of its share of domestic economic output."

wsj.com/articles/chinas-evergr

中國房市的危機點: 大城市以外的房地產仰賴泡沫支撐.

"But property construction in smaller cities ran well ahead of demand from prospective occupants for the last five years in China, leaving the market increasingly dependent on speculators and investors to buy properties, said Logan Wright, China markets research director at Rhodium Group, a research firm based in New York. About 21% of homes in urban China were already vacant in 2017, which equated to 65 million empty units, according to data from China Household Finance Survey."

wsj.com/articles/evergrande-ch

? 結果在恆大之後爆的竟然是一間完全沒聽過的中國地產商...

[ 惠誉将花样年的评级从“B”调降至“CCC-”并警告称,该公司财务状况存在不确定性,面临无法在周一偿还2.08亿美元的一个更受瞩目的国际债券的“重大”风险。

不过,最初的警报是由媒体报道引发的,媒体报道称花样年错过了9月28日到期的一笔1亿美元款项支付,这笔款项本应支付给那些对私人债券行使所谓“看跌”期权的债券持有人。" ]

reuters.com/article/china-prop

比較吃驚WSJ這麼快能抓出花樣年的資料來, 該不會把中國前一百大的地產商資料都備好了吧...

"When compared with Evergrande, Fantasia is significantly smaller in size. Its sales in the first nine months of 2021 ranked 73rd among its domestic peers, while Evergrande was in third place, according to a market report by research firm CricChina."

wsj.com/articles/chinese-luxur

不知道野村的預估是否包含影子銀行部位。

「野村預估,截至今年6月,中國開發商的債務已達5.2兆美元(約新台幣147.1兆)。最高比例為銀行貸款佔46%,債券市場則大約佔10%,包括相當於 2170億美元(約新台幣6.1兆)的美元債券,其中許多是垃圾債券。」

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

看樣子應該是有包括在內。

“The real-estate giants have borrowed not only from banks but also from shadow-banking outfits known as trust companies and from individuals who put their savings into investments called wealth-management products. Abroad, they became a mainstay of international junk-bond markets, offering juicy yields to get deals done.”

wsj.com/articles/beyond-evergr

趙君朔這集把最近的恆大危機連帶影響整理得很詳細:

youtu.be/GD2xrNTtxjw

中國開發商危機名單新增佳兆業集團:

"Kaisa’s tumble takes its shares’ year-to-date losses to nearly 73% amid growing investor concerns about Chinese developers’ ability to refinance or repay billions of dollars in debt. Fitch and S&P Global Ratings both downgraded the already junk-rated Kaisa in October to CCC-plus, near the bottom of their ratings scales, citing refinancing risk."

wsj.com/articles/chinese-devel

驚訝聯準會發這個示警:

「有鑒於中國經濟與金融系統的規模,以及其與世界其餘地方的廣大貿易連結,在風險情緒惡化之下,中國的金融壓力可能會讓全球金融市場感到緊張,對全球經濟成長構成風險,進而影響美國。」

cna.com.tw/news/aopl/202111090

報告只有85頁, 恆大部分在第65頁:

"Stresses in China’s real estate sector could strain the Chinese financial system, with
possible spillovers to the United States

In China, business and local government debt remain large; the financial sector’s leverage is
high, especially at small and medium-sized banks; and real estate valuations are stretched. In
this environment, the ongoing regulatory focus on leveraged institutions has the potential to
stress some highly indebted corporations, especially in the real estate sector, as exemplified by
the recent concerns around China Evergrande Group. Stresses could, in turn, propagate to
the Chinese financial system through spillovers to financial firms, a sudden correction of real
estate prices, or a reduction in investor risk appetite. Given the size of China’s economy and
financial system as well as its extensive trade linkages with the rest of the world, financial
stresses in China could strain global financial markets through a deterioration of risk sentiment, pose risks to global economic growth, and affect the United States."

federalreserve.gov/publication

有些理解為何此時示警了:

"In total, Chinese junk borrowers have about $197 billion of dollar debt outstanding, Goldman Sachs analysts have estimated. That means the ICE BofA index covers a little more than half of that total debt, implying the full losses for investors are considerably larger."

"Including cash from bond interest payments, the index has generated a total return of minus 28% so far this year, putting it on course for its worst performance since 2008. But this year’s selloff is much bigger in dollar terms, affecting far more investors. The total face value of the ICE BofA Asian Dollar High Yield Corporate China Issuers Index was just $3.2 billion at the end of 2008."

wsj.com/articles/chinese-junk-

恆大的許家印還算肯負責的:

"報導指出,恆大在過去3天內總共出售了在香港上市的恆騰網絡集團有限公司約5.7%的股份,總計籌集約1.45億美元資金。上個月,恆大傳出出售兩架私人飛機,套現5000多萬美元。

在此之前,恆大於9月間出售了盛京銀行17.5億股的股份,取得99.93億元資金;恆大創辦人許家印日前傳出,已賣掉香港豪宅,用以償還已到期的債務。"

cna.com.tw/news/acn/2021110900

繼明天系後, 中植系也要萎了嗎? 第一次聽到有人做皮拉提斯做到死的...

"報導稱,中植集團旗下有金融投資、併購、財富管理、新金融四大業務板塊,核心金融平台包括中融信託;四大財富公司-恆天財富、新湖財富、大唐財富、高晟財富,其中恆天財富規模曾破萬億;還有726億人民幣規模的公募-中融基金以及數百家的私募。這些平台中,中融信託與四大財富公司一直被公認為的「中植系」彈藥庫。"

ec.ltn.com.tw/article/breaking

中植拖了兩年後終於不支倒地:

"致歉信顯示,中植集團出險後聘請仲介機構進行全面清產核資,初步調查發現,集團總資產帳面金額約2000億元,但由於集團資產集中於債權和股權投資,存續時間長,清收難度大,預計可回收金額低,流動性枯竭,資產減值情況嚴重。

其次,中植集團債務規模巨大,剔除保證金後相關負債本息規模約為4200億至4600億元。這也代表,中植資不抵債至少2200億元。"

cna.com.tw/news/acn/2023112303

中植集團的倒下會造成多少漣漪就看表外負債牽連規模了:

"Zhongzhi caters mainly to wealthy investors, typically requiring its clients to invest the equivalent of at least $420,000 in its products, according to marketing documents for several funds seen by the Journal. The firm offered annual returns of around 7% to 8% last year, the documents show. There were few limits on what these funds could invest in.

中植的產品服務主要是迎合富裕投資者的需求,據《華爾街日報》看到的一些基金的營銷文件,客戶選購中植產品時的投資額通常需要達到至少約42萬美元。文件顯示,中植去年提供的年回報率約為7%至8% 。而這些中植基金在選擇投資標的方面幾乎沒有任何限制。"

cn.wsj.com/articles/%E4%B8%AD%

Follow

小翠這集解說何以中植能迅速破產清算而恆大不能的緣由:

youtu.be/N8Fs2V2ubtM

以中植規模能在兩個月內進入破產清算堪稱快刀斬亂麻:

"Investment products offered by Chinese trust companies often had a wide remit, allowing them to put their money in bank deposits, buy stocks or even invest in other trust products. But some trust companies also built exposure to two groups of borrowers that have been badly hit in recent years: real-estate developers and China’s beleaguered local governments.

中國信託公司提供的投資產品之前通常涉及廣闊領域,可以把資金放進銀行存款、購買股票,甚或投資於其他信託產品。但一些信託公司也建立了對兩類借款人的敞口,一是房地產開發商,二是陷入困境的中國地方政府,這兩者近年來已遭受嚴重衝擊。

In 2022, Zhongrong’s trust funds held 11% of their assets in the property sector, according to the company’s annual report. Dozens of Chinese property developers have defaulted or missed payments on their own debt, and in many cases their investors still haven’t recovered any of their initial investment.

據中融的年報,2022年,該公司11%的信託資產分佈在房地產領域。數十家中國房地產開發商已違約或拖欠債務,很多時候,投資者仍未收回任何初始投資。"

cn.wsj.com/articles/%E4%B8%AD%

中國用恆大開始年前清理掃雷:

"恆大集團是中國大型房地產開發商,前年初開始陷入債務危機後,一直嘗試與境外債權人商討債務重組協議,但最終無法達成,債權人向高院申請清盤令,而法庭經過多次延宕審訊後,今早終於頒下清盤令。"

cna.com.tw/news/acn/2024012900

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